main
20
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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bfbac92df5 |
fix(apps): back button follows real history; screens re-read on entry
Reported: from the profile page, going to login and pressing back landed
on home instead of the profile — with the instruction to audit the whole
structure rather than that one case. Seven defects, four reachable in
ordinary use.
NAVIGATION
PageBar's back arrow pushed a FIXED route name (`backTo`) and ignored
history, so it could not know where the person came from. That was true
of 14 of the 15 PageBar uses in each app — only SearchView used
router.back() — so it was never one screen's bug. Inherited from the
reference, which pushed a fixed name in every component's back arrow;
not replicated (D4).
`backTo` is now a fallback, used only when there is nothing to go back
to (a shared link, a refresh). All 14 declarations are kept untouched,
because that is exactly when they are right.
Answering "is there anywhere to go back to?" needs care: history.length
counts entries from before the app was opened, so a link opened in a
fresh tab would look navigable and back would walk the person out of the
app. navStore records the history `position` of the app's first
navigation and compares the current one against it — direction-proof,
unlike a counter, which only grows and would be wrong after one
back-and-forward. Confirmed vue-router writes `position` on every entry
rather than assuming it.
Three pushes became replaces, each of which left behind a page the
guards immediately bounce, making "back" a no-op or a trip home:
- after sign-in the login screen stayed in history — the worst, since
the same file already honoured ?redirect=, so signing in and
pressing back disagreed about where the person belonged;
- the 401 handler kept the page whose request had just failed;
- complete-profile kept a form that is unreachable once the documents
are in.
CartView's post-order push is left alone: back lands on the emptied
cart, which is a real screen, not a dead end.
READ FRESHNESS
Owner's rule: fetch what a screen needs when it is opened, rather than
caching with a lifetime. Better than the TTL I had proposed — a TTL
guesses how long data stays true, while entering the screen is when it
actually matters.
OrdersView was the worst: it is in the keep-alive list but only loaded
in onMounted, so the second and every later visit made no request at
all, and the first read the cache. Order status changes on the admin
side and nothing here invalidates it, so the list could be stale for a
whole session. Ledger entries had the same shape and a stronger reason —
they are written by the accounting side, which this app can never learn
about. The gold price was forced only by pull-to-refresh on the two
screens that show it most prominently.
The catalogue is deliberately NOT re-read, by the owner's own reasoning
that this must not add server load: it is the entire product list in one
response, it changes when an admin edits it, and pull-to-refresh and
placing an order already invalidate it.
The cache layer itself is sound — concurrent callers share one in-flight
promise, and a response arriving after an invalidate is returned but not
stored, so a write cannot lose a race against a read in flight. Its one
real gap was that nothing ever went stale. The policy is now written at
the top of queryCache.ts so a TTL is not re-introduced.
Both apps vue-tsc clean. Not click-tested in a browser; the back-button
behaviour is worth one manual pass.
اپ: دکمه بازگشت به صفحه قبلی واقعی برمیگردد و اطلاعات هر صفحه در هر بازدید بهروز میشود.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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ddcc8c5649 |
feat(apps): a sales expert can work inside their customer's account (D29)
Reported missing by the owner: in the reference an expert could open any
of their referred customers and use the app AS them — browse, see
balance and debt, place orders — «یکجورایی انگار با اکانت اون ها لاگین
کرده». D21 had deliberately left it out as a session-hijack primitive.
The owner asked for the capability back with the implementation left to
judgement, so the scope is the reference's and the mechanism is not.
Scope: everything, as the reference had it. Its axios interceptor
swapped the bearer token, so every request went as the customer,
document upload included. No route is closed in act-as mode.
Mechanism: the reference minted and handed over the customer's own
permanent api_token. Here the expert keeps their own token and sends
X-Act-As-Customer, resolved in one place — CustomerJwtStrategy
.validateExpert. That single point is why all 17 customer routes work
unchanged: validate() already returns a principal whose `id` is a
Customer id and every customer route reads it. It also fixes four real
defects of the original:
- ownership is re-checked on EVERY request, with referredByAgentId in
the same where clause as the id, so another expert's customer and a
non-existent id both answer 403, and a customer moved to another
expert loses access at once rather than at token expiry;
- nothing durable is handed out — the reference's token sat in
localStorage with no expiry and kept working after the expert left;
- adminUserId survives, so an order placed this way is attributable;
in the reference the request was literally the customer's;
- 403 rather than 401, so the app clears the act-as state instead of
logging a perfectly valid session out.
