Production build of both customer apps for f441ca8 (appearance settings,
dark mode, reduced motion, product morph, filter sheet). The API,
admin-panel and shared-types builds are unchanged: none of their sources
changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Applies to both user-app and user-app-v2. Logic and structure are shared;
each app keeps its own look.
Appearance settings
- New "تنظیمات ظاهری" page (/settings/appearance), opened from the
dashboard and available without login. It offers a light/dark/system
theme and a "fast & light" motion switch.
- appearanceStore saves the choice to localStorage. A small inline boot
script in index.html applies it before first paint so there is no
white flash. The "system" option follows OS changes live.
- New ToggleSwitch component.
Dark mode
- Theme LESS tokens now compile to CSS custom properties. Light/dark
values come from a generated virtual:palette.css (themeConfig/
appearance.ts, with colors.json + new colors.dark.json).
- New LESS alpha() plugin replaces fade() on theme tokens.
- New semantic tokens: page, onInk, heroSurface, hairlineStrong,
photoMat, photoStage.
- The dark palette is layered (page < card < panel < border) so
surfaces separate without shadows.
- Hard-coded colors were replaced by tokens according to their role.
- antd inputs/text get dark overrides; vant uses its own
.van-theme-dark.
- Light mode looks the same as before.
Reduced motion
- With html.motion-reduced, transitions are capped at 120ms, keyframe
loops stop, and backdrop blurs and permanent will-change are dropped.
- Spinners and the toast progress bar (which closes the toast) are
exempt via .keep-motion.
- Carousel autoplay, the v1 Lottie and the product morph honor the
setting.
Product detail
- Opening a product is now a container-transform morph from the tapped
card (ProductMorph). It replaces the bottom Drawer and uses composited
transform/opacity only.
- The detail view is seeded with the card's data, so it no longer
opens blank and jumps.
Filters and sheets
- Filters are now a full-width bottom sheet. Selections stay a draft
until applied, so the result list no longer re-renders while
dragging the slider.
- DropDown collapse animates grid-template-rows instead of a capped
max-height.
- v2 IslandSheet is restyled to the v2 design language (API unchanged).
Fixes
- filtersStore.reset() shallow-copied shared arrays, so clearing the
filters never cleared the selected brands.
Remove DialogVant/NotifyVant and add Toast and Sheet components with
useToast, useReveal, and usePageTransition composables. Rework
Navigation, RegisterView, and styles across both apps; rebuild dist assets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1. "0. Quick start — run these in order" at the top of DELIVERY.md: five steps
from an empty machine to a verified running stack, copy-pasteable, with no
decisions to make. Covers which env vars must have a value (and how to
generate the two JWT secrets), `pnpm build:release` BEFORE
`docker compose build`, what the boot log should say, which banner is
expected and which means a step was missed, and how to run the end-to-end
check. Every command in it was executed verbatim to confirm it works.
2. "Before the real release" replaces the old three-item list:
- A. blocking config: real JWT_SECRET and a SEPARATE JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET,
remove OTP_MASTER_CODE, configure the SMS credentials
- B. credentials the reference leaked and that must be rotated (SEC-12,
SEC-06) — same live accounts, never copied into this repo
- C. parity work not finished: admin (financial documents, users and
permissions incl. the still-open PERM-01, reports) and apps (MON-08 first,
then STUB-05 SMS recipients, STUB-04, STUB-03, analytics), pointing at
ISSUES.md for the rest
Also removed the obsolete `version:` key from docker-compose.yml, which printed
a deprecation warning on every compose command and made the checklist's output
noisy. Config re-validated.
Verified after these changes: container bundle is byte-identical to the local
release build (sha256 match), and that container was re-tested end to end:
compose e2e 32/32, complete-profile 38/38, report 40/40, expert login 36/36.
Locally: jest 54/54, build 5/5, typecheck clean on all four apps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by running the delivery flow against the actual built container rather
than a local dev process.
DEPLOY-02 (Critical) — ADMIN LOGIN RETURNED 500 FOR EVERY USER IN DOCKER.
docker-compose.yml passes each optional variable as ${X:-}, so an unconfigured
one arrives as "" rather than undefined. The code read them with
`process.env.X ?? 'default'`, which only falls back on undefined, so the empty
string reached jsonwebtoken and it threw
"expiresIn" should be a number of seconds or string representing a timespan
on every sign. Invisible to every existing suite, all of which run against a
local process where the variable is genuinely absent.
Added src/common/env.ts (envOr / envOrNull), which treat blank as unset, and
applied it to every auth, port, upload and SMS read. Three were not cosmetic:
a blank UPLOAD_DIR would have served static files from the FILESYSTEM ROOT, a
blank PORT would have bound a random ephemeral port (Number('') === 0), and a
blank JWT_SECRET would have become the verifying key. Recorded as D25, with a
standing rule to use these readers instead of `??`.
