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parity(docs): record user decisions D0-D12 and urgent investigation results

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Phase 0 gate passed. All rulings recorded in docs/parity/DECISIONS.md and
applied to PROTECTED.md, PROGRESS.md and ISSUES.md. No source code changed.

Urgent investigations requested by the user, all evidence-cited:

- percent trace: the target's implementation is WRONG. `percent` is the
  customer's OWN column in the reference (customer_add.php:32), a per-customer
  making-charge offset used to shift catalogue filter bounds
  (ApiMobileController.php:391-396,76-77). The target reads the referring
  agent's wagePercent instead (admin-customers.service.ts:245) and never
  writes the field at all. It is NOT part of the price formula -- that extra
  percent comes from a global ConfigStatic row (ProductVariant.php:50,183).
  Two unrelated `percent` keys exist and must not be confused with it.

- @Public audit: 15 routes across 7 controllers, grouped by risk. Group A is
  5 ledger routes (4 writes) that contradict decision D1; group B is 3 order
  routes incl. a public status change accepting a client-supplied
  actorAdminUserId; group C is 8 reads, of which only the catalogue, pricing,
  slider and uploads are legitimately public.

- Login leak: it is in the TARGET. GET /customers is public and returns every
  active customer with national ID numbers, debts and ID-document URLs.
  passwordHash is correctly excluded. Not possible in the reference.

Also logged 5 customer-module defects found in the deep check the user asked
for (CUST-01..05), including the fullName collapse the user reported.

Skill updated per D12: Step C gains rule C0 (field-by-field matrix, never
page-by-page) and Step E gains rule E0 (mandatory 4-step round-trip test).