Performance: one findFirst on the primary key, only when the header is
present, and it replaces the trading-account lookup rather than adding
to it.
Three things the reference never needed, because it swapped the whole
session. queryCache's `me:` keys, favouritesStore and wageQuoteStore all
dropped their data on a TOKEN change, which act-as does not cause — so
an expert would have seen their own profile, orders, balance, ledger and
favourites inside the customer's account. The wage-quote one is the
money case: making charge is per customer, so the figure on screen would
not have been the one the order was priced at. And uploadDocument builds
its own headers, so an expert's upload would have been filed against
their own account, silently.
Added with no reference equivalent: a permanent «در حال مشاهده بهعنوان
…» bar. There, impersonation was invisible once the token had been
swapped, and placing an order on the wrong customer's gold debt was one
tap away. It is also the exit — the reference's only way out was a
logout that ended the expert's own session too. The cart is cleared in
both directions.
CustomerJwtStrategy had no test coverage at all and is now where this
feature's whole authorisation boundary lives: act-as-customer.spec.ts
covers 11 cases, including the header being ignored on a customer token,
the no-header path asserting the extra query does not run, and a revoked
session short-circuiting before the header is read.
api: 308/308 tests, 28 suites; both apps vue-tsc clean.
اپ: کارشناس فروش میتواند وارد حساب مشتریان خود شود، وضعیتشان را ببیند و از طرفشان سفارش ثبت کند.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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c518f9995b |
fix(auth): tell the user when the number is not registered (D28)
Reported by the owner: a number that is not in the system produced no error at all. The app advanced to the code box and then nothing happened, and there was no way to tell apart "the SMS is late", "the gateway is down" and "this number was never registered" — the only one of the three the person can actually do something about. Step 1 now says which it is: - unregistered number -> 404 «این شماره در سیستم ثبت نشده است…» - SMS send failed -> 503 «ارسال پیام کوتاه … ممکن نیست…» - sales expert, account unusable -> 403, its own message and both apps surface the server's Persian message for a 404 exactly as they already did for a 429. Without that second half the person would still have seen the generic «خطا در ارسال کد», which is the confusion being removed. This restores the reference's behaviour (firstOrFail() in ApiMobileController::userAuth:43 returns 404); the opaque answer was our deviation, not this. The anti-enumeration protection it was there for is deliberately reduced at step 1 on the owner's instruction — the cost was being paid by real users and by support. Still standing: the per-mobile and per-IP send throttles, which the reference never had, so enumeration is rate-bounded rather than free, and verifyOtp keeps one message for every failure reason. ISSUES.md SEC-03's "no enumeration" claim is corrected rather than left to go stale. Two more instances of the same shape turned up while fixing it: A failed SMS send also returned success, because SmsService never throws (D20), so a dead gateway produced the identical dead end. D20 exists so a failed SMS cannot break an operation — an order must still be placed — but in a login the SMS IS the operation, so it now fails loudly. The local-dev path keys off SmsService's own `sms-not-configured` result rather than re-testing the config: with D26's default relay driver, smsConfigured() is true on any machine with an external IPv4, so a config test would have called a dev box configured and then failed its login. The new test caught precisely that on its first run. Three states return no trading account for a sales expert who does exist. Under the new 404 each would have claimed the number was not registered — false, and it would send support hunting a registration problem that is not there. Also corrects both apps' LoginView header comment, which still described this flow as stubbed: no SMS provider, any 4-digit code accepted, step 1 matching the customer list in the client (that was the login leak, D8). All three had been untrue for weeks and the stale text misled a reader during this session. requestOtp had NO test coverage: the 28-test customer-auth suite stayed green through a change to its response for every unregistered number, so its greenness was not treated as evidence. request-otp.spec.ts adds 9 cases, including that the dev fallback does not apply in production. api: 295/295 tests, 27 suites, typecheck clean; both apps vue-tsc clean. اپ: اگر شماره شما در سیستم ثبت نشده باشد، همان را میگوید و دیگر بیدلیل به صفحه کد نمیرود. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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89e2d7937e |