Pinned by src/common/env.spec.ts (9 tests), which reproduces the original throw
against the real jsonwebtoken and asserts the reader can no longer produce it.
DEPLOY-03 (process, documented) — the API image is `COPY release/ ./`, so it
ships a bundle pre-built on the developer machine. `docker compose build` will
happily produce an image from a STALE release/app.js and report success; at the
start of this run that bundle was four days old and the rebuilt container was
missing every route added since. DELIVERY.md's deploy section now leads with
`pnpm build:release`.
New: scripts/test-compose-e2e.cjs — the whole delivery flow against the built
container, over HTTP only, as a black box: a sales expert and an ordinary
customer both sign in with the master code, both place an order, both orders
appear in the admin grid and open there, and the three token boundaries still
hold in the deployed image. 32/32.
Verified: compose e2e 32/32 · jest 54/54 · build 5/5 ·
against the CONTAINER: complete-profile 38/38, report 40/40, expert login 36/36 ·
locally: apps smoke 43/43, admin smoke 43/43, B2B scan 34 ok/0 broken.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ports "گزارش" end to end (D24), the last missing app page.
In the reference this feature computes nothing: Customer\TahesabController
proxies an external accounting system (hesab.henzagold.com and a bare IP at
31.7.68.147:3030) with TLS verification disabled, a bearer token hardcoded in
the source and a URL-embedded secret, keyed on Customer.mcode. The target has
no such system and no mcode, so per the owner's option الف this is built on our
own ledger with no external connection.
API — customer/me/report{,/detail,/balances,/:id}
- one row per CONFIRMED ledger entry with the running gold and rial balance
after it, newest first as the reference displayed it
- only confirmed entries count, the same rule the cached
Customer.goldDebtGrams/fiatDebtRial follow, so the statement's closing
balance agrees with the figure shown everywhere else in the app
- fields the target has no source for (foreign currency, نام کارساخته,
جنس فلز, the external system's internal ids) are null/zero and the UI OMITS
the row rather than rendering a fabricated value (REP-01)
SEC-16, NOT ported: the reference's detail($id) took the factor code from the
URL and performed no ownership check at all — it never consults auth() — so any
signed-in customer could read any other customer's document by guessing a code.
Here the id is only a filter on top of a customerId scope from the token.
Tested in both directions.
Apps (both, template+script byte-identical, per-app styling only)
- ReportView with the reference's two tabs, its card rows and its «جزئیات»
modal; ReportDocument for one document
- routes /report and /report/detail, the latter opening the second tab
- dashboard entry (v1 tile, v2 row), shown to every signed-in customer since
the reference's hasMCode() gate has no target equivalent
Verified: build 5/5 · jest 45/45 · report 40/40 (new) ·
complete-profile 38/38 · apps smoke 43/43 · typecheck clean on all four apps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ports "تکمیل پروفایل" end to end (D22).
API
- POST customer/me/complete-profile — three required document ids, the
customer taken from the token, verification step set to the reference's
LIVE value (approved outright; its `= 1` line is commented out at :83 in
favour of `= 2` at :85). Both SMS messages byte-identical and non-blocking
per D20.
- POST customer/me/documents — the reference let the app upload through the
same file/create the admin used, inside its auth:api-customer group
(routes/api.php:95); the target's copy is admin-guarded, so the page could
not have uploaded at all. Reuses AdminUploadsService unchanged, so both
paths share one size limit, MIME whitelist and naming scheme (UPL-01).
- PROFILE_ADMIN_MOBILES replaces the reference's four hardcoded personal
numbers; blank means nobody is notified and the upload still succeeds.
Three reference behaviours deliberately NOT ported, all in ISSUES.md:
- SEC-14: `$customer->update($request->all())` mass-assigned the whole request
body, letting the app write its own credit limit, making charge, gold debt,
active flag or mobile. Replaced with a three-field whitelist.
- SEC-15: four real personal mobiles hardcoded in the source.
- APP-03: refresh()'s unterminated setInterval page reload.
Apps (both, template+script byte-identical, per-app styling only)
- CompleteProfileView + SingleImageUploader
- route /complete_profile, redirecting home once the documents are in, as the
reference's guard did (router/index.ts:266)
- the entry point on the profile screen, shown only while they are missing
(profile.vue:96-102)
Also (D23): JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET now warns loudly at boot when unset. It falls
back to JWT_SECRET, which signs app and admin tokens with the same key and
leaves the `typ` check as the only barrier — and an expert's app token carries
their AdminUser id in `sub`. Warn rather than refuse to boot (D19, lowest
risk); DELIVERY.md lists it as the first pre-release step (REL-03).
