- production refuses to boot without JWT_SECRET instead of signing admin tokens with the published development key - CORS_ORIGINS restricts browser callers; blank keeps allow-all with a production warning so a running deployment is not cut off - the boot-time seed creates only roles and permissions in production; the demo customers, orders, debt and known-password accounts need SEED_DEMO_DATA=true Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
157 lines
6.9 KiB
TypeScript
157 lines
6.9 KiB
TypeScript
import 'reflect-metadata';
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import { NestFactory } from '@nestjs/core';
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import { ValidationPipe } from '@nestjs/common';
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import { NestExpressApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-express';
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import { extname, join } from 'node:path';
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import type { Response } from 'express';
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import { AppModule } from './app.module';
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import { prepareDatabase } from './prisma/bootstrap';
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import { PrismaExceptionFilter } from './prisma/prisma-exception.filter';
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import { assertSmsConfigured } from './modules/sms/sms.service';
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import { envOr, envOrNull } from './common/env';
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import { masterOtpCode, masterOtpEnabled } from './modules/customer-auth/customer-auth.service';
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// serve-static's bundled `mime` version predates .avif, so it falls back to
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// application/octet-stream — browsers still render the image (they sniff
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// content), but a strict client or an <img> under some CSPs would not.
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const EXTRA_MIME_TYPES: Record<string, string> = {
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'.avif': 'image/avif',
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};
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/**
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* SEC-04 — production must not run on the published development key. Both JWT
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* modules fall back to 'dev-only-insecure-secret' (a string anyone can read
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* in this repository), with which anyone could mint an admin token. Outside
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* production that fallback is kept, so a fresh checkout still runs.
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*/
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function assertProductionSecrets() {
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if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production') return;
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if (!envOrNull('JWT_SECRET')) {
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throw new Error(
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'JWT_SECRET تنظیم نشده است — سرور در حالت production بدون آن اجرا نمیشود.\n' +
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'JWT_SECRET is not set: refusing to start in production on the public development key.',
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);
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}
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}
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/**
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* SEC-04 — which sites may call the API from a browser. CORS_ORIGINS is a
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* comma-separated list of exact origins (e.g. https://adm.example.ir,https://app.example.ir).
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* Unset keeps the old allow-all, with a warning in production, so an existing
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* deployment keeps working until the list is filled in.
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*/
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function corsOrigins(): string[] | true {
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const list = (envOrNull('CORS_ORIGINS') ?? '')
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.split(',')
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.map((o) => o.trim().replace(/\/+$/, ''))
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.filter(Boolean);
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if (list.length) return list;
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if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
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console.warn('⚠ CORS_ORIGINS تنظیم نشده — هر سایتی میتواند به API درخواست بفرستد. / CORS_ORIGINS is not set: any website may call this API.');
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}
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return true;
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}
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async function bootstrap() {
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assertProductionSecrets();
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// D20 — reports the SMS configuration and never throws. A missing credential
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// no longer stops the boot; messages are logged instead of sent.
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assertSmsConfigured();
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// A missing JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET is not a cosmetic default: customerJwtSecret()
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// falls back to JWT_SECRET, so admin and app tokens end up signed with the
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// SAME key. The `typ` check in JwtStrategy is then the only thing keeping an
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// app token off the admin routes — one guard instead of two independent ones,
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// and a sales expert's app token carries their AdminUser id in `sub`. Warn as
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// loudly as the master-code banner rather than fail the boot, so a running
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// deployment that has not set it yet still starts.
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if (!envOrNull('JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET')) {
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const sharedWithAdmin = Boolean(envOrNull('JWT_SECRET'));
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
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console.warn(
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'\n' +
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'='.repeat(72) +
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'\n ⚠ JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET تنظیم نشده است\n' +
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' ⚠ JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET IS NOT SET.\n' +
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(sharedWithAdmin
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? ' ⚠ Customer/expert app tokens are being signed with JWT_SECRET,\n' +
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' ⚠ the SAME key as admin tokens. The two token realms are no\n' +
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' ⚠ longer cryptographically separated.\n'
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: ' ⚠ Neither JWT_SECRET nor JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET is set, so app\n' +
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' ⚠ tokens are signed with a well-known development string.\n') +
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' ⚠ Set JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET to a distinct random value before release.\n' +
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'='.repeat(72) +
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'\n',
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);
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}
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// D20 — a loud, unmissable banner whenever the delivery bypass is armed, so
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// it cannot reach the real release unnoticed.
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if (masterOtpEnabled()) {
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const code = masterOtpCode() ?? '';
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// Both apps render the login OTP as FOUR single-character boxes and only
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// submit on @on-complete, i.e. at exactly 4 digits
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// (LoginView.vue:43 in each app, OtpInput.vue:43). The API itself accepts
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// any length, so a longer master code works over HTTP but can never be
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// typed into the apps. Warn rather than reject: an operator may be using it
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// for API testing only.
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const typable = /^\d{4}$/.test(code);
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
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console.warn(
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'\n' +
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'='.repeat(72) +
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'\n ⚠ OTP_MASTER_CODE فعال است — قبل از انتشار اصلی حذف شود\n' +
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' ⚠ OTP_MASTER_CODE IS ACTIVE: any active customer can sign in with\n' +
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' ⚠ this fixed code. Remove it from the environment before release.\n' +
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(typable
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? ''
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: ' ⚠\n' +
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' ⚠ NOTE: this code is not 4 digits, so it CANNOT be entered in the\n' +
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' ⚠ customer apps — their OTP box has exactly 4 boxes. Use a\n' +
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' ⚠ 4-digit code for the apps; this one works over the API only.\n') +
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'='.repeat(72) +
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'\n',
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);
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}
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await prepareDatabase();
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const app = await NestFactory.create<NestExpressApplication>(AppModule);
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app.setGlobalPrefix('api');
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app.useGlobalPipes(new ValidationPipe({ whitelist: true, transform: true }));
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app.useGlobalFilters(new PrismaExceptionFilter());
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app.enableCors({ origin: corsOrigins() });
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// Uploaded files, mounted OUTSIDE the /api prefix so the URLs stored on
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// UploadedFile.url ("/uploads/<name>") resolve directly.
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app.useStaticAssets(envOr('UPLOAD_DIR', join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'uploads')), {
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prefix: '/uploads/',
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index: false,
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dotfiles: 'deny',
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setHeaders: (res: Response, path: string) => {
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const mime = EXTRA_MIME_TYPES[extname(path).toLowerCase()];
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if (mime) res.setHeader('Content-Type', mime);
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},
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});
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// envOr, not `??`: Number('') is 0, which would bind a random ephemeral port
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// and make the container unreachable at the port compose maps. See DEPLOY-02.
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const port = Number(envOr('PORT', '3000'));
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try {
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// Bind all interfaces explicitly so the container is reachable from nginx.
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await app.listen(port, '0.0.0.0');
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} catch (err) {
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if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'EADDRINUSE') {
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
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console.error(
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`\n[api] Port ${port} is already in use. Free it or change API_PORT ` +
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`in the repo-root .env (and PORT in apps/api/.env to match) — the ` +
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`API will not fall back to a different port.\n`,
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);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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throw err;
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}
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}
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bootstrap();
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