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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5 4efe543d62 parity(api,apps): security hotfix stage 2 - real customer sessions, close IDOR

Stage 1 narrowed GET /customers but did not close the leak: the response still
carried every customer id, and /customers/:id, /:id/orders and
/:id/ledger-entries were still public, so the full customer book was still two
requests away. The user caught this. Stage 2 deletes the id-bearing surface.

Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1):
  - new src/modules/customer-auth/ with its own passport strategy,
    CustomerJwtGuard, @CustomerAuth() and @CurrentCustomer()
  - signed with JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, and every token carries typ:'customer'
    which the strategy verifies; both checks are present deliberately
  - customer state re-read per request, so deactivating takes effect at once
  - mirrors the reference's own split: auth:api vs auth('api-customer')

Real OTP (D6), porting ApiMobileController::userAuth/userVerfiy (:39-64):
  - new CustomerOtp table, additive migration, nothing existing touched
  - parity behaviour: rand(1000,9999), active-customer filter, faTOen digit
    normalisation on both number and code, rejection on mismatch
  - approved improvements over the reference: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-minute
    expiry, 5 attempts then lockout, single use, send throttle (60s per
    number, 5/number and 20/IP per 10 min), and no number enumeration

Routes removed, replaced by token-derived equivalents:
  GET customers, customers/:id, /:id/orders, /:id/ledger-entries
    -> GET customer/me, customer/me/orders, customer/me/ledger-entries
No route accepts a customer id any more, so the IDOR is closed structurally
rather than by a check. The admin panel was unaffected (admin/customers-omde/*).

Both apps migrated in the same commit per the v1/v2 parity rule: token-based
session store, Bearer header, 401 -> clear session and route to login, real
two-step OTP login. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only logic moved.

Tests: auth-smoke.sh extended with the stage-2 assertions, 46 passed 0 failed
against a live server. jest installed dev-only (user-approved) so pnpm test
works for the first time: 7 passed covering faToEn, which moved to its own
digits.ts to be testable without booting Nest. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.

[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:39-78]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-22 01:20:00 +03:30

8.0 KiB

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PROGRESS — Reference Parity Project

Read this file FIRST at the start of every session and after every /compact. Rules live in CLAUDE.md (workspace root). Method lives in the reference-parity-audit skill.

Current state

Field	Value
Phase	Security hotfix — stages 1 and 2 ✅ complete
Branch	`parity/security-hotfix`
Status	Both stages done and verified live: 46/46 smoke assertions, 7/7 jest unit tests, typecheck + build clean on all three projects.
Next step	Show the user the D0 (firstName/lastName) and `percent` migrations for approval, then start `01-ADMIN-MATRIX.md` field-by-field (D12)
Blocked on	user approval of those two migrations before they run
Last updated	2026-09-22

Security hotfix — final result

Route	Was	Now
`GET accounting/customers/:id/balance`	public	admin, rid `wallet.list`
`POST accounting/customers/:id/reconcile`	public write	admin, rid `wallet.charge`
`POST accounting/repayments/gold`	public write	admin, rid `document.create`
`POST accounting/repayments/rial`	public write	admin, rid `document.create`
`POST accounting/entries/:id/confirm`	public write	admin, rid `document.list.confirm`
`PATCH orders/:id/status`	public write	admin, rid `order.list.sts.submit`
`GET customers`	every customer, 18 fields	route deleted
`GET customers/:id`	public	route deleted → `GET customer/me` (token)
`GET customers/:id/orders`	public	route deleted → `GET customer/me/orders` (token)
`GET customers/:id/ledger-entries`	public	route deleted → `GET customer/me/ledger-entries` (token)
—	—	new `POST customer/auth/request-otp` · `verify-otp`

Still public by design: catalog/products, pricing/latest, home/slider, uploads/:filename (ruling T2), and POST /orders + GET /orders/:id — the last two are logged as SEC-02/B1-B2 and want a customer-token pass of their own.

Tests

apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh (live server): 46 passed, 0 failed. Run it with API=http://localhost:3000/api CODE_LOG=/path/to/api.log.
pnpm test in apps/api (jest, newly installed): 7 passed.
Typecheck: api ✅ · user-app ✅ · user-app-v2 ✅. Both apps build ✅.

⚠️ Correction worth remembering

Stage 1 reported the customer-book leak as "mitigated" after narrowing the GET /customers field list. That was wrong: the response still returned every customer id, and the three /customers/:id* routes were still public, so the full data was still two requests away. The user caught it. Stage 2 deleted the whole id-bearing surface instead. Narrowing a response is not closing a leak while the id and the id-addressed routes remain.

⚠️ Read `DECISIONS.md` before doing anything

All user rulings live there (D0–D12). Highlights that change how work is done:

D12 — the matrix is FIELD-BY-FIELD, not page-by-page, and a 4-step round-trip test per entity is mandatory. Both rules were added to the reference-parity-audit skill (Step C rule C0, Step E rule E0).
D0 — split fullName into firstName/lastName via an additive migration; show the migration and get approval before running it.
D4 — never port broken behaviour, but match calculations/rounding/messages exactly; annotate each non-replication «عمداً تکرار نشد — ISSUE #n».
D2 — target-only features get status ➕ and are left alone.

Phase checklist

P0.1 — All 3 reference folders readable (henza_server, henza_admin, henza_pwa)
P0.2 — Branch parity/phase-0 + docs/parity/ created
P0.3 — Inventory all 7 projects → _inv-*.md (8111 lines total) → consolidated in 00-INVENTORY.md
P0.4 — Mapping tables, missing list, extra list (00-INVENTORY.md §2–4)
P0.5 — Draft PROTECTED.md
P0.6 — GATE passed — PROTECTED.md confirmed, D0–D12 recorded
P0.7 — Urgent traces delivered: percent, @Public list, login leak
P0.8 — Skill updated with rules C0 (field-by-field) and E0 (round-trip test)
P1.0 — user approves: 5 ledger routes, percent column, D0 migration ← HERE
Phase 1 — Admin parity (branch parity/phase-1-admin, 01-ADMIN-MATRIX.md)
GATE: "Admin parity is complete and tested. Shall we move on to the apps (user-app & user-app-v2)?"
Phase 2 — Apps parity (02-APPS-MATRIX.md, both user apps)
Phase 3 — Work through ISSUES.md (only when user asks)

Answered — see `DECISIONS.md` for the full text

#	Ruling
D0	Split `fullName` → `firstName`/`lastName`, additive migration, backfill, sync, report multi-token rows. Approval needed before running.
D1	Target's stricter auth stands. Build the "reference operation ↔ rid" matrix; explain 172 vs 174.
D2	Audit only what the reference has. Target-only features → ➕, untouched.
D3	Build the 5 missing screens in Phase 2, both apps, plus analytics, `isLoaded`/`sts_verify_step_two` guards, guest toast+home, and v2's cart ceiling.
D4	Don't port breakage; do match calculations/rounding/messages. Unit-test the price formula.
D5	Leave the stray folder; delete last, own commit.
D6	OTP must verify — parity gap, fix it (plus expiry + attempt limits, which exceed the reference).
D7	`@Public` ledger routes: list delivered, awaiting approval to protect.
D8	Login leak: target, full customer book incl. national IDs and debts.
D9	`percent`: trace delivered — the target's implementation is wrong.
D10	Sales expert: keep `AdminUser`; investigate the 5 missing fields; propose `SalesExpertProfile`.
D11	`singleCustomer.vue` → diff-send.
D12	Field-by-field matrix + mandatory round-trip test. Added to the skill.

Open — awaiting user approval

Protect the 5 @Public ledger-write routes (DECISIONS.md group A).
percent schema change — add makingChargeOffsetPercent to Customer.
D0 migration file — must be shown and approved before it runs.

Key context (survives context loss)

Domain correction: the reference is a gold-jewellery B2B/B2C e-commerce system, not a gold bank. No buy/sell order book, no spread, no deposit/withdraw, no P2P transfer, no KYC levels, no daily limits (only gram_level), no payment callback route, no cron, no websockets. See 00-INVENTORY.md §0.
The gold price formula (Phase 1 row #1) — henza_server/app/Models/ProductVariant.php:183-190: +extra% → +7% margin → +9% VAT on the non-metal portion only → ×grams → floor(/1000)*1000. Three superseded commented-out variants above it apply VAT to the whole price — do not port those.
A large prior port already happened — see docs/ADMIN-PORT-PLAN.md and docs/CHANGELOG-PORT-HISTORY.md (80 views, 25 Nest modules, 29 Prisma models, 154 admin routes, 144/144 rids). Prior port notes no view was ever visually verified in a browser.
Stack changed across the port: Laravel→NestJS/Prisma, Vue2/Vuesax→Vue3/antd. Port behaviour, not code style.
Reference scale is inflated: 541 admin .vue files but only ~69 reachable (rest are Vuexy template demos); 9 reference router files are dead (not imported); ~28 legacy Django-era DB tables have no migrations.
v1 ⇄ v2 logic gaps (5, all v2 behind v1) are parity work, not design: ISSUES.md MON-01, V2-01..05.

Inventory files (Phase 0 working files)

File	Scope	Lines
`_inv-ref-server.md`	henza_server	1313
`_inv-tgt-api.md`	apps/api	1179
`_inv-ref-admin.md`	henza_admin	1705
`_inv-tgt-admin.md`	apps/admin-panel	1261
`_inv-ref-pwa.md`	henza_pwa	1178
`_inv-tgt-userapp.md`	apps/user-app	612
`_inv-tgt-userappv2.md`	apps/user-app-v2	700

Consolidated into 00-INVENTORY.md. Issues found: ISSUES.md (26 entries).

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