Verified: build 5/5 · jest 45/45 · complete-profile 38/38 (new) ·
expert login 36/36 · apps smoke 43/43 · admin smoke 43/43 ·
B2B scan 34 ok/0 broken · typecheck clean on all four apps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both expert screens are built in user-app and user-app-v2, with byte-identical
template and script and a per-app style block only — verified by diffing
everything above <style>:
ChildOrdersView "سفارش مشتریان" — legacy ChildOrders.vue. Keeps the
reference's title, search, infinite paging, and per-card item count, total
weight, customer name and the fixed «تحویل مسئول فروش» chip (the endpoint
only returns that status, ApiMobileController:766).
CustomerChoiceView "لیست مشتریان" — legacy customerChoice.vue. Keeps its
title, per-search re-query and the reference's choice to LIST inactive
customers (its active() scope is commented out at :187).
Reachable from inside the app, not just by URL: routes carry the reference's own
paths and names, the dashboard grows the two entries only for an expert (v1 as
tiles, v2 as its own rows), and a router guard sends an ordinary customer back
to their dashboard. None of that is relied on for safety — the server scopes
both endpoints on the AdminUser id in the token and answers 403 otherwise.
Not ported, both recorded in D21: the act-as api_token minting (:197-201) and
the child-order edit drawer, which recomputed an order's money from client-sent
values. The card opens a read-only summary instead.
APP-02 fixed: user-app-v2 gained getHomeSlider and now prefers admin-configured
slides, keeping its category-derived hero as the fallback and its own design.
Session stores stay byte-identical across the apps.
build 5/5, jest 45/45, expert login 36/36, apps smoke 43/43, typecheck clean.
[ref: henza_pwa/src/views/user/src/components/ChildOrders.vue, customerChoice.vue]
[ref: henza_pwa/src/router/index.ts:171-188]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A sales expert can now sign into the apps with their AdminUser account, without
reversing D17 — the expert remains an AdminUser and is never turned back into a
Customer.
The app token carries a `typ` of 'customer' or 'sales-expert'; the strategy
resolves both to one principal whose `id` is always a Customer id, so every
route already written for a customer works unchanged for an expert. That is what
the reference gave them, where an agent was a customer with extra screens.
Each expert gets ONE linked trading Customer row (additive migration, dry-run
clean and rolled back before applying) created at first sign-in, seeded from the
two numbers the reference read off the agent's own row: SalesExpertProfile
.gramLevel -> goldCreditLimitGrams and AdminUser.wagePercent ->
makingChargeOffsetPercent. Orders the expert places land there, exactly as the
reference's single row did.
New expert-only routes scope on the AdminUser id from the token:
POST expert/child-orders (legacy /order/child, ApiMobileController:759, keeping
its sts=5 filter as DELIVERED_TO_AGENT), POST expert/my-customers (legacy
/my-child, :184) and GET expert/whoami so the apps can hide the entries.
Security: jwt.strategy now rejects any token carrying an app `typ`. An expert's
app token holds their AdminUser id in `sub`, and JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET falls back
to JWT_SECRET when unset — in that configuration the token would otherwise have
validated as an admin with full panel permissions.
NOT ported: myChild minted an api_token per listed customer (:197-201), letting
an agent act AS that customer. Recorded in D21 rather than silently dropped.
Tests: new test-sales-expert-app-login.cjs 36/36 — expert sign-in, trading
account seeding, own-customers-only (with both negatives), child orders, the
expert ordering for themselves, an ordinary customer refused both screens with
their own app unaffected, and all four token boundaries including immediate
lockout on deactivation. jest 45/45, admin smoke 43/43, apps smoke 43/43,
B2B scan 34/34, B2B writes 25/25, auth-smoke 32/32.
[ref: henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ApiMobileController.php:184-195,534-535,759-781]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DEPLOY-01: docker-compose.yml passed only DATABASE_URL and PORT to the api
service, so JWT_SECRET, JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, OTP_MASTER_CODE and every SMS_TREZ_*
variable were silently dropped in Docker. A deployed build would have used the
development JWT fallback and would not have had the delivery master code at all,
so the demo login would have failed with no obvious cause. All are now forwarded,
defaulting to empty (which the code treats as unset); verified with
`docker compose config`.
TEST-01: test-sales-expert-roundtrip.cjs had localhost:3077 hardcoded and could
only connect by accident. Now defaults to the repo's API_PORT. 33/33.
DELIVERY.md documents env vars (names only), run/deploy commands, how migrations
run inside the container, the verification results and the known issues.
release/delivery contains both parity branches with no conflicts (fast-forward).
build 5/5, jest 45/45, admin smoke 43/43, apps smoke 43/43, B2B scan 34/34,
B2B writes 25/25, auth-smoke 32/32, typecheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
scan-admin-b2b.cjs (34 ok, 0 broken) hits every read endpoint the wholesale desk
uses daily. smoke-admin-b2b-writes.cjs (25/25) covers the money-touching writes:
admin order placement and a cash payment document, asserting the ledger and the
customer balance rather than the HTTP status.
Verified: the making charge computes exactly, a document is created unconfirmed,
confirming moves the gold debt, and confirming again toggles back and restores
the balance to the byte.
