Found by running the delivery flow against the actual built container rather
than a local dev process.
DEPLOY-02 (Critical) — ADMIN LOGIN RETURNED 500 FOR EVERY USER IN DOCKER.
docker-compose.yml passes each optional variable as ${X:-}, so an unconfigured
one arrives as "" rather than undefined. The code read them with
`process.env.X ?? 'default'`, which only falls back on undefined, so the empty
string reached jsonwebtoken and it threw
"expiresIn" should be a number of seconds or string representing a timespan
on every sign. Invisible to every existing suite, all of which run against a
local process where the variable is genuinely absent.
Added src/common/env.ts (envOr / envOrNull), which treat blank as unset, and
applied it to every auth, port, upload and SMS read. Three were not cosmetic:
a blank UPLOAD_DIR would have served static files from the FILESYSTEM ROOT, a
blank PORT would have bound a random ephemeral port (Number('') === 0), and a
blank JWT_SECRET would have become the verifying key. Recorded as D25, with a
standing rule to use these readers instead of `??`.
Pinned by src/common/env.spec.ts (9 tests), which reproduces the original throw
against the real jsonwebtoken and asserts the reader can no longer produce it.
DEPLOY-03 (process, documented) — the API image is `COPY release/ ./`, so it
ships a bundle pre-built on the developer machine. `docker compose build` will
happily produce an image from a STALE release/app.js and report success; at the
start of this run that bundle was four days old and the rebuilt container was
missing every route added since. DELIVERY.md's deploy section now leads with
`pnpm build:release`.
New: scripts/test-compose-e2e.cjs — the whole delivery flow against the built
container, over HTTP only, as a black box: a sales expert and an ordinary
customer both sign in with the master code, both place an order, both orders
appear in the admin grid and open there, and the three token boundaries still
hold in the deployed image. 32/32.
Verified: compose e2e 32/32 · jest 54/54 · build 5/5 ·
against the CONTAINER: complete-profile 38/38, report 40/40, expert login 36/36 ·
locally: apps smoke 43/43, admin smoke 43/43, B2B scan 34 ok/0 broken.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
276 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
276 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
# DELIVERY — gold-banking-monorepo
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Branch: **`release/delivery`** · Prepared 2026-09-23
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Contains everything from `parity/security-hotfix` and `parity/phase-1-admin`.
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Both merged with **no conflicts** (`phase-1-admin` already contained
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`security-hotfix`, so the merge was a fast-forward). `main` was not touched.
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---
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## ⚠ Before the real release — do these three things
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1. **Set `JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET` to its own random value.** This one is a real
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security boundary, not a default. If it is unset, the API signs customer and
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sales-expert **app** tokens with `JWT_SECRET` — *the same key admin tokens
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use* — so the two token realms stop being cryptographically separate. The
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only thing still keeping an app token off the admin routes is the `typ`
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check in `jwt.strategy.ts`, and a sales expert's app token carries their
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**AdminUser id** in `sub`. Two independent defences become one. The API
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prints a loud banner at boot while it is missing. Tracked as **REL-03
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(Critical)**.
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2. **Remove `OTP_MASTER_CODE` from the environment.** While it is set, **any
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active customer can sign in with that one fixed code**. Unset or empty
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disables it completely, and the API prints a warning banner at boot for as
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long as it is armed. Tracked as **REL-01 (Critical)** in
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`docs/parity/ISSUES.md`.
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3. **Configure the SMS credentials** (`SMS_TREZ_*`). Until then no customer can
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receive a real login code — messages are written to the log instead of sent.
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Tracked as **REL-02**.
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---
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## 1. Environment variables
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Names only — no values here, and none are committed. The full annotated list is
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in `.env.example`; `docker-compose.yml` passes each one through to the API
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container.
