tehran_taj/docs/parity/ISSUES.md

ISSUES — logged, NOT fixed during parity

Anything found during the parity audit that is a bug, risk, smell or improvement opportunity goes here. Do not fix these while parity work is in progress (see CLAUDE.md §3). They are worked through in Phase 3, only when the user asks.

Severity: Critical (money loss / security / data loss) · High · Medium · Low

Paths are relative to the workspace root (gold bank/). "REF" = reference project (read-only). "TGT" = gold-banking-monorepo. Items marked [replicated] exist in the reference and were faithfully ported — fixing them is a product decision, not a parity fix.

Security & auth

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Suggested fix
SEC-01	Critical	REF henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272	The whole admin route file is unauthenticated — the Route::middleware('auth:api')->group(...) wrapper is commented out at both ends, leaving all ~215 admin routes public (incl. wallet/charge, users, roles).	Verified by reading both lines.	n/a in reference (read-only). Drives TGT decision below.
SEC-02	Critical FIXED — hotfix stage 3	TGT apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7, orders/orders.controller.ts:7, customers/customers.controller.ts:5, catalog/catalog.controller.ts:5, pricing/pricing.controller.ts:5	15 routes carry @Public(), including ledger writes (POST accounting/repayments/*, entries/:id/confirm) and POST /api/orders + PATCH /api/orders/:id/status. The public status DTO accepts a client-supplied actorAdminUserId, so a caller can attribute an action to any admin.	grep -rn "@Public()"; source comments say "pre-existing unauthenticated endpoint".	✅ All closed across stages 1-3. Ledger + order-status behind admin rids; customer routes behind the customer JWT; POST /orders takes the customer from the token and ignores the body. Only catalog/products, pricing/latest, home/slider and uploads/:filename remain public, all by design.
SEC-03	Critical FIXED — hotfix stage 2	TGT apps/user-app/src/views/user/LoginView.vue, apps/user-app-v2/ same	OTP is not verified — any 4-digit code logs the user in. This is a parity gap: the reference does verify it (ApiMobileController.php:51-57, mismatch → HTTP 422).	DECISIONS.md D6	✅ Real server-side OTP: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-min expiry, 5 attempts, single use, send throttle, no enumeration. Verified end-to-end by auth-smoke.sh.
SEC-08	Critical FIXED — hotfix stage 2	TGT apps/api/src/modules/customers/customers.service.ts:6-23,44-50 + customers.controller.ts:10 (@Public())	Full customer book exposed to anonymous callers. Login downloads GET /customers and matches the phone client-side, so the endpoint returns every active customer with fullName, mobile, nationalCode, goldDebtGrams, fiatDebtRial, goldCreditLimitGrams, and the URLs of national-ID / business-licence / shop scans (and GET uploads/:filename is public too, so those URLs resolve). passwordHash is correctly excluded. Not possible in the reference, where userVerfiy returned one customer after the code matched.	Read customers.service.ts:5-23; DECISIONS.md D8	✅ Closed. The whole controller is deleted — no route accepts a customer id any more. Reads moved to token-derived /customer/me*. Stage 1 had only narrowed the fields, which left the ids and the :id routes exposed.
SEC-09	Critical FIXED — hotfix stage 1	TGT apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7	@Public() on the whole accounting controller exposes 5 routes, 4 of them writes: reconcile a balance, record a gold repayment, record a rial repayment, confirm a ledger entry. Faithful to the reference (whose admin routes were all unauthenticated) but contradicts the confirmed decision D1.	DECISIONS.md §"@Public audit" group A	✅ Done: rids wallet.list, wallet.charge, document.create ×2, document.list.confirm. Verified 401/403/pass-through by apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh.
SEC-10	High FIXED — hotfix stage 1	TGT apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts:22	PATCH orders/:id/status is public and its DTO accepts a client-supplied actorAdminUserId, so an anonymous caller can move an order's status and attribute it to any admin. In the reference this was an admin operation.	DECISIONS.md §"@Public audit" B3	✅ Done: order.list.sts.submit. Had no caller — the admin panel uses admin/orders/status.
SEC-04	High	TGT apps/api (two files)	JWT_SECRET falls back to 'dev-only-insecure-secret' and is absent from .env.example. enableCors() is wide open.	Reported by api inventory; see _inv-tgt-api.md §11.	Require the env var at boot; restrict CORS origins.
SEC-05	High	TGT apps/api/prisma/seed.ts	Seed creates a SUPER_ADMIN (09128081392) whose password equals the phone number, holding all 144 rids. Marked DEV-ONLY in comments but lives in the normal seed.	docs/CHANGELOG-PORT-HISTORY.md §4 documents this as intentional for dev.	Gate behind an explicit env flag so it can never run outside dev.
SEC-06	High	REF henza_server	Hardcoded secrets committed to the repo: SMS panel password, PayPing bearer token, Tahesab bearer + IP allowlist, wallet hash pepper ("yhoenszeaf").	See _inv-ref-server.md §11.4.	Rotate all of them before any deployment that reuses these credentials.
SEC-07	Medium	TGT apps/api/src/modules/admin-customers/admin-customers.service.ts	setRoles stores arbitrary strings as rids with no validation against ALL_RIDS.	api inventory §9.	Validate against the rid catalogue.