Retail/storefront surfaces were deliberately not scanned (D13).
No B2B breakage found. Three first-draft failures were test bugs, corrected
against the real callers: cities/list -> admin/cities/list, by-ids takes
products_id, and document type 4 is cash (2 is a transfer).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
smoke-apps.cjs walks login (master OTP), catalogue, cart cap, order placement
and order history, with the empty-order and unauthenticated negatives: 43/43.
The cart rules are executed from BOTH apps' own source so the result cannot be
carried by v1 alone.
No behavioural divergence found: all 9 stores are byte-identical, and the router,
API client and composables match except v1's protected variant-image picker.
APP-01: both apps' OTP box is exactly 4 inputs and only submits at 4, so a longer
OTP_MASTER_CODE cannot be typed into them. The login UI was left alone; main.ts
now warns at boot when the code is not 4 digits and .env.example states the rule.
APP-02 logged, not fixed: user-app-v2 has no getHomeSlider, so admin-configured
home slides show in v1 only. Changing v2's hero during a delivery is not worth
the risk.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
views/order/List.vue handed the timeline activity entry straight to
single/order-sts/edit. That entry is {status, title, proceed, uaj, note} and has
no order id, so UpdateOrderStatusDto rejected every call with 400 — neither
"ثبت وضعیت" nor "حذف وضعیت" worked on the retail order screen. Both handlers now
take the id from tempRow, matching OmdeList.vue and TaminList.vue, which were
already correct.
Found by the new scripts/smoke-admin.cjs (43/43), which walks login, customer
create, sales-expert create/edit, product+variant create/edit and order
list/detail/status, asserting the database changed rather than trusting a 200.
[ref: henza_server/routes/admin.php:59]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two live scripts against a running API, covering both halves of the master-OTP
contract:
* with OTP_MASTER_CODE set (8/8): signs in, the JWT works on customer/me,
Persian digits accepted, and the RULE E1 negatives — near-miss code,
unknown mobile, inactive customer — all still rejected.
* without it (6/6): the same code returns 401, no boot banner, a real code
still logs in, and replaying it fails.
Also confirmed from the boot log that with no SMS credentials the server starts
normally and declines to send instead of erroring (D20).
.env.example gained the auth, SMS and upload variables, names only, no values,
with OTP_MASTER_CODE marked delivery-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
D20: OTP_MASTER_CODE login bypass read only from the environment, disabled when
unset, audited on every use, with a boot banner while armed. SMS no longer
aborts the boot in production — it warns and declines silently, so no message
can stop an operation.
D19: port Utility::faTOen onto admin-entered mobiles (before the uniqueness
lookup, which could previously be bypassed with Persian digits), and the
create-only welcome SMS, byte-identical to the reference and fire-and-forget.
user-app-v2 was missing the cart stock ceiling entirely: capQty/maxQty, the
un-orderable guard and the qty clamp are ported, leaving v2's own design intact.
The two cart stores are now byte-identical. isVariantOrderable and the
orderable-first default selection ported too.
jest 45/45; typecheck clean on api, admin-panel, user-app, user-app-v2.
[ref: henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Adm/AdminController.php:333,348,364,378-387]
[ref: henza_server/app/Models/Utility.php:26]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Restores the sales-expert fields that were lost when a sales expert became
an AdminUser instead of a type=1 Customer row.
New SalesExpertProfile holds cityId, gramLevel, phone and nationalCode. A
separate table rather than columns on AdminUser, because these mean
something only for role = SALES_EXPERT. gramLevel is DECIMAL(14,4), matched
to Customer.goldCreditLimitGrams so the same credit limit has identical
precision on both tables. phone and nationalCode copy the reference exactly:
nullable, NOT unique, no format rule — createCustomer validates only mobile
and percent, and both fields are required:false on the reference form.
Inventing a uniqueness constraint would reject data the reference accepts.
reagent_id is deliberately NOT ported (D17). Every use of it in the
reference reads a CUSTOMER's reagent_id, which the target already models as
Customer.referredByAgentId. On a sales expert's own form it was a side
effect of the shared customers form: filling it removed that expert from
the selectable-agent list, because queryReagent filters on
whereNull('reagent_id'). The target's equivalent filters on role and active
only, so no agent can be dropped — strictly better than the reference.
AdminUser gains firstName/lastName with the same additive migration,
backfill and sync trigger as Customer, for all admins rather than only
sales experts. This closes D0 requirement 7, and every remaining
`fname: fullName, lname: ''` was fixed — six further sites across
admin-users, admin-comments, admin-documents, admin-orders and
admin-preorders.
listReagents now returns real city_id, city, gram_level, phone and ncode,
and left-joins so an expert without a profile still lists with empty cells
rather than vanishing. The two grid filters map through the relation. The
service upserts a profile on create and on a role change to SALES_EXPERT,
and the migration backfilled one for every existing expert.