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### Required
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| Variable | Purpose |
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|---|---|
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| `DATABASE_URL` | PostgreSQL connection string. Inside Docker the host is `db`. |
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| `POSTGRES_USER`, `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, `POSTGRES_DB` | Credentials for the bundled `db` service. |
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| `JWT_SECRET` | Signs **admin** tokens. Without it the API falls back to a well-known development string — set it. |
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| `JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET` | Signs **customer and sales-expert app** tokens. Must be its own value — see the warning at the top of this file. Unset, it falls back to `JWT_SECRET` and the two token realms merge. |
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### Optional
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| Variable | Default | Purpose |
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|---|---|---|
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| `PORT` / `API_PORT` | `3000` | API listen port. |
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| `JWT_EXPIRES_IN` | `12h` | Admin token lifetime. |
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| `JWT_CUSTOMER_EXPIRES_IN` | `30d` | Customer token lifetime. |
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| `UPLOAD_DIR` | `<api>/storage/uploads` | Where uploaded files are written. |
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| `ADMIN_PANEL_PORT`, `USER_APP_PORT`, `USER_APP_V2_PORT` | 5180–5182 | Dev servers only. |
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| `RUN_MIGRATIONS` | `true` | Set `false` to skip the boot-time migration run. |
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| `RUN_SEED` | `true` | Set `false` to skip seeding. |
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| `PROFILE_ADMIN_MOBILES` | *(blank)* | Comma-separated admin mobiles told when a customer completes their profile. The reference hardcoded four numbers; blank means nobody is notified and the upload still succeeds. |
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### SMS — all optional; blank means "log, do not send"
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`SMS_PROVIDER` (`trez` default, or `none`), `SMS_TREZ_URL`,
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`SMS_TREZ_USERNAME`, `SMS_TREZ_PASSWORD`, `SMS_TREZ_SENDER_LINE`.
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With these unset the server **still starts normally** and logs a warning; a
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failed or skipped SMS never blocks an operation, including customer creation.
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### ⚠ `OTP_MASTER_CODE` — delivery only
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A fixed OTP accepted for **any active customer**, alongside the real code.
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- Read only from the environment; never hardcoded.
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- Unset or empty → completely disabled.
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- **Must be exactly 4 digits.** Both apps' login box is four single-character
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inputs and only submits at four, so a longer code works over the API but
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cannot be typed into either app.
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- Every login through it is logged with the customer's mobile.
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- The real OTP keeps working unchanged while it is armed.
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---
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## 2. Running it
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### Development
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```bash
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pnpm install
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pnpm dev # all apps via turbo
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```
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Ports come from the repo-root `.env` (single source of truth):
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API 3000, admin-panel 5180, user-app 5181, user-app-v2 5182.
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### Build
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```bash
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pnpm build # all workspaces
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pnpm build:release # the production/Docker build
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```
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### Deploy (Docker)
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```bash
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pnpm build:release # ⚠ REQUIRED FIRST — see below
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docker compose up -d --build
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```
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> **⚠ `pnpm build:release` must be run before `docker compose build`.**
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> The API image is `COPY release/ ./` — it ships a bundle built on the
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> developer machine, not one built inside the image. So `docker compose build`
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> will happily produce an image from a **stale** `release/app.js` and report
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> success. During this delivery's compose run that bundle was four days old and
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> the container was missing every route added since. Tracked as **DEPLOY-03**.
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Services: `db` (Postgres 15), `api` (port 3000), `admin-panel`, `user-app`,
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`user-app-v2` (each nginx on port 80). The apps expose no host ports —
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Dokploy/Traefik routes to them by domain. Uploads persist in the `api_uploads`
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volume; without it every previously uploaded image 404s after a redeploy.
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---
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## 3. How migrations run
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**Automatically, inside the API container, at boot.** No manual step.
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`src/prisma/bootstrap.ts` calls `runMigrations()` before Nest starts. That
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runner (`src/prisma/migrate.ts`) applies the `.sql` files from
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`prisma/migrations` and records each one in its own tracking table,
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**`_goldbank_migrations`**, so every file runs exactly once.