Customer / person module (found during the user-requested deep check)

These are parity defects being fixed, not deferred items — see DECISIONS.md D0, D9, D10, D11. Listed here so the trail is complete.

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Status
CUST-01	Critical	TGT apps/api/src/modules/admin-customers/admin-customers.service.ts:231-233	First and last name collapse. The reference stores fname/lname as two columns; the target merged them into fullName and returns fname: c.fullName, lname: ''. Opening any edit form puts the whole name in the first-name box and blanks the surname; saving then persists that. singleCustomer.vue tries to compensate with split(' '), which mis-splits multi-part names.	REF database/migrations/2020_10_01_120430_customers_table.php:18-19 (two columns) vs TGT :231-233. Reported by the user from live use.	FIXING — D0
CUST-02	Critical	TGT same file :245, :600-658	percent read from the wrong entity and never written. Target returns c.referredByAgent?.wagePercent; the reference reads the customer's own percent column. update() ignores data.percent entirely, so editing the field does nothing. The create-time default (3) and the admin-path required rule are both missing, as is the app-side filterPercentPay offset.	REF database/migrations/2020_10_19_153228_customer_add.php:32; AdminController.php:338,354; ApiMobileController.php:391-396,76-77. Full trace in DECISIONS.md §percent.	FIXING — D9
CUST-03	High	TGT apps/admin-panel/src/views/apps/customer/ReagentCustomer.vue:97-110	Sales-expert form is missing 5 reference fields: ncode, phone, city_id, gram_level, reagent_id. The reference form had 15; the target has 8. Likely because AdminUser lacks those columns.	REF henza_admin/src/views/apps/customer/ReagentCustomer.vue (15 v-decorator fields) vs TGT form object.	INVESTIGATING — D10
CUST-04	Low	TGT apps/admin-panel/src/views/apps/customer/singleCustomer.vue:91	Still spreads the whole form on save while the other two customer forms send a diff. Harmless today (4 fields, all repopulated) but the same shape that caused the earlier data loss.	read at :80-106	FIXING — D11
CUST-05	Low	TGT apps/admin-panel/src/views/apps/customer/bulkCustomer.vue	Diff-send on edit is a deliberate deviation from the reference, which posts all 15 fields on every save. Recorded so it is not "fixed" back.	DECISIONS.md D11	accepted deviation