ReagentCustomer.vue gains the four fields plus the city -> commission
autofill, ported verbatim including the reference's falsy test so a city
percent of 0 also falls through to the aux lookup (replicated, not fixed).
Tests: new sales-expert round trip 33/33, covering create with every field,
an edit form with each field populated separately, a byte-identical no-op
save, single-field edits, both grid filters with negative cases, the
left-join case and the referrer dropdown. «محمد علی» + «احمدی» survives
intact. Plus jest 32/32, auth-smoke 53/53, customer trigger 9/9, typecheck
clean on api and admin-panel. Migration dry-run twice in a rolled-back
transaction before applying; drift is zero.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner ruling: computing and displaying price / price_with_discount is retail
storefront work, so it falls under D13 and is marked out of scope. The B2B
app works in making charge only.
variant-price.ts and its 11 hand-checked tests are kept and still run, just
unused. Nothing needed reverting: computeVariantPrice was never called from
outside its own file and spec, verified by grep over apps/api/src and
apps/admin-panel/src, so no price had been wired into any screen. PRICE-01
is re-marked in ISSUES.md rather than deleted so the evidence survives if
the storefront is ever taken up.
Making-charge work stays fully in scope: percentage_pay,
makingChargeOffsetPercent, and wage display on variants and order lines.
New Phase 1 order: Persons -> products/categories/variants/order detail ->
financial documents -> users and permissions -> admin SMS -> promotions,
notifications, cities, branches, workshops -> reports -> gate. Per section:
implement the gaps, then field-by-field test that section, and show a gap
summary before fixing.
SEC-02 re-verified live rather than quoted: 9/9 assertions, plus 32/32 in
auth-smoke.sh. POST /orders is 401 without a token; a body customerId of
"customer-2" sent with a customer-dev-test token still lands the order on
customer-dev-test and is warn-logged; a foreign order id returns 404 rather
than 403 so ids stay unenumerable; the admin read rejects a customer token.
Client-supplied wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge remain as MON-08,
already scheduled as Phase 2 item #1.
Also records why the dev OTP log briefly looked broken: a stale API process
still held port 3077, so the new instance died with EADDRINUSE and the
tailed log belonged to the old process. Not a regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Answers D1's 172-vs-174 question with real counts: the catalogues hold 176
(reference) and 174 (target) unique keys, and the ENTIRE difference is the
dashboard. The reference has `dashboard` + `dashboard.omde` + `dashboard.tak`;
the target replaces all three with `dashboard.view`, because the admin
Dashboard is a PROTECTED zone that merged the two reference dashboards.
176 - 3 + 1 = 174. All 173 other keys match exactly, including the same 5
keys that legitimately appear twice in the tree.
Route-guard rids are 57 vs 57, differing only by that dashboard
consolidation plus one target-only route reusing an existing catalogue rid.
All 67 reachable reference admin routes exist in the target at the same
paths; 2 target-only routes are additive.
Three findings logged:
PRICE-01 (critical) — no product price is computed or shown anywhere in the
admin panel. The reference appends price/price_with_discount to every
variant and renders it in three places in its product list; the target's
variantRow() returns neither, nothing fetches a gold rate for the admin
list, and computeVariantPrice() — ported and unit-tested earlier today — is
called from nowhere. This is fix#1.
PERM-01 (medium) — dashboard.omde and dashboard.tak are seeded into the
permission table but absent from the permission UI, so they are grantable
yet unmanageable; the DB holds 178 distinct rids against the UI's 174. The
fix deletes permission rows, so it waits for the owner's approval.
PRICE-02 (info) — rial_pay belongs only to the superseded commented-out
formula; the target correctly omits it. Recorded so it is not "restored".
Contrary to the Phase 0 expectation, the order module is in good shape: the
gram_level credit limit matches the reference exactly including the strict
'>' comparison, and debt recognition fires at the same status.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Prisma migrate diff proposed DROP TABLE "_goldbank_migrations" because the
table exists in the database but was not declared in the schema. Declaring
it with @@ignore removes the proposal without exposing it to Prisma Client,
and the table and all its rows are kept.
Correcting the earlier DEAD-07 note: this is not a leftover from the
pre-Prisma port. It is the tracking table of the application's own
migration runner (src/prisma/migrate.ts:5), which exists because the Docker
deploy image is copy-only and ships no Prisma CLI, so migrate deploy cannot
run in the container (migrate.ts:7-13). The project therefore keeps two
ledgers deliberately: _prisma_migrations for the CLI in development, and
_goldbank_migrations for the runtime runner in the container. That runner
already filtered out any DROP of its own table (migrate.ts:190-196); the
schema declaration removes the cause rather than relying on that guard.
The practical consequence, recorded in DECISIONS.md D15: a new migration
must be safe under both paths, so its SQL stays idempotent.
The ledger grew 12 -> 14 rows while testing, with nothing deleted: starting
the API ran prepareDatabase(), which appended the two migrations applied
earlier today. Its $$-aware statement splitter handled the PL/pgSQL trigger
body correctly — trigger and function are both present and the 9 trigger
assertions pass against the live database.
