# CHANGELOG — parity changes Every change made to `gold-banking-monorepo` during the parity project, with the reason and the reference path that justifies it. Format: ``` ## — — - **What:** - **Why:** - **Reference:** - **Target:** - **Matrix row:** - **Commit:** ``` --- ## 2026-09-21 — Phase 0 — Setup - **What:** Created branch `parity/phase-0` and `docs/parity/` scaffolding (`PROGRESS.md`, `ISSUES.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`). - **Why:** Persistent state required by `CLAUDE.md` §6. - **Reference:** n/a - **Target:** `docs/parity/` - **Matrix row:** n/a _No source code changed in Phase 0 (read-only phase)._ --- ## 2026-09-22 — Security hotfix, stage 1 — close the unauthenticated write paths Branch `parity/security-hotfix`. Authorised by the user's rulings D7, T1–T3. ### 1. Ledger routes are admin-only (SEC-09) - **What:** removed the controller-level `@Public()` from `AccountingController` and gave each route a rid: `wallet.list` (balance), `wallet.charge` (reconcile), `document.create` (both repayments), `document.list.confirm` (confirm entry). - **Why:** four of the five routes WRITE to the ledger and were reachable with no token at all. Faithful to the reference, whose entire admin route file is unauthenticated, but contrary to confirmed decision D1. - **Reference:** `henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272` (the `auth:api` wrapper is commented out at both ends) - **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts` - **Breakage check:** `api.getBalance()` is the only app-side consumer and it has **zero call sites** in either user app (dead code, already logged as DEAD-01/02). ### 2. Order status change is admin-only (SEC-10) - **What:** moved `@Public()` from the class to the two customer-facing handlers, leaving `PATCH orders/:id/status` behind `order.list.sts.submit`. - **Why:** it let an anonymous caller move any order's status **and** attribute the change to any admin through the DTO's `actorAdminUserId`. - **Reference:** an admin operation; the admin panel posts to `admin/orders/status` (`apps/admin-panel/src/api/endpoints.ts:42,48`), so this route had no caller. - **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts` - **Still public:** `POST /orders` and `GET /orders/:id`, because the target has no customer session yet — closed in stage 2. ### 3. `GET /customers` no longer leaks the customer book (SEC-08) - **What:** added `LOGIN_LOOKUP_SELECT` (`id`, `mobile`, `isActive`, `isArchived`) and pointed `list()` at it. Removed `fullName`, `nationalCode`, `goldDebtGrams`, `fiatDebtRial`, `goldCreditLimitGrams`, `verificationStep`, `cityId`, `referredByAgentId`, `nationalIdImageUrl`, `businessLicenseUrl`, `shopImageUrl`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt` from that response. - **Why:** the route is unauthenticated because both apps match the phone number in the browser, so it shipped every customer's national ID number, debts, credit limit and identity-document URLs to any visitor. - **Reference:** login was `POST userAuth` → SMS → `POST userVerfiy`, returning exactly one customer after the code matched (`henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ApiMobileController.php:39-78`). - **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/customers/customers.service.ts`, plus `CustomerSummary` narrowed in **both** apps' `src/api/client.ts` (parity rule: the same logic change in both). - **Route survives** until stage 2 replaces the client-side phone match with OTP. ### 4. Test script - **What:** added `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh` — asserts 401 without a token, 403 with a low-privilege token, and pass-through for a super admin, on every closed route; plus that the public routes still answer 200 and that `GET /customers` exposes only the four login fields. - **Result:** **23 passed, 0 failed** against a live server and the dev seed. ### Not changed `/uploads` — per ruling T2, uploaded files including identity documents stay public. The filename check requested alongside it passed with no changes needed (md5 of time + name + UUID; no directory listing).