2194b3d4d9d73e3190cdc8e59ca5fd26bc0cacc8
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
|
8133a2bdf4 |
parity(api,admin): split customer name, add making-charge offset, wire SMS
Applies the two approved additive migrations and fixes every consumer.
D0 — Customer.firstName / lastName
The reference has had two columns since 2020
(2020_10_01_120430_customers_table.php:18-19); the port collapsed them, so
the edit form showed the whole name in the "first name" box and saved an
empty last name. Adds both columns, backfills first-token/rest, and keeps
fullName in sync with a customer_sync_full_name trigger. Nothing dropped.
The trigger is SQL, so Prisma cannot see it: writing the parts rebuilds
fullName, writing fullName re-derives the parts, and writing both in one
statement lets THE PARTS WIN. Documented in the migration header, the
Customer model doc comment and DECISIONS.md §D14, because a write can now
store something other than what was passed.
D9 — Customer.makingChargeOffsetPercent
Legacy customers.percent, the per-customer making-charge offset that the
app adds to the variant's making charge (henza_pwa
Mixins/product/index.ts:69-75). toRow() was returning the referring
AGENT's commission rate instead (CUST-02). DB default 0 reproduces
today's behaviour exactly, so no existing customer's price moves; the
reference's application-layer default of 3 for NEW customers
(AdminController.php:338) lives in the create form, and the field is
required on create with the reference's own message (:354).
update() and updateCredit() both accepted percent and silently discarded
it; both now persist it. Sort/filter aliases fname/lname pointed at
fullName and now point at the real columns.
SMS — Trez provider (Sms.php:57-82)
New global SmsModule/SmsService: form-urlencoded POST, 20s timeout, body
trimmed, every message persisted. send() never throws, matching the
reference, which discarded Sms::Send's result so a gateway outage never
aborted the order or approval that triggered it. The OTP text is
byte-identical, including the Android SMS Retriever markers. Credentials
come from env only; production refuses to boot without them rather than
silently locking every customer out. .env.example carries names, no values.
Admin panel: the split(' ') fallback is removed from singleCustomer.vue,
and bulkCustomer.vue defaults percent to 3, requires it, coerces the
Decimal on load so diff-send works, and only re-sends `name` when a name
part changed. ReagentCustomer.vue is untouched — its «درصد کمیسیون» is
AdminUser.wagePercent, a different field.
Tests: 32 jest (incl. 14 new SMS config/template), 9 trigger assertions,
53 auth smoke, and the full D12 round-trip on the customer entity —
«محمد علی» + «احمدی» survives create, edit, a byte-identical no-op save,
and single-field edits. Typecheck clean on api and admin-panel.
Note: migrate dev is interactive-only and could not run here, so the
migrations were applied with migrate deploy after a read-only drift check.
The only drift is the pre-existing _goldbank_migrations table, which
Prisma would DROP; it was NOT dropped (DEAD-07).
[ref: henza_server/app/Models/Sms.php, app/Http/Controllers/Adm/AdminController.php]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
|
024e3dd045 |
parity(api,apps): close SEC-02 - orders take the customer from the token
The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger. POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token; the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes that id explicitly, behind the admin guard. GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id route because Nest matches in declaration order. Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered customerId, which is no longer a credential. OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere; one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by NODE_ENV !== 'production'. Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line. Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement; logged rather than changed, per D4. Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api, user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types. [ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
|
4efe543d62 |
parity(api,apps): security hotfix stage 2 - real customer sessions, close IDOR
Stage 1 narrowed GET /customers but did not close the leak: the response still
carried every customer id, and /customers/:id, /:id/orders and
/:id/ledger-entries were still public, so the full customer book was still two
requests away. The user caught this. Stage 2 deletes the id-bearing surface.
Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1):
- new src/modules/customer-auth/ with its own passport strategy,
CustomerJwtGuard, @CustomerAuth() and @CurrentCustomer()
- signed with JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, and every token carries typ:'customer'
which the strategy verifies; both checks are present deliberately
- customer state re-read per request, so deactivating takes effect at once
- mirrors the reference's own split: auth:api vs auth('api-customer')
Real OTP (D6), porting ApiMobileController::userAuth/userVerfiy (:39-64):
- new CustomerOtp table, additive migration, nothing existing touched
- parity behaviour: rand(1000,9999), active-customer filter, faTOen digit
normalisation on both number and code, rejection on mismatch
- approved improvements over the reference: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-minute
expiry, 5 attempts then lockout, single use, send throttle (60s per
number, 5/number and 20/IP per 10 min), and no number enumeration
Routes removed, replaced by token-derived equivalents:
GET customers, customers/:id, /:id/orders, /:id/ledger-entries
-> GET customer/me, customer/me/orders, customer/me/ledger-entries
No route accepts a customer id any more, so the IDOR is closed structurally
rather than by a check. The admin panel was unaffected (admin/customers-omde/*).
Both apps migrated in the same commit per the v1/v2 parity rule: token-based
session store, Bearer header, 401 -> clear session and route to login, real
two-step OTP login. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only logic moved.
Tests: auth-smoke.sh extended with the stage-2 assertions, 46 passed 0 failed
against a live server. jest installed dev-only (user-approved) so pnpm test
works for the first time: 7 passed covering faToEn, which moved to its own
digits.ts to be testable without booting Nest. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.
[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:39-78]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|