Also records the UTF-8 testing rule: Persian test input must come from a
file, never a shell argument, because the Windows shell replaces Persian
characters with '?' and a test can then pass while storing '????'.
Verified: migrate diff -> "This is an empty migration" (zero drift);
migrate status -> up to date; tsc clean; 32 jest; 9 trigger assertions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Applies the two approved additive migrations and fixes every consumer.
D0 — Customer.firstName / lastName
The reference has had two columns since 2020
(2020_10_01_120430_customers_table.php:18-19); the port collapsed them, so
the edit form showed the whole name in the "first name" box and saved an
empty last name. Adds both columns, backfills first-token/rest, and keeps
fullName in sync with a customer_sync_full_name trigger. Nothing dropped.
The trigger is SQL, so Prisma cannot see it: writing the parts rebuilds
fullName, writing fullName re-derives the parts, and writing both in one
statement lets THE PARTS WIN. Documented in the migration header, the
Customer model doc comment and DECISIONS.md §D14, because a write can now
store something other than what was passed.
D9 — Customer.makingChargeOffsetPercent
Legacy customers.percent, the per-customer making-charge offset that the
app adds to the variant's making charge (henza_pwa
Mixins/product/index.ts:69-75). toRow() was returning the referring
AGENT's commission rate instead (CUST-02). DB default 0 reproduces
today's behaviour exactly, so no existing customer's price moves; the
reference's application-layer default of 3 for NEW customers
(AdminController.php:338) lives in the create form, and the field is
required on create with the reference's own message (:354).
update() and updateCredit() both accepted percent and silently discarded
it; both now persist it. Sort/filter aliases fname/lname pointed at
fullName and now point at the real columns.
SMS — Trez provider (Sms.php:57-82)
New global SmsModule/SmsService: form-urlencoded POST, 20s timeout, body
trimmed, every message persisted. send() never throws, matching the
reference, which discarded Sms::Send's result so a gateway outage never
aborted the order or approval that triggered it. The OTP text is
byte-identical, including the Android SMS Retriever markers. Credentials
come from env only; production refuses to boot without them rather than
silently locking every customer out. .env.example carries names, no values.
Admin panel: the split(' ') fallback is removed from singleCustomer.vue,
and bulkCustomer.vue defaults percent to 3, requires it, coerces the
Decimal on load so diff-send works, and only re-sends `name` when a name
part changed. ReagentCustomer.vue is untouched — its «درصد کمیسیون» is
AdminUser.wagePercent, a different field.
Tests: 32 jest (incl. 14 new SMS config/template), 9 trigger assertions,
53 auth smoke, and the full D12 round-trip on the customer entity —
«محمد علی» + «احمدی» survives create, edit, a byte-identical no-op save,
and single-field edits. Typecheck clean on api and admin-panel.
Note: migrate dev is interactive-only and could not run here, so the
migrations were applied with migrate deploy after a read-only drift check.
The only drift is the pre-existing _goldbank_migrations table, which
Prisma would DROP; it was NOT dropped (DEAD-07).
[ref: henza_server/app/Models/Sms.php, app/Http/Controllers/Adm/AdminController.php]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds computeVariantPrice(), a verbatim port of the live formula at
henza_server/app/Models/ProductVariant.php:183-190, with the per-customer
making-charge offset as an explicit input defaulting to 0. The three
superseded formulas commented out above it apply VAT to the whole price
and are deliberately not ported (D4).
11 unit tests assert against hand calculations derived from the PHP source
rather than from the implementation, covering: with and without the
offset, VAT on the non-metal portion only, floor-to-nearest-1000, the
extraPercent default of 7, and the equivalence between the app folding the
offset into percent_pay and the server deriving it. 18 tests pass overall.
Also adds the D0 name-split review report script (read-only) and two
investigations the owner asked for:
- SMS: the reference uses the Trez panel (smspanel.trez.ir, Sms.php:69,97)
with production credentials committed to git (SEC-12 — rotate them). All
12 message templates catalogued; env var names proposed; nothing
implemented pending approval.
- MON-08: henza_pwa computes percent_pay, discount and rial_pay rather
than asking the user (cart.vue:170-179, Mixins/product/index.ts:69-75),
so Phase 2 item #1 is to derive them server-side and ignore the client's
values. rash_weight stays read from the DB as a recorded deviation.
Records the owner's two new standing rules: migrations only through the
standard Prisma workflow, and every data deletion logged in CHANGELOG.
[ref: henza_server/app/Models/{ProductVariant,Sms}.php, henza_pwa/src/views/cart.vue]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner ruled that the reference also ran a retail storefront (B2C
single-customer shop) and that the wallet, cashback and
ConfigStatic['percent'] belong to it. These are preserved exactly as they
are: nothing deleted or disabled on either side, no parity work, listed in
the matrices with status "preserved — out of current scope" and no gap or
work row. Shared surfaces (product, variant, price, order, customer) need
the owner's approval before a change that could reach the storefront.