feat(apps): tell a guest why they were bounced to the login page (D3)
A guest tapping a personal page — orders, transactions, profile, favourites, complete-profile — was redirected in silence, so they landed on the login box with nothing explaining what happened. Legacy showed «ابتدا وارد شوید» (henza_pwa/src/router/index.ts:259). The message is now shown in both apps. The destination deliberately stays the target's /login?redirect=…, which legacy did not have: legacy sent the guest to home and lost where they were going, while here signing in returns them to the page they asked for. The owner chose that trade-off, so it is logged as «عمداً تکرار نشد — D3/الف» rather than quietly left as a divergence. The guard also keys off meta.requiresAuth instead of legacy's hand-kept list of five route names, so the two sales-expert pages are covered too. Legacy's isLoaded router guard is NOT ported, and the reasoning is written into both apps' configStore beside the line that says so: it guarded legacy's one big bootstrap request, which this target does not have, so it would guard nothing and only add a bounce — a shared product link would open home instead of the product. That is porting the breakage, not the behaviour (D4). Route analytics is deferred at the owner's request; its design is parked in docs/PHASE2-D3-PLAN.md so it need not be re-derived, along with the two reference defects not to copy (log/create was unauthenticated and accepted any title; log/update was a GET that wrote) and the open retention and IP questions. Seven of D3's ten items turned out to be built already — all five screens in both apps, the sts_verify_step_two guard, v2's cart ceiling — verified in the code rather than from the checkmarks. Neither app has a test runner: verified with vue-tsc -b on both (clean) plus confirming the toast can actually appear, not merely compile — toast.info exists and <ToastHost /> is mounted in each App.vue. اپ: وقتی بدون ورود صفحه شخصی را باز کنید، پیام «ابتدا وارد شوید» نشان داده میشود. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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fd9191eca8 |
feat(orders): log the client price figures the server discards (MON-08)
Step 2 of the owner's MON-08 ruling. An app order is priced by the server (steps 1, 3, 4 landed with the wage-formula work), but the client's own wagePercent, discountPercent and flatRialCharge were being thrown away in silence — so a stale app build, a promotion that expired between the product page and checkout, and a deliberately tampered request were indistinguishable and left no trace anywhere. They are now logged with both numbers, the same pattern already used for the body's customerId. The pricing itself is untouched: the server's figures are what the order is charged, and an operator ordering from the panel still keeps the numbers they typed. Also adds the comparison test the ruling asked for, which step 3 never actually had — the suite only proved a tampered request gets overridden. The new test places one honest order as a customer and the same order as an operator and asserts the totals are identical, which is the real claim: an ordinary customer's total does not move. Two more cover the logging, including that an honest order logs nothing — so the quiet case cannot pass merely because the method never ran. Closes STUB-05 in the docs as well: the reference's six hardcoded staff numbers have been behind PROFILE_ADMIN_MOBILES / ORDER_ADMIN_MOBILES for a while, but its status still read "pending". api: 286/286 tests, 26 suites, typecheck clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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83e5d2868b |
feat(orders): send the order-placement SMS and close Phase 1
The reference texted three audiences on every placed order
(henza_server Api/ApiMobileController::setOrder:733-766). None of it was
wired here — OrdersService had no SmsService at all, so a customer could
place an order and nobody was told: not the customer, not the admins, not
the referring sales expert.
Now, after the transaction commits (so a rolled-back order texts nobody)
and without ever being awaited (D20 — a dead gateway must not fail an
order):
- every mobile in ORDER_ADMIN_MOBILES, with the customer's name and
the rounded gold weight;
- the customer, with distinct text for a normal and an over-limit
suspended order;
- the referring sales expert, looked up on AdminUser (the target's
referring expert is an admin, not a customer as in the reference).
The reference's four hardcoded personal numbers stay out of git, behind
the same env-var pattern as PROFILE_ADMIN_MOBILES.
The «در سیستم ویرایش شد» variant was deliberately not ported: the target
has no order-edit route, so it would be dead code — «عمداً تکرار نشد».
