tehran_tala/docs/parity/CHANGELOG.md

# CHANGELOG — parity changes

Every change made to `gold-banking-monorepo` during the parity project, with the
reason and the reference path that justifies it.

Format:

```
## <date> — <phase> — <group title>
- **What:** <the change>
- **Why:** <the parity gap it closes>
- **Reference:** <henza_* path:line>
- **Target:** <gold-banking-monorepo path:line>
- **Matrix row:** <id in 01-ADMIN-MATRIX.md / 02-APPS-MATRIX.md>
- **Commit:** <sha>
```

---

## 2026-09-21 — Phase 0 — Setup

- **What:** Created branch `parity/phase-0` and `docs/parity/` scaffolding
  (`PROGRESS.md`, `ISSUES.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`).
- **Why:** Persistent state required by `CLAUDE.md` §6.
- **Reference:** n/a
- **Target:** `docs/parity/`
- **Matrix row:** n/a

_No source code changed in Phase 0 (read-only phase)._

---

## 2026-09-22 — Security hotfix, stage 1 — close the unauthenticated write paths

Branch `parity/security-hotfix`. Authorised by the user's rulings D7, T1–T3.

### 1. Ledger routes are admin-only (SEC-09)

- **What:** removed the controller-level `@Public()` from `AccountingController`
  and gave each route a rid: `wallet.list` (balance), `wallet.charge`
  (reconcile), `document.create` (both repayments), `document.list.confirm`
  (confirm entry).
- **Why:** four of the five routes WRITE to the ledger and were reachable with no
  token at all. Faithful to the reference, whose entire admin route file is
  unauthenticated, but contrary to confirmed decision D1.
- **Reference:** `henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272` (the `auth:api` wrapper is
  commented out at both ends)
- **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts`
- **Breakage check:** `api.getBalance()` is the only app-side consumer and it has
  **zero call sites** in either user app (dead code, already logged as DEAD-01/02).

### 2. Order status change is admin-only (SEC-10)

- **What:** moved `@Public()` from the class to the two customer-facing handlers,
  leaving `PATCH orders/:id/status` behind `order.list.sts.submit`.
- **Why:** it let an anonymous caller move any order's status **and** attribute
  the change to any admin through the DTO's `actorAdminUserId`.
- **Reference:** an admin operation; the admin panel posts to `admin/orders/status`
  (`apps/admin-panel/src/api/endpoints.ts:42,48`), so this route had no caller.
- **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts`
- **Still public:** `POST /orders` and `GET /orders/:id`, because the target has
  no customer session yet — closed in stage 2.

### 3. `GET /customers` no longer leaks the customer book (SEC-08)

- **What:** added `LOGIN_LOOKUP_SELECT` (`id`, `mobile`, `isActive`,
  `isArchived`) and pointed `list()` at it. Removed `fullName`, `nationalCode`,
  `goldDebtGrams`, `fiatDebtRial`, `goldCreditLimitGrams`, `verificationStep`,
  `cityId`, `referredByAgentId`, `nationalIdImageUrl`, `businessLicenseUrl`,
  `shopImageUrl`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt` from that response.
- **Why:** the route is unauthenticated because both apps match the phone number
  in the browser, so it shipped every customer's national ID number, debts,
  credit limit and identity-document URLs to any visitor.
- **Reference:** login was `POST userAuth` → SMS → `POST userVerfiy`, returning
  exactly one customer after the code matched
  (`henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ApiMobileController.php:39-78`).
- **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/customers/customers.service.ts`,
  plus `CustomerSummary` narrowed in **both** apps' `src/api/client.ts`
  (parity rule: the same logic change in both).
- **Route survives** until stage 2 replaces the client-side phone match with OTP.

### 4. Test script

- **What:** added `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh` — asserts 401 without a token,
  403 with a low-privilege token, and pass-through for a super admin, on every
  closed route; plus that the public routes still answer 200 and that
  `GET /customers` exposes only the four login fields.
- **Result:** **23 passed, 0 failed** against a live server and the dev seed.

### Not changed

`/uploads` — per ruling T2, uploaded files including identity documents stay
public. The filename check requested alongside it passed with no changes needed
(md5 of time + name + UUID; no directory listing).

---

## 2026-09-22 — Security hotfix, stage 2 — real customer sessions

Branch `parity/security-hotfix`. Authorised by D6, D7, T1 and T3.

Stage 1 narrowed `GET /customers` but, as the user pointed out, did not close
the leak: the response still carried every customer **id**, and
`/customers/:id`, `/:id/orders` and `/:id/ledger-entries` were still public — so
two requests still reconstructed the whole book. Stage 2 removes the id-bearing
surface entirely.

### 1. Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1)

- **New:** `src/modules/customer-auth/` — `CustomerJwtStrategy` (passport
  strategy `'customer-jwt'`), `CustomerJwtGuard`, `@CustomerAuth()`,
  `@CurrentCustomer()`.
- Signed with **`JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET`**, separate from `JWT_SECRET`, and every
  token carries **`typ: 'customer'`** which the strategy verifies. Either check
  alone would be enough; both are present deliberately.
- Customer state is re-read from the DB on every request, so deactivating or
  archiving a customer takes effect at once rather than at token expiry.
- **Reference:** the same split existed there — `auth:api` for admins,
  `auth('api-customer')` for the app.