Classifying the endpoints for that split surfaced a counting error in the
Phase 0 inventory: routes/admin.php has 151 live explicit routes, not the
117 recorded, so the reference total is 412 and not 369 (logged DOC-01).
get-analytics-tak reads SingleCustomerOrders, so it is a storefront route
despite its neutral name (logged DOC-02).
Of the 412 reference endpoints, 109 are retail storefront, 15 are web.php
dev/ops closures, and 288 remain in scope (218 admin + 70 B2B app).
[ref: henza_server/routes/{admin,api,customer,site,web}.php]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders
with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's
account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger.
POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the
customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token;
the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays
optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating
while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is
unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes
that id explicitly, behind the admin guard.
GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both
return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the
new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id
route because Nest matches in declaration order.
Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered
customerId, which is no longer a credential.
OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere;
one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is
wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by
NODE_ENV !== 'production'.
Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code
included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text
searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the
hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line.
Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken
from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes
rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement;
logged rather than changed, per D4.
Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body
customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types.
[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stage 1 narrowed GET /customers but did not close the leak: the response still
carried every customer id, and /customers/:id, /:id/orders and
/:id/ledger-entries were still public, so the full customer book was still two
requests away. The user caught this. Stage 2 deletes the id-bearing surface.
Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1):
- new src/modules/customer-auth/ with its own passport strategy,
CustomerJwtGuard, @CustomerAuth() and @CurrentCustomer()
- signed with JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, and every token carries typ:'customer'
which the strategy verifies; both checks are present deliberately
- customer state re-read per request, so deactivating takes effect at once
- mirrors the reference's own split: auth:api vs auth('api-customer')
Real OTP (D6), porting ApiMobileController::userAuth/userVerfiy (:39-64):
- new CustomerOtp table, additive migration, nothing existing touched
- parity behaviour: rand(1000,9999), active-customer filter, faTOen digit
normalisation on both number and code, rejection on mismatch
- approved improvements over the reference: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-minute
expiry, 5 attempts then lockout, single use, send throttle (60s per
number, 5/number and 20/IP per 10 min), and no number enumeration
Routes removed, replaced by token-derived equivalents:
GET customers, customers/:id, /:id/orders, /:id/ledger-entries
-> GET customer/me, customer/me/orders, customer/me/ledger-entries
No route accepts a customer id any more, so the IDOR is closed structurally
rather than by a check. The admin panel was unaffected (admin/customers-omde/*).
Both apps migrated in the same commit per the v1/v2 parity rule: token-based
session store, Bearer header, 401 -> clear session and route to login, real
two-step OTP login. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only logic moved.
Tests: auth-smoke.sh extended with the stage-2 assertions, 46 passed 0 failed
against a live server. jest installed dev-only (user-approved) so pnpm test
works for the first time: 7 passed covering faToEn, which moved to its own
digits.ts to be testable without booting Nest. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.
[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:39-78]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Authorised by rulings D7 and T1-T3 in docs/parity/DECISIONS.md. This is the
CLAUDE.md section 3 carve-out: matching the reference here would keep a money
write path open to anonymous callers.
Closed, each behind the rid the legacy vocabulary already had:
GET accounting/customers/:id/balance -> wallet.list
POST accounting/customers/:id/reconcile -> wallet.charge
POST accounting/repayments/gold -> document.create
POST accounting/repayments/rial -> document.create
POST accounting/entries/:id/confirm -> document.list.confirm
PATCH orders/:id/status -> order.list.sts.submit
Four of the accounting routes WRITE to the ledger. The order-status route was
worse in kind: its DTO takes a client-supplied actorAdminUserId, so an
anonymous caller could move any order and pin it on any admin. It had no
caller - the admin panel posts to admin/orders/status.
GET /customers kept its public status (both apps' login still matches the
phone number in the browser) but now selects only id/mobile/isActive/
isArchived. It previously returned every active customer's full name, national
code, both debts, credit limit and the URLs of their identity-document scans.
CustomerSummary narrowed in BOTH user apps in the same commit, per the
v1/v2 parity rule.
Not changed: /uploads stays public per ruling T2. The filename check requested
alongside it passed unchanged - md5(time + name + uuid), no directory listing.
Tests: apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh asserts 401 without a token, 403 with a
low-privilege token (ut 88, 5 unrelated rids) and pass-through for a super
admin on every closed route, plus that the public routes still answer 200 and
that GET /customers exposes only the four login fields. 23 passed, 0 failed
against a live server. Typecheck clean on api, user-app and user-app-v2.
[ref: henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272; ApiMobileController.php:39-78]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 0 gate passed. All rulings recorded in docs/parity/DECISIONS.md and
applied to PROTECTED.md, PROGRESS.md and ISSUES.md. No source code changed.