Also fills §2 of the admin matrix, the D1 deliverable that had been
(pending) since the phase opened: 163 rid-guarded routes, 68 distinct
rids, 176 grantable tree keys, and a per-module map to the reference
controllers. Only two enforced rids are ungrantable from the permission
screen (newsletters, persons.list.sellers.view) — filed as PERM-02,
awaiting an owner ruling because it changes the permission vocabulary.
Phase 1 (admin parity) is at its gate. api: 283/283 tests, 26 suites.
پنل: پیامک ثبت سفارش برای مشتری، ادمینها و کارشناس فروش فعال شد.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5.5
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4d3b15c3b9 |
docs: data migration map — precheck results, owner rulings, run status
DATA-MIGRATION-MAP.md now records: - the precheck numbers from the live henza DB and the assumptions they overturned: verify steps are 1/2/3, not boolean; reagent_id points at customers, not users; cashes.remain/rial_remain are NULL on every row - owner rulings: mobile as the match key, sales expert wins conflicts, merge rather than import, allow-list columns only, retail orders_orders deferred, fav and birth_date kept, token_mobile and marriage_date dropped - run status of the prep migration and the REJECTED consumer audit - a process hazard: on the dev machine, a file in prisma/migrations is applied by the watch-mode server on the next src/ edit - two open owner questions about the live verify() flow migration-precheck-3.sql: read-only (COUNT only). Checks where new_city should land and whether birth_date holds Jalali years. PROGRESS.md: workstream row pointing here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 4.6
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19d490e790 |
feat: accounting integration (D27), SMS relay driver (D26), rebuild user apps
- Add Tahesab/Zarrin accounting sync module with admin panel UI - Add SMS relay driver as default provider, refactor SMS into driver pattern - Update customer services, orders, products, and catalog queries - Rebuild user-app and user-app-v2 dist assets - Add Prisma migration for accounting tables - Update docker-compose and env examples - Update parity docs (DECISIONS, ISSUES, PROGRESS) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeili
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6ae48d417d | md app | ||
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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2194b3d4d9 |
parity(admin): D17 — SalesExpertProfile, AdminUser name parts, agent grid fields
Restores the sales-expert fields that were lost when a sales expert became
an AdminUser instead of a type=1 Customer row.
New SalesExpertProfile holds cityId, gramLevel, phone and nationalCode. A
separate table rather than columns on AdminUser, because these mean
something only for role = SALES_EXPERT. gramLevel is DECIMAL(14,4), matched
to Customer.goldCreditLimitGrams so the same credit limit has identical
precision on both tables. phone and nationalCode copy the reference exactly:
nullable, NOT unique, no format rule — createCustomer validates only mobile
and percent, and both fields are required:false on the reference form.
Inventing a uniqueness constraint would reject data the reference accepts.
reagent_id is deliberately NOT ported (D17). Every use of it in the
reference reads a CUSTOMER's reagent_id, which the target already models as
Customer.referredByAgentId. On a sales expert's own form it was a side
effect of the shared customers form: filling it removed that expert from
the selectable-agent list, because queryReagent filters on
whereNull('reagent_id'). The target's equivalent filters on role and active
only, so no agent can be dropped — strictly better than the reference.
AdminUser gains firstName/lastName with the same additive migration,
backfill and sync trigger as Customer, for all admins rather than only
sales experts. This closes D0 requirement 7, and every remaining
`fname: fullName, lname: ''` was fixed — six further sites across
admin-users, admin-comments, admin-documents, admin-orders and
admin-preorders.
listReagents now returns real city_id, city, gram_level, phone and ncode,
and left-joins so an expert without a profile still lists with empty cells
rather than vanishing. The two grid filters map through the relation. The
service upserts a profile on create and on a role change to SALES_EXPERT,
and the migration backfilled one for every existing expert.
ReagentCustomer.vue gains the four fields plus the city -> commission
autofill, ported verbatim including the reference's falsy test so a city
percent of 0 also falls through to the aux lookup (replicated, not fixed).