### 2. Real OTP (D6)

- **New table `CustomerOtp`** (migration `20260922000000_customer_otp`,
  additive: one new table, nothing existing touched).
- `POST /api/customer/auth/request-otp` ← `ApiMobileController::userAuth` (:39-49)
- `POST /api/customer/auth/verify-otp` ← `ApiMobileController::userVerfiy` (:51-64)
- **Parity behaviour:** the 4-digit `rand(1000,9999)` range, the
  active-customer filter, `Utility::faTOen()` digit normalisation on both the
  number and the code, and rejection on mismatch.
- **Deliberate improvements over the reference** (user-approved, recorded in
  DECISIONS.md so the matrix does not flag them later):
  - the code is stored as a **bcrypt hash**, never plain text;
  - it **expires** after 2 minutes (the reference's never did);
  - **5 attempts** per challenge, then lockout (the reference had no limit);
  - **single use** — a consumed code cannot be replayed;
  - **send throttle**: 60s cooldown per number, 5 per number and 20 per IP per
    10 minutes, counted off the table so it survives restarts;
  - **no enumeration** — an unregistered number returns the same `{sent:true}`.
    The reference's `firstOrFail()` leaked a 404 for unknown numbers.
- No SMS gateway exists in this project (STUB-02), so the code is logged in
  non-production only and the message is persisted as an `SmsMessage` row. The
  reference's message text is kept verbatim for when a gateway lands.

### 3. The id-bearing customer routes are gone

- **Deleted** `customers.controller.ts` — with it `GET /customers`,
  `/customers/:id`, `/:id/orders`, `/:id/ledger-entries`.
- **Replaced by** `/api/customer/me`, `/me/orders`, `/me/ledger-entries`, which
  take the id **from the token**. There is no longer any route that accepts a
  customer id, so the IDOR is closed structurally rather than by a check.
- `CustomersService` stays and is reached only through those routes.
- The admin panel was unaffected — it uses `admin/customers-omde/*`.

### 4. Both apps migrated together (parity rule)

- `stores/session.ts`: `token` is now the credential and `isLoggedIn` is
  token-based. `customerId` is kept for display only and is no longer an
  identity claim.
- `api/client.ts`: sends `Authorization: Bearer`, throws `UnauthorizedError` on
  401 and calls the handler registered in `main.ts`, which clears the session
  and routes to login so stale personal data cannot stay on screen.
- `LoginView.vue`: real two-step OTP. Each app keeps its own markup and styling;
  only the logic changed, and it is identical in both.
- The four account screens now call `getMe()` / `getMyOrders()` /
  `getMyLedgerEntries()`; router guards test `isLoggedIn`.

### Tests

- `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh` extended with the stage-2 assertions:
  **46 passed, 0 failed** against a live server — old routes 404, customer
  routes 401 without a token, wrong/reused code 401, correct code 200, throttle
  429, no enumeration, customer token rejected on admin routes and admin token
  rejected on customer routes, no id-bearing surface, and `/customer/me`
  returning the token's own customer.
- **jest installed** (dev-only, user-approved) with `jest.config.cjs`, so
  `pnpm test` works for the first time: **7 passed** covering `faToEn`.
  `faToEn` moved to its own `digits.ts` so it can be tested without booting Nest.
- Typecheck clean on api, user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.

---

## 2026-09-22 — Security hotfix, stage 3 — SEC-02 (orders) + OTP audit

Branch `parity/security-hotfix`. The user declined to defer SEC-02 to Phase 2:
a public `POST /orders` taking `customerId` from the body let anyone place an
order on any customer's account, and an order lands on that customer's **gold
debt and ledger**. That is a money hole, so it is closed here.

### 1. `POST /orders` is customer-authenticated

- **What:** the route is behind `@CustomerAuth()`. `OrdersService.createOrder`
  now takes `customerId` as a **separate argument**, supplied by the controller
  from the token. The body's `customerId` is ignored entirely; a mismatch is
  logged (`OrdersService` warn) and the token always wins.
- `CreateOrderDto.customerId` and the shared `CreateOrderDto` are **optional**,
  so both apps keep validating while they still send it. Removed in Phase 2.
- **Reference:** `ApiMobileController::setOrder` read `auth()->id()`
  (henza_server:533) behind the `api-customer` guard — this restores that.
- **Admin path unaffected:** `AdminOrdersService` places orders *for* a selected
  customer and passes that id explicitly; its route is admin-guarded.

### 2. `GET /orders/:id` is scoped to the owner

- `getOwnedById(orderId, customerId)` matches on both, and a miss is **404, not
  403** — a 403 would confirm the id exists, the same enumeration leak the old
  `/customers/:id` routes had. A nonexistent id and someone else's id are
  indistinguishable.
- Operators use the new `GET /orders/admin/:id` behind rid `order.list`.
  Declared **before** `:id` because Nest matches in declaration order.

### 3. Both apps

- `CartView.vue` in **both** apps now gates on `session.isLoggedIn` (the token)
  rather than on a remembered `customerId`, which is no longer a credential.

### 4. OTP audit (user request 3)

- **No master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code** anywhere in the API or either
  app — verified by grep for `master.?code|bypass|backdoor|1111|0000|1234|skipOtp|DEV_OTP|TEST_OTP`.
  Exactly one code path issues a token, and only after `bcrypt.compare`.
- **SMS provider: none.** No gateway is wired up (STUB-02). In development the
  code is logged once via `Logger`, guarded by `NODE_ENV !== 'production'`.
- **Fixed while auditing:** `deliver()` persisted the real message text — with
  the code in it — into `SmsMessage.body`, which the admin SMS grid both lists
  and full-text searches (`admin-misc.service.ts:135-136`). Any operator with
  the `sms` rid could read live OTP codes, defeating the point of hashing
  `codeHash`. The persisted row is now a redacted audit line; the real text is
  built for the future gateway and not stored. The 9 test rows created during
  this session were deleted.

### Tests

`apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh` extended again — **53 passed, 0 failed**:
order routes 401 without a token, a spoofed body `customerId` ignored in favour
of the token, own order readable, unknown/foreign order id 404, and the admin
order route rejecting a customer token while admitting an admin one.
Typecheck clean on api, user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types.