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It exists because **the deploy image is copy-only and ships no Prisma CLI**, so
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`prisma migrate deploy` is not available there. This is why the database has two
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migration ledgers — `_prisma_migrations` (written by the Prisma CLI in
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development) and `_goldbank_migrations` (written by the runtime runner). Both
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are intentional. `_goldbank_migrations` is declared in `schema.prisma` with
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`@@ignore` so drift checks do not propose dropping it.
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**Never** run `prisma migrate reset`, and never edit either table by hand.
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In development, migrations are created with `prisma migrate dev`; in production
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the container runner applies them.
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Seeding runs once after migrations, gated on a marker row, and is skipped when
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no seed script is present.
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---
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## 4. What was verified on this branch
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All green on `release/delivery`:
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| Suite | Result |
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| `pnpm build` (5 workspaces) | ✅ all pass |
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| jest (api unit) | **54/54** |
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| `smoke-admin.cjs` — admin flows | **43/43** |
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| `smoke-apps.cjs` — customer flows, both apps | **43/43** |
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| `scan-admin-b2b.cjs` — every B2B read endpoint | **34 ok, 0 broken** |
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| `smoke-admin-b2b-writes.cjs` — order + document writes | **25/25** |
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| `auth-smoke.sh` — permissions/401/403 | **32/32** |
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| `test-sales-expert-roundtrip.cjs` | **33/33** |
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| `test-sales-expert-app-login.cjs` — expert app login (D21) | **36/36** |
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| `test-complete-profile.cjs` — «تکمیل پروفایل» | **38/38** |
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| `test-report.cjs` — «گزارش» | **40/40** |
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| `test-compose-e2e.cjs` — **the whole flow inside Docker Compose** | **32/32** |
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| `test-name-trigger.cjs` | **9/9** |
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| typecheck (api, admin-panel, user-app, user-app-v2) | ✅ clean |
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### Verified inside Docker Compose, not just locally
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The whole delivery flow was run against the **built container**, which is what
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actually ships: `test-compose-e2e.cjs` signs a **sales expert** and an
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**ordinary customer** into the app with the master code, has **both place an
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order**, and confirms **both orders appear in the admin panel** and open there.
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It also re-checks the three token boundaries in the deployed image. **32/32.**
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The three page suites were re-run against the container too — complete-profile
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38/38, report 40/40, expert login 36/36.
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That run found two deployment problems that no local test could have caught:
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- **DEPLOY-02 (fixed):** admin login returned **500 for every user in Docker**.
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Compose passes optional variables as `${X:-}`, so an unconfigured one arrives
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as `""`, not `undefined`; the code used `?? 'default'`, which only falls back
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on `undefined`, so the empty string reached `jsonwebtoken` and it threw on
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every sign. Fixed with `src/common/env.ts`, applied to every auth, port,
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upload and SMS read, and pinned by a test that reproduces the original throw.
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- **DEPLOY-03 (process):** the API image ships a **pre-built** bundle, so
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`docker compose build` can silently produce an image from stale code. See the
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warning in the deploy section above.
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Flows walked end to end: admin login, customer creation, sales-expert
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create/edit, product and variant create/edit, order list/detail/status change,
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wholesale order placement from the admin panel, cash document creation +
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confirm + un-confirm; and in **both** customer apps: OTP login with the master
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code, product browsing, cart, order placement, order history.
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Money paths were checked against the reference's own formulas, not just for a
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200: making charge `rash × (1 + (wage − discount)/100)` reproduced exactly, and
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the cash-document conversion `price / (price_per_gram / 4.331802)` moved the
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customer's gold debt by the expected amount and restored it exactly on
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un-confirm.
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Every test script deletes only the rows it created; the write test also asserts
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the customer's balances end exactly as they started.
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---
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## 5. Known issues — not done tonight
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Nothing here blocks the delivery. Full detail in `docs/parity/ISSUES.md`.
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### Missing app pages
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**None.** Every page the reference PWA has now exists in both apps.