[ref: henza_server, henza_admin]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
s.esmaeili
2026-09-21 23:26:35 +03:30
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 71192ba2ba
commit 004a3945c2
4 changed files with 481 additions and 29 deletions
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docs/parity/ISSUES.md
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@@ -17,12 +17,28 @@ Severity: `Critical` (money loss / security / data loss) · `High` · `Medium`
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEC-01 | Critical | REF `henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272` | The whole admin route file is **unauthenticated** — the `Route::middleware('auth:api')->group(...)` wrapper is commented out at both ends, leaving all ~215 admin routes public (incl. `wallet/charge`, `users`, `roles`). | Verified by reading both lines. | n/a in reference (read-only). Drives TGT decision below. |
| SEC-02 | Critical | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7`, `orders/orders.controller.ts:7`, `customers/customers.controller.ts:5`, `catalog/catalog.controller.ts:5`, `pricing/pricing.controller.ts:5` | 15 routes carry `@Public()`, including **ledger writes** (`POST accounting/repayments/*`, `entries/:id/confirm`) and `POST /api/orders` + `PATCH /api/orders/:id/status`. The public status DTO accepts a client-supplied `actorAdminUserId`, so a caller can attribute an action to any admin. | `grep -rn "@Public()"`; source comments say "pre-existing unauthenticated endpoint". | Introduce customer-session auth for the app-facing routes; move ledger/status writes behind the admin guard. **[replicated]** from SEC-01. |
| SEC-03 | Critical | TGT `apps/user-app/src/views/user/LoginView.vue`, `apps/user-app-v2/` same | OTP is **not verified** — any 4-digit code logs the user in. Login also downloads the **entire customer list** (`GET /api/customers`) and matches the phone number client-side, exposing every customer's data to any visitor. | Both inventory agents verified independently; `customers.controller.ts:5` is `@Public()`. | Implement a real server-side OTP issue/verify pair; never ship the customer list to the client. |
| SEC-03 | Critical | TGT `apps/user-app/src/views/user/LoginView.vue`, `apps/user-app-v2/` same | OTP is **not verified** — any 4-digit code logs the user in. This is a **parity gap**: the reference does verify it (`ApiMobileController.php:51-57`, mismatch → HTTP 422). | `DECISIONS.md` D6 | **FIXING — D6** (plus expiry + attempt limits, which exceed the reference) |
| SEC-08 | Critical | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/customers/customers.service.ts:6-23,44-50` + `customers.controller.ts:10` (`@Public()`) | **Full customer book exposed to anonymous callers.** Login downloads `GET /customers` and matches the phone client-side, so the endpoint returns **every** active customer with `fullName`, `mobile`, **`nationalCode`**, `goldDebtGrams`, `fiatDebtRial`, `goldCreditLimitGrams`, and the URLs of **national-ID / business-licence / shop scans** (and `GET uploads/:filename` is public too, so those URLs resolve). `passwordHash` is correctly excluded. Not possible in the reference, where `userVerfiy` returned **one** customer after the code matched. | Read `customers.service.ts:5-23`; `DECISIONS.md` D8 | Fixed as a side-effect of D6: once OTP verify returns the authenticated customer, take `GET /customers` off the public surface. |
| SEC-09 | Critical | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7` | `@Public()` on the whole accounting controller exposes **5 routes, 4 of them writes**: reconcile a balance, record a gold repayment, record a rial repayment, confirm a ledger entry. Faithful to the reference (whose admin routes were all unauthenticated) but contradicts the confirmed decision D1. | `DECISIONS.md` §"@Public audit" group A | Put behind the admin guard with the matching wallet/document rid — **awaiting user approval** |
| SEC-10 | High | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts:22` | `PATCH orders/:id/status` is public **and** its DTO accepts a client-supplied `actorAdminUserId`, so an anonymous caller can move an order's status and attribute it to any admin. In the reference this was an admin operation. | `DECISIONS.md` §"@Public audit" B3 | Protect with the order-status rid |
| SEC-04 | High | TGT `apps/api` (two files) | `JWT_SECRET` falls back to `'dev-only-insecure-secret'` and is absent from `.env.example`. `enableCors()` is wide open. | Reported by api inventory; see `_inv-tgt-api.md` §11. | Require the env var at boot; restrict CORS origins. |
| SEC-05 | High | TGT `apps/api/prisma/seed.ts` | Seed creates a SUPER_ADMIN (`09128081392`) whose **password equals the phone number**, holding all 144 rids. Marked DEV-ONLY in comments but lives in the normal seed. | `docs/CHANGELOG-PORT-HISTORY.md` §4 documents this as intentional for dev. | Gate behind an explicit env flag so it can never run outside dev. |
| SEC-06 | High | REF `henza_server` | Hardcoded secrets committed to the repo: SMS panel password, PayPing bearer token, Tahesab bearer + IP allowlist, wallet hash pepper (`"yhoenszeaf"`). | See `_inv-ref-server.md` §11.4. | Rotate all of them before any deployment that reuses these credentials. |
| SEC-07 | Medium | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/admin-customers/admin-customers.service.ts` | `setRoles` stores arbitrary strings as rids with no validation against `ALL_RIDS`. | api inventory §9. | Validate against the rid catalogue. |
## Customer / person module (found during the user-requested deep check)
> These are **parity defects being fixed**, not deferred items — see
> `DECISIONS.md` D0, D9, D10, D11. Listed here so the trail is complete.
| ID | Severity | Where | Description | Evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CUST-01 | Critical | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/admin-customers/admin-customers.service.ts:231-233` | **First and last name collapse.** The reference stores `fname`/`lname` as two columns; the target merged them into `fullName` and returns `fname: c.fullName, lname: ''`. Opening any edit form puts the whole name in the first-name box and blanks the surname; saving then persists that. `singleCustomer.vue` tries to compensate with `split(' ')`, which mis-splits multi-part names. | REF `database/migrations/2020_10_01_120430_customers_table.php:18-19` (two columns) vs TGT `:231-233`. Reported by the user from live use. | **FIXING — D0** |
| CUST-02 | Critical | TGT same file `:245`, `:600-658` | **`percent` read from the wrong entity and never written.** Target returns `c.referredByAgent?.wagePercent`; the reference reads the customer's **own** `percent` column. `update()` ignores `data.percent` entirely, so editing the field does nothing. The create-time default (3) and the admin-path `required` rule are both missing, as is the app-side `filterPercentPay` offset. | REF `database/migrations/2020_10_19_153228_customer_add.php:32`; `AdminController.php:338,354`; `ApiMobileController.php:391-396,76-77`. Full trace in `DECISIONS.md` §percent. | **FIXING — D9** |
| CUST-03 | High | TGT `apps/admin-panel/src/views/apps/customer/ReagentCustomer.vue:97-110` | **Sales-expert form is missing 5 reference fields:** `ncode`, `phone`, `city_id`, `gram_level`, `reagent_id`. The reference form had 15; the target has 8. Likely because `AdminUser` lacks those columns. | REF `henza_admin/src/views/apps/customer/ReagentCustomer.vue` (15 `v-decorator` fields) vs TGT form object. | **INVESTIGATING — D10** |
| CUST-04 | Low | TGT `apps/admin-panel/src/views/apps/customer/singleCustomer.vue:91` | Still spreads the whole form on save while the other two customer forms send a diff. Harmless today (4 fields, all repopulated) but the same shape that caused the earlier data loss. | read at `:80-106` | **FIXING — D11** |
| CUST-05 | Low | TGT `apps/admin-panel/src/views/apps/customer/bulkCustomer.vue` | Diff-send on edit is a **deliberate deviation** from the reference, which posts all 15 fields on every save. Recorded so it is not "fixed" back. | `DECISIONS.md` D11 | accepted deviation |
## Money, stock & data integrity
| ID | Severity | Where | Description | Evidence | Suggested fix |