Tests: new sales-expert round trip 33/33, covering create with every field,
an edit form with each field populated separately, a byte-identical no-op
save, single-field edits, both grid filters with negative cases, the
left-join case and the referrer dropdown. «محمد علی» + «احمدی» survives
intact. Plus jest 32/32, auth-smoke 53/53, customer trigger 9/9, typecheck
clean on api and admin-panel. Migration dry-run twice in a rolled-back
transaction before applying; drift is zero.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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e3af31948e |
parity(docs): D16 — stop PRICE-01 as storefront, reorder Phase 1, verify SEC-02
Owner ruling: computing and displaying price / price_with_discount is retail storefront work, so it falls under D13 and is marked out of scope. The B2B app works in making charge only. variant-price.ts and its 11 hand-checked tests are kept and still run, just unused. Nothing needed reverting: computeVariantPrice was never called from outside its own file and spec, verified by grep over apps/api/src and apps/admin-panel/src, so no price had been wired into any screen. PRICE-01 is re-marked in ISSUES.md rather than deleted so the evidence survives if the storefront is ever taken up. Making-charge work stays fully in scope: percentage_pay, makingChargeOffsetPercent, and wage display on variants and order lines. New Phase 1 order: Persons -> products/categories/variants/order detail -> financial documents -> users and permissions -> admin SMS -> promotions, notifications, cities, branches, workshops -> reports -> gate. Per section: implement the gaps, then field-by-field test that section, and show a gap summary before fixing. SEC-02 re-verified live rather than quoted: 9/9 assertions, plus 32/32 in auth-smoke.sh. POST /orders is 401 without a token; a body customerId of "customer-2" sent with a customer-dev-test token still lands the order on customer-dev-test and is warn-logged; a foreign order id returns 404 rather than 403 so ids stay unenumerable; the admin read rejects a customer token. Client-supplied wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge remain as MON-08, already scheduled as Phase 2 item #1. Also records why the dev OTP log briefly looked broken: a stale API process still held port 3077, so the new instance died with EADDRINUSE and the tailed log belonged to the old process. Not a regression. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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64e76a8616 |
parity(admin): start the Phase 1 matrix — rid mapping, price and order sections
Answers D1's 172-vs-174 question with real counts: the catalogues hold 176 (reference) and 174 (target) unique keys, and the ENTIRE difference is the dashboard. The reference has `dashboard` + `dashboard.omde` + `dashboard.tak`; the target replaces all three with `dashboard.view`, because the admin Dashboard is a PROTECTED zone that merged the two reference dashboards. 176 - 3 + 1 = 174. All 173 other keys match exactly, including the same 5 keys that legitimately appear twice in the tree. Route-guard rids are 57 vs 57, differing only by that dashboard consolidation plus one target-only route reusing an existing catalogue rid. All 67 reachable reference admin routes exist in the target at the same paths; 2 target-only routes are additive. Three findings logged: PRICE-01 (critical) — no product price is computed or shown anywhere in the admin panel. The reference appends price/price_with_discount to every variant and renders it in three places in its product list; the target's variantRow() returns neither, nothing fetches a gold rate for the admin list, and computeVariantPrice() — ported and unit-tested earlier today — is called from nowhere. This is fix #1. PERM-01 (medium) — dashboard.omde and dashboard.tak are seeded into the permission table but absent from the permission UI, so they are grantable yet unmanageable; the DB holds 178 distinct rids against the UI's 174. The fix deletes permission rows, so it waits for the owner's approval. PRICE-02 (info) — rial_pay belongs only to the superseded commented-out formula; the target correctly omits it. Recorded so it is not "restored". Contrary to the Phase 0 expectation, the order module is in good shape: the gram_level credit limit matches the reference exactly including the strict '>' comparison, and debt recognition fires at the same status. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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654b98520d |
parity(api): declare _goldbank_migrations as an ignored model; drift now zero
Prisma migrate diff proposed DROP TABLE "_goldbank_migrations" because the table exists in the database but was not declared in the schema. Declaring it with @@ignore removes the proposal without exposing it to Prisma Client, and the table and all its rows are kept. Correcting the earlier DEAD-07 note: this is not a leftover from the pre-Prisma port. It is the tracking table of the application's own migration runner (src/prisma/migrate.ts:5), which exists because the Docker deploy image is copy-only and ships no Prisma CLI, so migrate deploy cannot run in the container (migrate.ts:7-13). The project therefore keeps two ledgers deliberately: _prisma_migrations for the CLI in development, and _goldbank_migrations for the runtime runner in the container. That runner already filtered out any DROP of its own table (migrate.ts:190-196); the schema declaration removes the cause rather than relying on that guard. The practical consequence, recorded in DECISIONS.md D15: a new migration must be safe under both paths, so its SQL stays idempotent. The ledger grew 12 -> 14 rows while testing, with nothing deleted: starting the API ran prepareDatabase(), which appended the two migrations applied earlier today. Its $$-aware statement splitter handled the PL/pgSQL trigger body correctly — trigger and function are both present and the 9 trigger assertions pass against the live database. Also records the UTF-8 testing rule: Persian test input must come from a file, never a shell argument, because the Windows shell replaces Persian characters with '?' and a test can then pass while storing '????'. Verified: migrate diff -> "This is an empty migration" (zero drift); migrate status -> up to date; tsc clean; 32 jest; 9 trigger assertions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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8133a2bdf4 |
parity(api,admin): split customer name, add making-charge offset, wire SMS
Applies the two approved additive migrations and fixes every consumer.