Urgent investigations requested by the user, all evidence-cited:
- percent trace: the target's implementation is WRONG. `percent` is the
customer's OWN column in the reference (customer_add.php:32), a per-customer
making-charge offset used to shift catalogue filter bounds
(ApiMobileController.php:391-396,76-77). The target reads the referring
agent's wagePercent instead (admin-customers.service.ts:245) and never
writes the field at all. It is NOT part of the price formula -- that extra
percent comes from a global ConfigStatic row (ProductVariant.php:50,183).
Two unrelated `percent` keys exist and must not be confused with it.
- @Public audit: 15 routes across 7 controllers, grouped by risk. Group A is
5 ledger routes (4 writes) that contradict decision D1; group B is 3 order
routes incl. a public status change accepting a client-supplied
actorAdminUserId; group C is 8 reads, of which only the catalogue, pricing,
slider and uploads are legitimately public.
- Login leak: it is in the TARGET. GET /customers is public and returns every
active customer with national ID numbers, debts and ID-document URLs.
passwordHash is correctly excluded. Not possible in the reference.
Also logged 5 customer-module defects found in the deep check the user asked
for (CUST-01..05), including the fullName collapse the user reported.
Skill updated per D12: Step C gains rule C0 (field-by-field matrix, never
page-by-page) and Step E gains rule E0 (mandatory 4-step round-trip test).
[ref: henza_server, henza_admin]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Read-only inventory of all 7 projects (3 reference + 4 target) produced by
parallel subagents, every claim cited path:line. No source code changed.
- 00-INVENTORY.md consolidated mapping: stack, backend, admin, user apps
- PROTECTED.md draft protected list (awaiting user confirmation)
- ISSUES.md 26 logged issues (security, money/stock, validation, dead code)
- CHANGELOG.md change log scaffold
- PROGRESS.md resumable state + Q1-Q5 blocking Phase 1
- _inv-*.md 7 raw per-project inventories (8111 lines)
Key finding: the reference is a gold-jewellery B2B/B2C e-commerce system, not a
gold bank. Buy/sell, deposit/withdraw, transfer, KYC levels, payment callbacks,
cron and websockets do not exist in it, so they cannot be parity gaps.
[ref: henza_server, henza_admin, henza_pwa]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Extract product image gallery into a dedicated GallerySlider component
with swipe/tap support
- Add a teleported fullscreen image preview (tap to open, thumbnail strip,
body scroll lock) to SingleProduct
- Restore the Trust section that was accidentally commented out
- Swap back/favorite button positions and recenter the image counter
- Fix Icon.vue: tempIcon was a static ref set once at setup, so it never
updated on prop change when Vue reused the component instance (e.g. cart
qty steppers toggling trash/minus icons); switched to computed + watch
- Rename brand text from "منتزر" to "هنزاگلد"
- Fix a CSS typo in user-app-v2 SingleProduct (rgba alpha value)
- Rebuild dist assets
- SingleProduct.vue: rebuild gallery/header/action bar as a self-scrolling
layout with a sticky photo, solid-on-scroll header matching PageBar, and
a full-screen image preview (blurred overlay, centered thumbnail strip)
- Add GallerySlider.vue: pointer-based swipe carousel isolated in an
LTR subtree, fixing RTL/transform sign mismatch that caused slide jumps
- Fix Icon.vue: icon was read into a plain ref once at setup and never
updated on prop change; switch to computed so icon swaps (e.g. cart
qty stepper trash/minus toggle) actually re-render
- Fix quantity stepper DOM order in SingleProduct.vue/CartItem.vue so
plus/minus render correctly under RTL flex
- prisma/assign-downloaded-images.js: seed real product photos (FEATURED/
FEATURED_MOBILE/GALLERY/GALLERY_MOBILE) onto the 5 placeholder products
DashboardView ("میز کار"): Rebuilt from scratch with a new structure, distinct from the old card+grid layout but visually aligned with HomeView (same blurred bar, @ink/@wine palette, staged reveal animation on mount):
Single hero card (ink→wine gradient) showing balance, gold/fiat debt, and identity — no quick-action icons inside it anymore.
Live gold rate folded into a slim inline row at the bottom instead of a titled section.
Iterated shadow/spacing on the hero card per feedback (softer, less clipped).
DialogVant / DialogVantOneButton (shared modal components, used in 7+ call sites: Dashboard, Cart, SingleProduct, Register, App): Replaced Vant's default dialog chrome with the app's own rounded-card language — circular icon badge for the illustration, pill-shaped primary/secondary buttons. No call-site markup changed.
LoginView: Rebuilt from scratch — full-bleed dark hero (brand + step copy) overlapped by a floating white form sheet, animated crossfade transition between the mobile-number and OTP steps, same staged entrance animation as Home/Dashboard. All auth logic (API check, OTP stub, session login) unchanged.
Montech