Money, stock & data integrity

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Suggested fix
MON-01	Critical	TGT apps/user-app-v2/src/stores/cartStore.ts	v2 has no capQty / maxQty stock ceiling, which user-app does have (apps/user-app/src/stores/cartStore.ts:62,65; components/product/CartItem.vue:82-83). A v2 user can order more units than exist.	Verified by grep across both apps — zero hits in v2.	Port the ceiling to v2 (this is also a Phase 2 parity gap, row to be added to 02-APPS-MATRIX.md).
MON-02	High	REF henza_server wallet package	The wallet balance column mixes grams and toman in one field, and money operations are not wrapped in DB transactions.	_inv-ref-server.md §7.	Separate the units; wrap mutations in transactions.
MON-03	High	TGT apps/api/src/modules/accounting/ledger.service.ts:189	GRAMS_PER_MESGHAL = 4.331802 is a JS float used inside an otherwise-Prisma.Decimal CASH repayment formula, so the divisor is pre-rounded before the Decimal division.	Read at ledger.service.ts:182-190; the source comment already flags the formula for stakeholder review.	Make the constant a Decimal (or a string literal passed to Decimal).
MON-04	High	TGT apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.service.ts	Debt is recognised at DELIVERED_TO_AGENT, but the idempotency guard checks deliveredAt, which is only set by DELIVERED_TO_CUSTOMER — so the debt trigger is not reliably idempotent. There is also no status-transition validation anywhere.	api inventory §8.	Guard on the same field the trigger fires on; add an explicit transition table.
MON-05	Medium	TGT apps/api	canPlaceOrders and verificationStep are stored and toggled by the admin panel but never enforced on any order path.	api inventory §8.	Enforce at order creation, or remove the toggles.
MON-06	Medium	TGT apps/api	Setting rows are never seeded — wallet.config, wallet.birthday, promotion.auto, mobile_main_slider only materialise on first write, so a fresh install has undefined behaviour until an admin saves each one.	api inventory §7.	Seed the defaults.
MON-07	Medium	REF henza_server/app/Models/ProductVariant.php:183-190 vs SingleCustomerOrders.php:67, Order.php:66	Two divergent order-status enums coexist (0–6 and 1–7) for what is conceptually one flow.	Read both models.	Unify, or document the mapping explicitly.

Validation & contracts

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Suggested fix
VAL-01	High	REF henza_server	Zero FormRequests; all validation is inline, and setOrder, wallet charge, setConst and file upload have no validation at all. The wallet package's own validator is dead code (it calls failed() instead of fails()).	_inv-ref-server.md §12.	n/a in reference; informs how much validation the target must add.
VAL-02	High	TGT apps/api	Only 8 DTO classes exist; most admin request bodies are untyped Record<string, unknown>, so class-validator never runs on them.	api inventory §5.	Add DTOs for the admin write paths.
VAL-03	Medium	TGT both user apps	HTTP client is a bare fetch wrapper: no interceptors, no Authorization header, no refresh, no 401 handling, no error toasts. Non-2xx throws a generic Error; call sites mostly console.log(e). Order-submit failure is silent to the user.	apps/user-app/src/api/client.ts, apps/user-app-v2/src/api/client.ts:3.	Add a shared client with error surfacing; compare against henza_pwa/src/service/* in Phase 2.

Parity-relevant divergence between user-app and user-app-v2

CLAUDE.md §2: the only allowed difference is visual design. These are logic differences, so they are Phase 2 parity gaps as well as issues.

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence
V2-01	Critical	v2 missing stock ceiling	see MON-01	grep
V2-02	Medium	v2 missing getHomeSlider() / GET /home/slider admin banner	v1 api/client.ts:152-170 defines AdminSlide + getHomeSlider; v2 has neither	diff apps/user-app/src/api/client.ts apps/user-app-v2/src/api/client.ts
V2-03	Medium	v2 missing per-variant images	v1 defines ProductImageSummary (id/url/sortOrder/role) and imageId/image on the variant; v2's images is just Array<{url:string}>	same diff
V2-04	Medium	v2 missing orderable-first variant defaulting	v1 composables/useProduct.ts:26 picks the first orderable variant; v2 has no equivalent	grep
V2-05	Low	v2 missing variant-chip preview cap + per-chip stock badges	v1 components/product/SingleProduct.vue:388-392	grep