D0 — Customer.firstName / lastName
The reference has had two columns since 2020
(2020_10_01_120430_customers_table.php:18-19); the port collapsed them, so
the edit form showed the whole name in the "first name" box and saved an
empty last name. Adds both columns, backfills first-token/rest, and keeps
fullName in sync with a customer_sync_full_name trigger. Nothing dropped.
The trigger is SQL, so Prisma cannot see it: writing the parts rebuilds
fullName, writing fullName re-derives the parts, and writing both in one
statement lets THE PARTS WIN. Documented in the migration header, the
Customer model doc comment and DECISIONS.md §D14, because a write can now
store something other than what was passed.
D9 — Customer.makingChargeOffsetPercent
Legacy customers.percent, the per-customer making-charge offset that the
app adds to the variant's making charge (henza_pwa
Mixins/product/index.ts:69-75). toRow() was returning the referring
AGENT's commission rate instead (CUST-02). DB default 0 reproduces
today's behaviour exactly, so no existing customer's price moves; the
reference's application-layer default of 3 for NEW customers
(AdminController.php:338) lives in the create form, and the field is
required on create with the reference's own message (:354).
update() and updateCredit() both accepted percent and silently discarded
it; both now persist it. Sort/filter aliases fname/lname pointed at
fullName and now point at the real columns.
SMS — Trez provider (Sms.php:57-82)
New global SmsModule/SmsService: form-urlencoded POST, 20s timeout, body
trimmed, every message persisted. send() never throws, matching the
reference, which discarded Sms::Send's result so a gateway outage never
aborted the order or approval that triggered it. The OTP text is
byte-identical, including the Android SMS Retriever markers. Credentials
come from env only; production refuses to boot without them rather than
silently locking every customer out. .env.example carries names, no values.
Admin panel: the split(' ') fallback is removed from singleCustomer.vue,
and bulkCustomer.vue defaults percent to 3, requires it, coerces the
Decimal on load so diff-send works, and only re-sends `name` when a name
part changed. ReagentCustomer.vue is untouched — its «درصد کمیسیون» is
AdminUser.wagePercent, a different field.
Tests: 32 jest (incl. 14 new SMS config/template), 9 trigger assertions,
53 auth smoke, and the full D12 round-trip on the customer entity —
«محمد علی» + «احمدی» survives create, edit, a byte-identical no-op save,
and single-field edits. Typecheck clean on api and admin-panel.
Note: migrate dev is interactive-only and could not run here, so the
migrations were applied with migrate deploy after a read-only drift check.
The only drift is the pre-existing _goldbank_migrations table, which
Prisma would DROP; it was NOT dropped (DEAD-07).