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### Delivered tonight
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| Feature | State |
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|---|---|
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| **Sales-expert app login (D21)** | ✅ Done. An expert signs into both apps with their AdminUser account and the ordinary OTP flow; the master code works for them too. They get the whole app — browsing, cart, ordering, order history — plus their own two screens. |
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| **«سفارش مشتریان» (ChildOrder)** | ✅ Done in both apps. Their referred customers' orders at «تحویل مسئول فروش», searchable, infinite-scrolled. |
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| **«مشتریان من» (customerChoice)** | ✅ Done in both apps. Their referred customers, searchable, with a read-only detail sheet. |
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| **APP-02 — admin home slider in v2** | ✅ Fixed. v2 now prefers admin-configured slides and keeps its category-derived hero as the fallback. |
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| **«تکمیل پروفایل» (complete_profile)** | ✅ Done in both apps. Three document uploads (جواز کسب، سردر مغازه، کارت ملی), then the profile is marked verified. Reached from the profile screen, and only while the documents are missing — exactly the reference's condition. |
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| **«گزارش» (report + report/detail)** | ✅ Done in both apps. Two tabs («کلیات حساب» / «جزئیات حساب»), a running gold and rial balance per document, and a per-document detail sheet. Built on the **internal ledger** (owner's option الف) — no connection to the external accounting system the reference proxied. See D24. |
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An expert's own order lands on their **own trading account**, with the making
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charge from `AdminUser.wagePercent` and the credit limit from
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`SalesExpertProfile.gramLevel` — the same two numbers the reference read off
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the agent's own customer row. See D21.
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**Two reference behaviours were deliberately not ported**, both money/session
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risks and both recorded in D21:
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1. `myChild` minted an `api_token` per listed customer so the agent could act
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**as** them — a session-hijack primitive.
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2. The child-order edit drawer (`PUT /order/child/{id}`) recalculated an
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order's weights and prices from client-sent values. The card opens a
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read-only summary instead.
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### Behavioural gaps
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| ID | What |
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| **APP-02** | `user-app-v2` has no `getHomeSlider`, so slides configured in the admin panel appear in **user-app only**; v2 always derives its hero from categories. Not fixed because v2's home is its own design and rewiring it during a delivery risks the page being demonstrated. |
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| **PERS-02** | The reference's cities are a province → city **tree** (provinces not selectable); the target flattened this to a `province` string and a flat select on all three Persons forms. The city itself is still captured correctly. |
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| **PERS-03** | The reference collects a Jalali **birth date** on the customer forms; the target has no column for it. |
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| **PERS-01** | The reference makes a customer's **mobile immutable on edit**; the target allows editing it. Owner ruled this NOT ported — the target keeps its current behaviour. |
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| **PERF-01** | `listReagents()` runs one aggregate per row (N+1) for the per-agent sales total. Harmless at the current agent count. |
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### Parity work not reached
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Phase 1 was not completed: the field-by-field audit stopped after the Persons
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section, and products/categories/variants, financial documents, users and
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permissions, SMS templates, promotions, cities, branches, workshops and reports
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have had only the breakage scan above, not a full parity audit. The
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**Phase 1 gate was lifted for tonight only** (D19) and still stands as the next
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milestone.
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`PERM-01` (the database holds 178 distinct permission ids against the UI's 174)
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is still awaiting a decision, because resolving it means deleting rows.
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---
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## 6. Decisions that shaped this build
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Recorded in `docs/parity/DECISIONS.md`:
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- **D13** — the retail storefront (`single*`, wallet, comments, `customer.php`,
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`site.php`) is **preserved but out of scope**. Nothing there was changed.
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- **D19** — delivery mode: implement the main gaps, do not stop to ask, choose
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the lowest-risk option, change nothing protected.
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- **D20** — SMS can never block a boot or an operation; `OTP_MASTER_CODE` for
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the delivery.
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- **D11 is cancelled** — superseded by D13.
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