Dead code & maintenance

ID	Severity	Where	Description
DEAD-01	Low	TGT apps/user-app	8 components with no importers, loadingStore, api.getBalance (zero call sites), unused gsap dependency.
DEAD-02	Low	TGT apps/user-app-v2	11 dead components, loadingStore, getBalance, priceUnit/priceUnitRialLess, 12 of 15 validators, unused gsap + @ant-design/icons-vue deps.
DEAD-03	Low	TGT gold-banking-monorepo/user-app-v2/ (repo root, outside apps/)	Stray leftover folder containing only package.json and an older vite.config.ts (hardcoded port 5179, hardcoded proxy, imports a themeConfig that doesn't exist there). Not matched by pnpm-workspace.yaml, so pnpm ignores it. Left in place — deleting it needs user approval.
DEAD-04	Low	REF henza_server/app/Console/Kernel.php	schedule() is empty — no cron. Price refresh / expiry / birthday logic must be driven by OS cron or the GET / web route.
DEAD-05	Low	REF henza_server	PayPing returnUrl points at site/transaction/verify, which is not registered in any route file — the payment callback is unreachable.

Known stubs in the target (not bugs, but not parity either)

ID	Where	Description
STUB-01	TGT both user apps	Registration persists nothing; favourites are in-memory only (lost on reload); notifications is a static empty state; home slides are 3 hardcoded placeholders in v2.
STUB-02	TGT apps/api	No OTP, no SMS provider, no payment gateway/callbacks, no cron, no websockets. SMS and notifications are DB-persistence only.
STUB-03	TGT both user apps	All list filtering and "pagination" is client-side over one flat GET /catalog/products; no server page/limit params. "Pagination" is a 20-item IntersectionObserver window.
STUB-04	TGT both user apps	Live price is pull-on-mount only (GET /pricing/latest?karatPerMille=750) — no socket, no SSE, no polling interval. quotedAt renders as a Jalali date only, so a stale rate looks current.

Found during the stage-3 OTP audit

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Status
SEC-11	High	TGT apps/api/src/modules/customer-auth/customer-auth.service.ts (deliver)	The OTP message text, code included, was persisted to SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text searches (admin-misc.service.ts:135-136). Any operator holding the sms rid could read live codes — defeating the bcrypt hashing of codeHash.	Read both files; grid allowed includes body.	✅ Fixed in stage 3: the persisted row is a redacted audit line.
MON-08	Medium	TGT apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.service.ts:40-52	wagePercent, discountPercent and flatRialCharge are taken from the client on order creation, so a caller can set their own making charge. rashWeightGrams is correctly read from the variant. The reference is worse — ApiMobileController.php:538-539,619 takes rash_weight from the client too — so this is a partial improvement already. Reported per the user's instruction to flag client-supplied pricing.	REF :536-545,615-632 vs TGT :40-52	Log only (D4). Fix in Phase 2 alongside the price-formula work.

Found while classifying scope for D13

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Status
DOC-01	Medium	DOC docs/parity/_inv-ref-server.md:588 (§3.6)	The Phase 0 inventory undercounted routes/admin.php: it recorded 117 explicit routes where the file has 151 live ones (6 more are commented out). Every downstream total inherited the error, so the reference endpoint count was reported as 369 when it is 412 (admin 249, not 215). No code is affected — only the planning figures.	grep -E "^\s*Route::(get|post|put|patch|delete|any)" routes/admin.php | grep -v "^\s*//" | wc -l → 151; resources 14×7=98; 151+98=249	✅ Corrected in 00-INVENTORY.md §2.1 and DECISIONS.md §D13. _inv-ref-server.md left as the raw subagent record.
DOC-02	Low	REF routes/admin.php:38	GET admin/get-analytics-tak reads SingleCustomerOrders (Adm/AdminController.php:557-579), so it is a retail-storefront endpoint despite its neutral name. A keyword scan for wallet|single|comment misses it. Noted so the D13 scope split stays correct — anything else named neutrally but querying SingleCustomerOrders, Fav, Address, Comment or Transaction is storefront too.	AdminController.php:563 — SingleCustomerOrders::select(...)	✅ Classified as ⏸️ storefront in D13 (the 31st admin storefront route).

Found during the SMS / MON-08 investigation (2026-09-22)

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Status
SEC-12	Critical	REF henza_server/app/Models/Sms.php:73-77,101-105	Live SMS-panel production credentials (username, plaintext password, sender line) are committed to git in the reference, duplicated across two methods. An older provider's credentials sit commented out beside them. Anyone with repo access can send SMS on the owner's account at their cost.	Read the file.	Not ported — the target will read them from env only. The owner should rotate these credentials; they must be assumed compromised.
STUB-05	Medium	REF ApiMobileController.php:154-158,601-605; Adm/OrderController.php:54-55; Customer/OrderController.php:141-145	Admin notification recipients are hardcoded mobile numbers scattered across controllers (six distinct numbers). Staff changes require a code deploy, and an ex-employee keeps receiving order data.	Read the files.	Port as SMS_ADMIN_RECIPIENTS (comma-separated, default empty) rather than copying the literals. Pending the SMS approval.
DEAD-06	Low	REF henza_pwa/src/views/cart.vue:181-182	The cart sends wage_weight: 5.7856000000000005 and weight: 6.303744000000001 as literal constants, each with a // how to get?! comment. The server ignores both: it recomputes weight from rash_weight, and the wage_weight use is commented out (ApiMobileController.php:549-551).	Read both files.	Dead payload fields — do not port.

Found while applying the D0 / percent migrations (2026-09-22)

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Status
DEAD-07	Low	TGT DB table _goldbank_migrations + apps/api/src/prisma/migrate.ts	Re-assessed 2026-09-22 — not dead code. It is the tracking table of the app's OWN migration runner (src/prisma/migrate.ts:5), which exists because the Docker deploy image is copy-only and ships no Prisma CLI, so migrate deploy cannot run there (migrate.ts:7-13). So the project has TWO ledgers on purpose: _prisma_migrations (CLI, used in development) and _goldbank_migrations (runtime runner, used in the container). migrate diff proposed DROP TABLE only because the table was not declared in the schema; the runner already refused to execute such a statement (migrate.ts:190-196).	Read src/prisma/migrate.ts.	✅ Resolved: declared as an @@ignored model, so drift is now zero. Table and all rows kept.

Found in the Phase 1 admin matrix (2026-09-22)

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Status
PRICE-01	⏸️ out of scope (was Critical)	TGT apps/api/src/modules/admin-products/admin-products.service.ts:188-208; apps/admin-panel/src/views/apps/product/ProductList.vue	No product price is computed or shown anywhere in the admin panel. The reference appends price and price_with_discount to every variant (ProductVariant.php:115-119), sets the live gold rate before listing (AdminController.php:97-98), and renders {{ item.price }} in three places in its product list (ProductList.vue:283,287,301). The target's variantRow() returns neither field, nothing fetches a gold price for the admin list, and computeVariantPrice() — ported and unit-tested today — is called from nowhere.	grep computeVariantPrice src/ --include=*.ts matches only its own file and spec.	⏸️ Stopped by D16 — price display is retail-storefront, out of scope. variant-price.ts and its 11 tests are KEPT but unused. Nothing needed reverting: the function was never called. Making-charge fields stay in scope.
PRICE-02	Info	REF app/Models/ProductVariant.php:163 vs TGT admin-products.service.ts:206-208	rial_pay (a flat rial charge per variant) appears only in the superseded, commented-out formula, not the live one at :183-190. The target returns null rather than faking it, which matches the live reference. Recorded so nobody "restores" it from the dead code.	Read both.	✅ No action — matches.
PERM-01	Medium	TGT prisma/seed.ts; apps/admin-panel/src/views/user/permissionConst.ts	dashboard.omde and dashboard.tak are seeded into the permission table but are absent from the permission UI tree, so they can be held by a row yet never seen, granted or revoked from the admin screen — and nothing reads them any more (the protected Dashboard uses dashboard.view). The DB holds 178 distinct rids against the UI's 174.	SELECT rid FROM permission GROUP BY rid → 178, including all three dashboard rids.	Open — the fix removes permission rows, which is a data deletion and needs the owner's approval first.

Delivery-mode items (D19/D20, 2026-09-22)

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Suggested fix
REL-01	Critical — before the real release	TGT deployment env	OTP_MASTER_CODE must be removed from the environment, and the SMS credentials configured. While the variable is set, ANY active customer can sign in with that one fixed code. It is off by default (unset = disabled) and the API prints a boot banner while it is armed, but nothing stops it reaching production except this step.	customer-auth.service.ts masterOtpCode(); main.ts boot banner; D20	Unset OTP_MASTER_CODE; set SMS_TREZ_USERNAME / SMS_TREZ_PASSWORD / SMS_TREZ_SENDER_LINE; restart and confirm the banner is gone.
REL-02	High	TGT apps/api/src/modules/sms/sms.service.ts	D20 removed the rule that a missing SMS credential aborts the boot in production. The server now starts with SMS disabled, so customers cannot receive a login code and the failure is only a log line. Deliberate, to keep the delivery unblocked.	D14 (superseded) vs D20	After the delivery, decide whether to restore a boot check or add a health endpoint that reports SMS readiness.
PERS-01	Medium	REF AdminController.php:348 vs TGT admin-customers.service.ts update()	The reference discards the submitted mobile on edit ($input['mobile'] = $customer->mobile;), making it immutable once set; the target lets an operator change it. D19 ruled the lock NOT ported, so the target keeps the editable behaviour. Changing a mobile changes the customer's login identity.	AdminController.php:348; D19 answer B	If the lock is wanted later, apply it in update() and hide/disable the field on the edit form.
PERS-02	Medium	REF cities table vs TGT City model	The reference's cities are a two-level hierarchy (parent + level, provinces at level 0) rendered as an a-tree-select with provinces not selectable (citiesModel.js:38). The target flattened this to a nullable province string and a flat a-select on all three Persons forms. Functionally the city is still captured; the province grouping and its tree UI are absent.	2021_09_18_171700_city_table.php:18-19; henza_admin/src/mixins/citiesModel.js:20-48; schema.prisma model City	Structural change; decide with the owner during the cities screen (Phase 1c).
PERS-03	Low	REF bulkCustomer.vue:111, singleCustomer.vue:29 vs TGT	The reference collects a Jalali birth date on both the wholesale (birth_date) and retail (birth_day) customer forms via DateInput. The target's Customer model has no column for it and both forms omit the field.	henza_admin/.../bulkCustomer.vue:111; schema.prisma model Customer (no birth field)	Additive: add a nullable birthDate column and the picker, if the owner wants it.
PERF-01	Low	TGT admin-customers.service.ts listReagents()	The per-agent gold-sold total runs one order.aggregate per row inside Promise.all — an N+1 on every page of the sales-expert grid. Harmless at the current agent count.	listReagents() rows.map(async ...)	Replace with a single groupBy over the referring agent.

Apps — found during the delivery smoke test (2026-09-23)

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Suggested fix
APP-01	Medium (constraint, handled)	TGT apps/user-app/src/views/user/LoginView.vue:43, user-app-v2 same, components/input/OtpInput.vue:43	Both apps render the login OTP as four single-character inputs and submit only on @on-complete, i.e. at exactly 4 digits. The API accepts any length, so an OTP_MASTER_CODE longer than 4 works over HTTP but cannot be typed into either app. The real OTP is 4 digits, so the box itself is correct.	OtpInput.vue:43 otp.join('').length === numInputs; Math.floor(1000 + random*9000) in customer-auth.service.ts	Handled without touching the shipped login UI: main.ts warns at boot when the code is not 4 digits, and .env.example states the rule.
APP-02	Medium	TGT apps/user-app-v2/src/api/client.ts (no getHomeSlider) vs apps/user-app/src/api/client.ts:228	user-app calls GET /home/slider and prefers admin-configured slides, falling back to category-derived ones (HomeView.vue:258). user-app-v2 has no such call at all and always derives its hero from categories, so slides configured in the admin panel never appear in v2.	grep getHomeSlider finds it only in user-app	Add getHomeSlider to v2's client and let HeroCarousel prefer admin slides. Deliberately deferred: v2's home is its own design (PROTECTED) and rewiring its hero during a delivery risks the page being demonstrated.
DEPLOY-01	High FIXED	TGT docker-compose.yml	The api service passed only DATABASE_URL and PORT, so every auth and SMS variable was silently ignored in Docker — JWT_SECRET would fall back to the development default, and OTP_MASTER_CODE would never reach the container, so the delivery login would not have worked in a deployed environment.	docker compose config before/after	✅ All auth, SMS and master-OTP variables are now passed through, each defaulting to empty (which the code treats as "unset").
TEST-01	Low (fixed)	TGT apps/api/scripts/test-sales-expert-roundtrip.cjs:10	The script had localhost:3077 hardcoded — a port from an earlier dev session — so it could only ever connect by accident. It failed with ECONNREFUSED on this branch.	Run against the standard port	✅ Now defaults to localhost:3000 (API_PORT) and accepts an override argument. Re-ran: 33/33.

complete_profile — found while porting the page (2026-09-23)

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Suggested fix
REL-03	Critical — before the real release	TGT deployment env; customer-auth.service.ts customerJwtSecret()	JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET must be set to its own value. Unset, it falls back to JWT_SECRET, so customer/sales-expert app tokens are signed with the same key as admin tokens and the two realms stop being cryptographically separate. The only remaining defence is the typ check in jwt.strategy.ts — and an expert's app token carries their AdminUser id in sub, which is exactly what that check exists to stop. Two independent defences collapse to one.	customerJwtSecret() ?? process.env.JWT_SECRET; jwt.strategy.ts APP_TOKEN_TYPES	Set JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET to a distinct random value. A loud boot banner now fires while it is missing (main.ts), and DELIVERY.md lists it first.
SEC-14	High (reference bug, NOT ported)	REF Major/CustomerController.php:87	complete() did $customer->update($request->all()) — it mass-assigned the entire request body onto the customer row. The app could therefore set its own gram_level (credit limit), percent (making charge), remain (gold debt), active or even mobile by adding fields to the profile-completion POST. A privilege-escalation and money hole reachable from any signed-in customer.	$input = $request->all(); ... $customer->update($input);	Not ported. The target reads a three-field whitelist (CompleteProfileDto) and writes only the three document URLs plus the verification step. Asserted by test-complete-profile.cjs §7, which posts credit-limit/debt/mobile overrides and checks the row is unchanged.
SEC-15	Low (reference bug, NOT ported)	REF Major/CustomerController.php:110-112	sendSmsToAdmin() hardcoded four real personal mobile numbers in the source.	$admin_mobile = ['0990…','0913…','0912…','0919…'];	Not ported. The target reads PROFILE_ADMIN_MOBILES (comma-separated, blank = notify nobody), so no personal number is committed to this repository.
APP-03	Low (reference bug, NOT ported)	REF completeProfile.vue:175-181	refresh() called window.setInterval(() => window.location.reload(), 1000) — an unterminated timer that reloaded the whole page every second forever, not a one-off refresh.	completeProfile.vue:178-180	Not ported. The target navigates home once after the success dialog.
UPL-01	Medium (gap, fixed)	TGT admin-uploads.controller.ts	The reference let the app upload documents through the same file/create the admin panel used, inside its auth:api-customer group (routes/api.php:95). The target's copy of that route is admin-guarded, which no app token can pass — so without a customer-facing upload route, complete_profile could not have worked at all.	AdminUploadsController has no @CustomerAuth() route	✅ Added POST customer/me/documents, reusing AdminUploadsService unchanged so the size limit, MIME whitelist and stored-name scheme are identical on both paths. The uploader is recorded as null rather than as an admin, since that column is an AdminUser FK.

report — found while porting the page (2026-09-23)

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Suggested fix
SEC-16	High (reference bug, NOT ported)	REF Customer/TahesabController.php::detail()	The document-detail endpoint took the factor code straight from the URL and performed no ownership check at all — the method never consults auth(). Any signed-in customer could read any other customer's accounting document by guessing or enumerating a code.	public function detail(Request $request, $id) → proxies GetHesabDetailByFactorCode?Factor_Code=$id with no customer scope	Not ported. In the target the id is only a filter on top of a customerId scope taken from the token, so another customer's id returns nothing. Asserted in both directions by test-report.cjs §6.
REP-01	Medium (documented gap)	REF external Tahesab system vs TGT LedgerEntry	The reference's statement carried columns the target has no source for: foreign currency (rial_V2/rial_Kh2/tahesabP2), vaznPlastik, nO_kar (نام کارساخته), jens_felez (جنس فلز) and the external system's internal ids (gid/rec/reg).	henza_pwa/src/type/accounting.ts; AccountingDetail.vue:34-46	The API returns null/zero for these and the UI omits the row rather than showing a fabricated value. If the business needs them, they need columns on LedgerEntry first.
REP-02	Low (performance)	TGT customer-report.service.ts summary()	The running balance makes a row depend on every entry before it, so the whole confirmed ledger for the customer is folded in memory and the page sliced afterwards. Cheap at one customer's own document counts; linear in their history.	summary() findMany without take	If a customer ever accumulates enough entries for it to matter, move the fold to a stored running total written at entry time.
SEC-17	Medium (reference, not applicable to target)	REF Customer/TahesabController.php	The reference calls the external accounting system with Http::withoutVerifying() (TLS certificate verification disabled) against a bare IP, with a bearer token and an sfx secret hardcoded in the source and embedded in the URL.	->withToken("S3F1P8…"), sfx=wcG97tkF… in four URLs	Not applicable — the target makes no external call. Listed so it is not reintroduced if a Tahesab integration is ever added; the credentials in that reference file should be rotated regardless.

Found by the pre-delivery Docker Compose run (2026-09-23)

ID	Severity	Where	Description	Evidence	Suggested fix
DEPLOY-02	Critical FIXED	TGT auth.module.ts, customer-auth.service.ts, jwt.strategy.ts, main.ts, upload-path.ts, sms.service.ts	Admin login returned 500 for every user in Docker. docker-compose.yml passes each optional variable as ${X:-}, so an unconfigured one arrives as "", not undefined. The code read them with process.env.X ?? 'default', which only falls back on undefined — so the empty string won and jsonwebtoken threw "expiresIn" should be a number of seconds or string representing a timespan on every sign. Invisible to every suite that ran against a local dev process, where the variable is genuinely absent. The same pattern also meant a blank UPLOAD_DIR would have served static files from the filesystem root, and a blank PORT would have bound a random ephemeral port (Number('') === 0), making the container unreachable.	Container log: ERROR [ExceptionsHandler] "expiresIn" should be a number of seconds or string representing a timespan	✅ Added src/common/env.ts (envOr / envOrNull) which treats blank as unset, and applied it to every auth, port, upload and SMS read. Pinned by src/common/env.spec.ts (9 tests), which reproduces the original throw against the real jsonwebtoken and asserts the reader can no longer produce it. Re-verified end to end in compose: 32/32.
DEPLOY-03	Medium (process)	TGT apps/api/Dockerfile	The image is COPY release/ ./ — it ships a pre-built bundle produced on the developer machine by pnpm build:release, not a build performed inside the image. So docker compose build happily produces an image from a stale release/app.js and reports success. At the start of this run that bundle was four days old, and the rebuilt container was missing every route added since.	apps/api/release/app.js dated Sep 19 while the source was Sep 23; the container mapped none of the new routes	pnpm build:release MUST be run before docker compose build. Noted in DELIVERY.md's deploy section. A longer-term fix is to build inside the Dockerfile, or to have the build fail when release/ is older than src/.