[ref: henza_server/app/Models/Sms.php, app/Http/Controllers/Adm/AdminController.php]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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7b598e9e8e |
parity(api): port the reference price formula with tests; SMS + MON-08 reports
Adds computeVariantPrice(), a verbatim port of the live formula at henza_server/app/Models/ProductVariant.php:183-190, with the per-customer making-charge offset as an explicit input defaulting to 0. The three superseded formulas commented out above it apply VAT to the whole price and are deliberately not ported (D4). 11 unit tests assert against hand calculations derived from the PHP source rather than from the implementation, covering: with and without the offset, VAT on the non-metal portion only, floor-to-nearest-1000, the extraPercent default of 7, and the equivalence between the app folding the offset into percent_pay and the server deriving it. 18 tests pass overall. Also adds the D0 name-split review report script (read-only) and two investigations the owner asked for: - SMS: the reference uses the Trez panel (smspanel.trez.ir, Sms.php:69,97) with production credentials committed to git (SEC-12 — rotate them). All 12 message templates catalogued; env var names proposed; nothing implemented pending approval. - MON-08: henza_pwa computes percent_pay, discount and rial_pay rather than asking the user (cart.vue:170-179, Mixins/product/index.ts:69-75), so Phase 2 item #1 is to derive them server-side and ignore the client's values. rash_weight stays read from the DB as a recorded deviation. Records the owner's two new standing rules: migrations only through the standard Prisma workflow, and every data deletion logged in CHANGELOG. [ref: henza_server/app/Models/{ProductVariant,Sms}.php, henza_pwa/src/views/cart.vue] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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c71574b1d2 |
parity(docs): record D13 — retail storefront preserved but out of scope
The owner ruled that the reference also ran a retail storefront (B2C
single-customer shop) and that the wallet, cashback and
ConfigStatic['percent'] belong to it. These are preserved exactly as they
are: nothing deleted or disabled on either side, no parity work, listed in
the matrices with status "preserved — out of current scope" and no gap or
work row. Shared surfaces (product, variant, price, order, customer) need
the owner's approval before a change that could reach the storefront.
Classifying the endpoints for that split surfaced a counting error in the
Phase 0 inventory: routes/admin.php has 151 live explicit routes, not the
117 recorded, so the reference total is 412 and not 369 (logged DOC-01).
get-analytics-tak reads SingleCustomerOrders, so it is a storefront route
despite its neutral name (logged DOC-02).
Of the 412 reference endpoints, 109 are retail storefront, 15 are web.php
dev/ops closures, and 288 remain in scope (218 admin + 70 B2B app).
[ref: henza_server/routes/{admin,api,customer,site,web}.php]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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4efe543d62 |
parity(api,apps): security hotfix stage 2 - real customer sessions, close IDOR
Stage 1 narrowed GET /customers but did not close the leak: the response still
carried every customer id, and /customers/:id, /:id/orders and
/:id/ledger-entries were still public, so the full customer book was still two
requests away. The user caught this. Stage 2 deletes the id-bearing surface.
Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1):
- new src/modules/customer-auth/ with its own passport strategy,
CustomerJwtGuard, @CustomerAuth() and @CurrentCustomer()
- signed with JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, and every token carries typ:'customer'
which the strategy verifies; both checks are present deliberately
- customer state re-read per request, so deactivating takes effect at once
- mirrors the reference's own split: auth:api vs auth('api-customer')
Real OTP (D6), porting ApiMobileController::userAuth/userVerfiy (:39-64):
- new CustomerOtp table, additive migration, nothing existing touched
- parity behaviour: rand(1000,9999), active-customer filter, faTOen digit
normalisation on both number and code, rejection on mismatch
- approved improvements over the reference: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-minute
expiry, 5 attempts then lockout, single use, send throttle (60s per
number, 5/number and 20/IP per 10 min), and no number enumeration
Routes removed, replaced by token-derived equivalents:
GET customers, customers/:id, /:id/orders, /:id/ledger-entries
-> GET customer/me, customer/me/orders, customer/me/ledger-entries
No route accepts a customer id any more, so the IDOR is closed structurally
rather than by a check. The admin panel was unaffected (admin/customers-omde/*).
Both apps migrated in the same commit per the v1/v2 parity rule: token-based
session store, Bearer header, 401 -> clear session and route to login, real
two-step OTP login. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only logic moved.
Tests: auth-smoke.sh extended with the stage-2 assertions, 46 passed 0 failed
against a live server. jest installed dev-only (user-approved) so pnpm test
works for the first time: 7 passed covering faToEn, which moved to its own
digits.ts to be testable without booting Nest. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.
