parity(api,apps): security hotfix stage 2 - real customer sessions, close IDOR

Stage 1 narrowed GET /customers but did not close the leak: the response still
carried every customer id, and /customers/:id, /:id/orders and
/:id/ledger-entries were still public, so the full customer book was still two
requests away. The user caught this. Stage 2 deletes the id-bearing surface.

Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1):
  - new src/modules/customer-auth/ with its own passport strategy,
    CustomerJwtGuard, @CustomerAuth() and @CurrentCustomer()
  - signed with JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, and every token carries typ:'customer'
    which the strategy verifies; both checks are present deliberately
  - customer state re-read per request, so deactivating takes effect at once
  - mirrors the reference's own split: auth:api vs auth('api-customer')

Real OTP (D6), porting ApiMobileController::userAuth/userVerfiy (:39-64):
  - new CustomerOtp table, additive migration, nothing existing touched
  - parity behaviour: rand(1000,9999), active-customer filter, faTOen digit
    normalisation on both number and code, rejection on mismatch
  - approved improvements over the reference: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-minute
    expiry, 5 attempts then lockout, single use, send throttle (60s per
    number, 5/number and 20/IP per 10 min), and no number enumeration

Routes removed, replaced by token-derived equivalents:
  GET customers, customers/:id, /:id/orders, /:id/ledger-entries
    -> GET customer/me, customer/me/orders, customer/me/ledger-entries
No route accepts a customer id any more, so the IDOR is closed structurally
rather than by a check. The admin panel was unaffected (admin/customers-omde/*).

Both apps migrated in the same commit per the v1/v2 parity rule: token-based
session store, Bearer header, 401 -> clear session and route to login, real
two-step OTP login. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only logic moved.

Tests: auth-smoke.sh extended with the stage-2 assertions, 46 passed 0 failed
against a live server. jest installed dev-only (user-approved) so pnpm test
works for the first time: 7 passed covering faToEn, which moved to its own
digits.ts to be testable without booting Nest. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.

[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:39-78]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
s.esmaeili
2026-09-22 01:20:00 +03:30
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent fdf833565f
commit 4efe543d62
42 changed files with 3552 additions and 277 deletions
+84
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@@ -92,3 +92,87 @@ Branch `parity/security-hotfix`. Authorised by the user's rulings D7, T1–T3.
`/uploads` — per ruling T2, uploaded files including identity documents stay
public. The filename check requested alongside it passed with no changes needed
(md5 of time + name + UUID; no directory listing).
---
## 2026-09-22 — Security hotfix, stage 2 — real customer sessions
Branch `parity/security-hotfix`. Authorised by D6, D7, T1 and T3.
Stage 1 narrowed `GET /customers` but, as the user pointed out, did not close
the leak: the response still carried every customer **id**, and
`/customers/:id`, `/:id/orders` and `/:id/ledger-entries` were still public — so
two requests still reconstructed the whole book. Stage 2 removes the id-bearing
surface entirely.
### 1. Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1)
- **New:** `src/modules/customer-auth/` — `CustomerJwtStrategy` (passport
strategy `'customer-jwt'`), `CustomerJwtGuard`, `@CustomerAuth()`,
`@CurrentCustomer()`.
- Signed with **`JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET`**, separate from `JWT_SECRET`, and every
token carries **`typ: 'customer'`** which the strategy verifies. Either check
alone would be enough; both are present deliberately.
- Customer state is re-read from the DB on every request, so deactivating or
archiving a customer takes effect at once rather than at token expiry.
- **Reference:** the same split existed there — `auth:api` for admins,
`auth('api-customer')` for the app.
### 2. Real OTP (D6)
- **New table `CustomerOtp`** (migration `20260922000000_customer_otp`,
additive: one new table, nothing existing touched).
- `POST /api/customer/auth/request-otp` ← `ApiMobileController::userAuth` (:39-49)
- `POST /api/customer/auth/verify-otp` ← `ApiMobileController::userVerfiy` (:51-64)
- **Parity behaviour:** the 4-digit `rand(1000,9999)` range, the
active-customer filter, `Utility::faTOen()` digit normalisation on both the
number and the code, and rejection on mismatch.
- **Deliberate improvements over the reference** (user-approved, recorded in
DECISIONS.md so the matrix does not flag them later):
- the code is stored as a **bcrypt hash**, never plain text;
- it **expires** after 2 minutes (the reference's never did);
- **5 attempts** per challenge, then lockout (the reference had no limit);
- **single use** — a consumed code cannot be replayed;
- **send throttle**: 60s cooldown per number, 5 per number and 20 per IP per
10 minutes, counted off the table so it survives restarts;
- **no enumeration** — an unregistered number returns the same `{sent:true}`.
The reference's `firstOrFail()` leaked a 404 for unknown numbers.
- No SMS gateway exists in this project (STUB-02), so the code is logged in
non-production only and the message is persisted as an `SmsMessage` row. The
reference's message text is kept verbatim for when a gateway lands.
### 3. The id-bearing customer routes are gone
- **Deleted** `customers.controller.ts` — with it `GET /customers`,
`/customers/:id`, `/:id/orders`, `/:id/ledger-entries`.
- **Replaced by** `/api/customer/me`, `/me/orders`, `/me/ledger-entries`, which
take the id **from the token**. There is no longer any route that accepts a
customer id, so the IDOR is closed structurally rather than by a check.
- `CustomersService` stays and is reached only through those routes.
- The admin panel was unaffected — it uses `admin/customers-omde/*`.
### 4. Both apps migrated together (parity rule)
- `stores/session.ts`: `token` is now the credential and `isLoggedIn` is
token-based. `customerId` is kept for display only and is no longer an
identity claim.
- `api/client.ts`: sends `Authorization: Bearer`, throws `UnauthorizedError` on
401 and calls the handler registered in `main.ts`, which clears the session
and routes to login so stale personal data cannot stay on screen.
- `LoginView.vue`: real two-step OTP. Each app keeps its own markup and styling;
only the logic changed, and it is identical in both.
- The four account screens now call `getMe()` / `getMyOrders()` /
`getMyLedgerEntries()`; router guards test `isLoggedIn`.
### Tests
- `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh` extended with the stage-2 assertions:
**46 passed, 0 failed** against a live server — old routes 404, customer
routes 401 without a token, wrong/reused code 401, correct code 200, throttle
429, no enumeration, customer token rejected on admin routes and admin token
rejected on customer routes, no id-bearing surface, and `/customer/me`
returning the token's own customer.
- **jest installed** (dev-only, user-approved) with `jest.config.cjs`, so
`pnpm test` works for the first time: **7 passed** covering `faToEn`.
`faToEn` moved to its own `digits.ts` so it can be tested without booting Nest.
- Typecheck clean on api, user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.