The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger. POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token; the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes that id explicitly, behind the admin guard. GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id route because Nest matches in declaration order. Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered customerId, which is no longer a credential. OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere; one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by NODE_ENV !== 'production'. Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line. Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement; logged rather than changed, per D4. Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api, user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types. [ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
187 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript
187 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { Injectable, Logger, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
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import { OrderChannel, OrderStatus, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
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import { PrismaService } from '../../prisma/prisma.service';
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import { CatalogService } from '../catalog/catalog.service';
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import { LedgerService } from '../accounting/ledger.service';
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import { CreateOrderDto } from './dto/create-order.dto';
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interface ComputedItem {
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productVariantId: string;
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quantity: number;
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rashWeightGramsSnapshot: Prisma.Decimal;
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wagePercentSnapshot: Prisma.Decimal;
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discountPercentSnapshot: Prisma.Decimal;
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computedWeightGrams: Prisma.Decimal;
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flatRialCharge: Prisma.Decimal;
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}
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@Injectable()
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export class OrdersService {
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private readonly logger = new Logger(OrdersService.name);
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constructor(
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private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
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private readonly catalog: CatalogService,
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private readonly ledger: LedgerService,
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) {}
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/**
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* Places a stock order. Per line item:
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* w = rashWeightGrams * (1 + (wagePercent - discountPercent) / 100)
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* mirrors legacy ApiMobileController::setOrder. Debt is NOT posted here —
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* only once the order reaches DELIVERED_TO_AGENT (see updateStatus).
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*/
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/**
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* @param customerId taken from the caller's token by the controller, NEVER
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* from the request body. The body's `customerId` is ignored; see the note
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* on CreateOrderDto.
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*/
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async createOrder(dto: CreateOrderDto, customerId: string) {
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const customer = await this.prisma.customer.findUnique({ where: { id: customerId } });
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if (!customer) throw new NotFoundException(`Customer ${customerId} not found`);
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// The apps still send customerId in the body (removed from them in Phase 2).
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// It is not used for anything; a mismatch means either a stale client or an
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// attempt to order on someone else's account, and both are worth seeing.
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if (dto.customerId && dto.customerId !== customerId) {
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this.logger.warn(
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`Order body carried customerId=${dto.customerId} but the token is ${customerId}; ` +
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`the token wins.`,
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);
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}
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const computedItems: ComputedItem[] = await Promise.all(
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dto.items.map(async (item) => {
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const variant = await this.catalog.getVariantOrThrow(item.productVariantId);
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const rashWeight = new Prisma.Decimal(variant.rashWeightGrams);
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const wagePercent = new Prisma.Decimal(item.wagePercent);
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const discountPercent = new Prisma.Decimal(item.discountPercent ?? 0);
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const netPercent = wagePercent.sub(discountPercent);
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const computedWeightGrams = rashWeight.mul(netPercent.div(100).add(1));
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return {
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productVariantId: variant.id,
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quantity: item.quantity,
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rashWeightGramsSnapshot: rashWeight,
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wagePercentSnapshot: wagePercent,
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discountPercentSnapshot: discountPercent,
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computedWeightGrams,
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flatRialCharge: new Prisma.Decimal(item.flatRialCharge ?? 0),
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};
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}),
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);
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const totalGoldWeightGrams = computedItems.reduce(
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(sum, item) => sum.add(item.computedWeightGrams.mul(item.quantity)),
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new Prisma.Decimal(0),
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);
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const totalRashWeightGrams = computedItems.reduce(
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(sum, item) => sum.add(item.rashWeightGramsSnapshot.mul(item.quantity)),
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new Prisma.Decimal(0),
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);
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const wageWeightGrams = totalGoldWeightGrams.sub(totalRashWeightGrams);
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const flatRialCharge = computedItems.reduce(
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(sum, item) => sum.add(item.flatRialCharge.mul(item.quantity)),
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new Prisma.Decimal(0),
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);
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// legacy: inValidOrder = (allGram + customer.remain) > customer.gram_level
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const isSuspendedOverCreditLimit = totalGoldWeightGrams
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.add(customer.goldDebtGrams)
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.gt(customer.goldCreditLimitGrams);
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const initialStatus = isSuspendedOverCreditLimit ? OrderStatus.SUSPENDED : OrderStatus.PLACED;
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return this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
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const order = await tx.order.create({
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data: {
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orderNumber: this.generateOrderNumber(),
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customerId,
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branchId: dto.branchId,
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channel: dto.channel ?? OrderChannel.RETAIL,
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status: initialStatus,
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totalGoldWeightGrams,
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wageWeightGrams,
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flatRialCharge,
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isSuspendedOverCreditLimit,
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items: {
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create: computedItems.map((item) => ({
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productVariantId: item.productVariantId,
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quantity: item.quantity,
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rashWeightGramsSnapshot: item.rashWeightGramsSnapshot,
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wagePercentSnapshot: item.wagePercentSnapshot,
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discountPercentSnapshot: item.discountPercentSnapshot,
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computedWeightGrams: item.computedWeightGrams,
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flatRialCharge: item.flatRialCharge,
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})),
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},
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statusEvents: {
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create: { toStatus: initialStatus, note: isSuspendedOverCreditLimit ? 'Credit limit exceeded' : undefined },
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},
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},
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include: { items: true, statusEvents: true },
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});
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return order;
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});
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}
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async updateStatus(orderId: string, newStatus: OrderStatus, actorAdminUserId?: string, note?: string) {
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return this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
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const order = await tx.order.findUnique({ where: { id: orderId } });
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if (!order) throw new NotFoundException(`Order ${orderId} not found`);
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const updated = await tx.order.update({
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where: { id: orderId },
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data: {
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status: newStatus,
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deliveredAt: newStatus === OrderStatus.DELIVERED_TO_CUSTOMER ? new Date() : order.deliveredAt,
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},
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});
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await tx.orderStatusEvent.create({
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data: { orderId, fromStatus: order.status, toStatus: newStatus, note, actorAdminUserId },
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});
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// Debt recognition point — mirrors legacy sts>4, which first becomes true
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// at sts=5 ("تحویل مسئول فروش" / delivered to agent), not sts=6 (delivered
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// to customer). Only fires once: a second transition into this status
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// (e.g. a data-fix re-save) would double-post debt, so guard on the order
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// not already having deliveredAt.
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if (newStatus === OrderStatus.DELIVERED_TO_AGENT && !order.deliveredAt) {
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await this.ledger.postOrderDebt(orderId, tx);
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}
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return updated;
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});
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}
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/** Unscoped read. Only reachable from the admin-guarded route. */
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getById(orderId: string) {
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return this.prisma.order.findUnique({
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where: { id: orderId },
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include: { items: true, statusEvents: true, ledgerEntries: true },
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});
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}
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/**
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* A customer reading one of their own orders.
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*
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* Someone else's order is reported as 404, not 403: a 403 would confirm the
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* id exists, which is the same enumeration leak the id-addressed customer
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* routes had.
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*/
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async getOwnedById(orderId: string, customerId: string) {
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const order = await this.prisma.order.findFirst({
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where: { id: orderId, customerId },
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include: { items: true, statusEvents: true, ledgerEntries: true },
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});
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if (!order) throw new NotFoundException('سفارش یافت نشد');
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return order;
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}
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private generateOrderNumber(): string {
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const random = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8).toUpperCase();
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return `ORD-${Date.now()}-${random}`;
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}
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}
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