[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:39-78]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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fdf833565f |
parity(api,apps): security hotfix stage 1 - close unauthenticated write paths
Authorised by rulings D7 and T1-T3 in docs/parity/DECISIONS.md. This is the CLAUDE.md section 3 carve-out: matching the reference here would keep a money write path open to anonymous callers. Closed, each behind the rid the legacy vocabulary already had: GET accounting/customers/:id/balance -> wallet.list POST accounting/customers/:id/reconcile -> wallet.charge POST accounting/repayments/gold -> document.create POST accounting/repayments/rial -> document.create POST accounting/entries/:id/confirm -> document.list.confirm PATCH orders/:id/status -> order.list.sts.submit Four of the accounting routes WRITE to the ledger. The order-status route was worse in kind: its DTO takes a client-supplied actorAdminUserId, so an anonymous caller could move any order and pin it on any admin. It had no caller - the admin panel posts to admin/orders/status. GET /customers kept its public status (both apps' login still matches the phone number in the browser) but now selects only id/mobile/isActive/ isArchived. It previously returned every active customer's full name, national code, both debts, credit limit and the URLs of their identity-document scans. CustomerSummary narrowed in BOTH user apps in the same commit, per the v1/v2 parity rule. Not changed: /uploads stays public per ruling T2. The filename check requested alongside it passed unchanged - md5(time + name + uuid), no directory listing. Tests: apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh asserts 401 without a token, 403 with a low-privilege token (ut 88, 5 unrelated rids) and pass-through for a super admin on every closed route, plus that the public routes still answer 200 and that GET /customers exposes only the four login fields. 23 passed, 0 failed against a live server. Typecheck clean on api, user-app and user-app-v2. [ref: henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272; ApiMobileController.php:39-78] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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004a3945c2 |
parity(docs): record user decisions D0-D12 and urgent investigation results
Phase 0 gate passed. All rulings recorded in docs/parity/DECISIONS.md and applied to PROTECTED.md, PROGRESS.md and ISSUES.md. No source code changed. Urgent investigations requested by the user, all evidence-cited: - percent trace: the target's implementation is WRONG. `percent` is the customer's OWN column in the reference (customer_add.php:32), a per-customer making-charge offset used to shift catalogue filter bounds (ApiMobileController.php:391-396,76-77). The target reads the referring agent's wagePercent instead (admin-customers.service.ts:245) and never writes the field at all. It is NOT part of the price formula -- that extra percent comes from a global ConfigStatic row (ProductVariant.php:50,183). Two unrelated `percent` keys exist and must not be confused with it. - @Public audit: 15 routes across 7 controllers, grouped by risk. Group A is 5 ledger routes (4 writes) that contradict decision D1; group B is 3 order routes incl. a public status change accepting a client-supplied actorAdminUserId; group C is 8 reads, of which only the catalogue, pricing, slider and uploads are legitimately public. - Login leak: it is in the TARGET. GET /customers is public and returns every active customer with national ID numbers, debts and ID-document URLs. passwordHash is correctly excluded. Not possible in the reference. Also logged 5 customer-module defects found in the deep check the user asked for (CUST-01..05), including the fullName collapse the user reported. Skill updated per D12: Step C gains rule C0 (field-by-field matrix, never page-by-page) and Step E gains rule E0 (mandatory 4-step round-trip test). [ref: henza_server, henza_admin] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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71192ba2ba |
parity(docs): Phase 0 inventory, mapping and draft PROTECTED list
Read-only inventory of all 7 projects (3 reference + 4 target) produced by parallel subagents, every claim cited path:line. No source code changed. - 00-INVENTORY.md consolidated mapping: stack, backend, admin, user apps - PROTECTED.md draft protected list (awaiting user confirmation) - ISSUES.md 26 logged issues (security, money/stock, validation, dead code) - CHANGELOG.md change log scaffold - PROGRESS.md resumable state + Q1-Q5 blocking Phase 1 - _inv-*.md 7 raw per-project inventories (8111 lines) Key finding: the reference is a gold-jewellery B2B/B2C e-commerce system, not a gold bank. Buy/sell, deposit/withdraw, transfer, KYC levels, payment callbacks, cron and websockets do not exist in it, so they cannot be parity gaps. [ref: henza_server, henza_admin, henza_pwa] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |