# DECISIONS — user rulings on the parity project

Binding decisions made by the user. They override defaults and survive context
loss. Referenced from `PROTECTED.md` and `PROGRESS.md`.

| Date | Phase | Decisions |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-21 | Phase 0 gate | D0–D5, D6–D8 (urgent), D9–D11, D12 (method change) |

---

## D0 — First name / last name: split the column (option **الف**)

**Ruling.** Add real `firstName` / `lastName` columns to `Customer` via an
**additive** migration.

Requirements:

1. Additive migration only — nothing dropped.
2. Backfill existing rows: **first token** of `fullName` → `firstName`, **the
   rest** → `lastName`.
3. Rows whose `fullName` has **more than two tokens** must be written to a report
   for manual review (they cannot be split safely).
4. **`fullName` is NOT removed.** It stays and is kept in sync as
   `firstName + " " + lastName` so existing code keeps working.
5. `toRow()` must return the **real** `fname` / `lname`, not `fullName` / `''`.
6. Fix every consumer: `singleCustomer.vue`, `bulkCustomer.vue`,
   `ReagentCustomer.vue`, and anywhere a name is displayed, searched or sorted.
   **Remove the `split(' ')` fallback in `singleCustomer.vue`.**
7. Check the same defect on **`AdminUser`** (sales expert) and on
   **registration / profile in `user-app` and `user-app-v2`**.
8. **Show the migration file and the command, and get approval, before running it.**

Evidence for the defect: reference has two columns
(`henza_server/database/migrations/2020_10_01_120430_customers_table.php:18-19`);
target collapses them (`apps/api/src/modules/admin-customers/admin-customers.service.ts:231-233`
returns `fname: c.fullName, lname: ''`).

## D1 — Admin auth: keep the target stricter

The reference leaves all ~215 admin routes unauthenticated
(`henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272`). The target's JWT + 144-rid enforcement
**stands**, recorded as an accepted deviation.

**Additional requirement:** build a complete mapping matrix
**"every reference admin operation ↔ its permission key (rid) in the target"**,
so no operation is left without an equivalent permission. Explain the
**172 (reference) vs 174 (target) unique key** difference.

## D2 — Domain scope: audit only what the reference has

Confirmed. Do not manufacture rows for buy/sell gold, deposit, withdraw,
transfer, KYC levels, price sockets or payment callbacks — none exist in the
reference (`00-INVENTORY.md` §0).

Target-only capabilities (e.g. the dual-currency ledger, gram/rial debt) are
listed with status **➕** and **left untouched**. Ask when unsure.

## D3 — The 5 missing user-app screens: build them in Phase 2

`/report`, `/report/detail`, `/ChildOrder`, `/customerChoice`, `/complete_profile`
are built in **both** apps, each in its own design language, plus whatever backend
they need.

Also brought to reference behaviour in Phase 2:
- route analytics (`POST /log/create/{key}`, `GET /log/update/{id}`)
- the `isLoaded` guard
- the `sts_verify_step_two` guard on `completeProfile`
- guest behaviour: **toast «ابتدا وارد شوید» + redirect to `home`** (not a redirect to `/login`)
- **v2's missing cart stock ceiling (`capQty`/`maxQty`) must match v1 and the reference**

## D4 — Reference bugs: replicate behaviour, not breakage

- Broken or destructive reference behaviour is **not** ported — logged only.
- **Business behaviour, calculations, rounding and messages must match the
  reference exactly.**
- Every deliberate non-replication gets a matrix note:
  **«عمداً تکرار نشد — ISSUE #n»**.
- The price formula is the **live** version at
  `henza_server/app/Models/ProductVariant.php:183-190` — *not* the commented-out
  ones above it.
- Write a **unit test** for it with sample numbers and compare against the
  reference formula computed by hand.

## D5 — Stray root folder: leave it for now

`gold-banking-monorepo/user-app-v2/` is logged in `ISSUES.md` (DEAD-03). At the
very end, after verifying nothing references it, delete it in **its own commit**.

---

## D6 — URGENT: OTP must be verified (exception to "log only", per `CLAUDE.md` §3)

The reference **does** verify the OTP, so the target accepting any code is a
**parity gap**, not just a security issue. Fix it to match the reference:
code matching, expiry, and attempt limits.

Reference implementation (`henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ApiMobileController.php:39-78`):

| Step | Reference behaviour | Line |
|---|---|---|
| Send | `userAuth` validates `username`, finds an **active** customer by mobile, generates `rand(1000,9999)`, stores it in `customer.send_password`, sends it by SMS | `:39-49` |
| Verify | `userVerfiy` validates `username` + `password`; if `faTOen(password) != customer.send_password` → **HTTP 422** | `:51-57` |
| Token | issues `api_token = Str::random(60)` only if the customer doesn't already have one | `:60-62` |
| Digits | the code is normalised through `Utility::faTOen()` (Persian → English digits) on **both** send and verify | `:42,56` |

⚠️ Note for the matrix: the reference has **no expiry and no attempt limit** —
`send_password` is a plain column that stays valid indefinitely. D6 asks for
expiry and attempt limits, which go **beyond** the reference. Recorded as a
deliberate, user-requested improvement; the parity row is the code match itself.

## D7 — URGENT: `@Public()` routes that write to the ledger

Show the exact list with file paths and what the reference did for each, then
protect them **after user approval**. See §"@Public audit" below.

## D8 — URGENT: the login customer-list leak

Identify whether it is reference or target, and what data leaks. See §"Login leak"
below.

---

## D9 — `percent`: trace before acting

Done — see `00-INVENTORY.md` and the trace summary delivered to the user.
**Key finding: the target's implementation is wrong.** `percent` is a real column
on the customer in the reference, not a derived value from the referring agent.

## D10 — Sales expert: the 5 missing fields

The move to `AdminUser` is **accepted**. For `ncode`, `phone`, `city_id`,
`gram_level`, `reagent_id`: find where the reference uses each for `type=1`
(list, filter, report, order, calculation). Fields that are genuinely used must
be added — **proposed shape: a `SalesExpertProfile` table related to `AdminUser`**.
Fields with no use are listed for the user to decide.

## D11 — `singleCustomer.vue`: migrate to the diff-send pattern

Bring it in line with `bulkCustomer.vue` and `ReagentCustomer.vue`. **Diff-send
is recorded as an accepted deviation** from the reference (which sends every
field on every save).

---

## D12 — METHOD CHANGE for Phase 1 (and Phase 2)

**1. The matrix is field-by-field, not page-by-page.** Every form field (name,
type, required, validation, message, default), every table column, every filter,
every button — and for each one, the **client field name ↔ API field name ↔ DB
column**, on **both** sides.

**2. A round-trip test is mandatory per entity:**

```
create with every field populated
  → open the edit form, assert every field is correctly populated
  → save with no changes, assert the DB row is byte-identical
  → change exactly one field, assert only that field changed
```

Run it for the sales expert too.

**3. Both rules are to be added to the `reference-parity-audit` skill**
(Step C and Step E) so Phase 2 inherits them.

---

## T1 — Customer authentication: a separate JWT strategy (option **الف**)

Approved. Conditions:

1. **Separate secrets** — customer tokens are signed with `JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET`,
   admin tokens with `JWT_SECRET`.
2. **A `typ` claim is checked in both guards** — `typ: 'admin'` vs `typ: 'customer'`.
3. **Mandatory cross-token tests:** a customer token on any admin route → 401;
   an admin token on a customer route → rejected, unless deliberately allowed.
4. **Token lifetime and logout must be compared against the reference and
   recorded here** (see below).
5. **No IDOR** — customer routes that return personal data derive the customer
   from the **token**, never from an id in the request.

### Reference comparison — token lifetime and logout

| Aspect | Reference | Target (current) | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|
| Customer token | `api_token = Str::random(60)`, a random opaque string stored on the customer row (`ApiMobileController.php:60-62`) | none | new customer JWT |
| Expiry | **none** — the reference token never expires; it is reused on every login if already set | admin JWT `JWT_EXPIRES_IN`, default `12h` | customer JWT gets an explicit expiry (deliberate improvement over the reference) |
| Logout | the reference has **no logout endpoint**; the app drops the token client-side | apps clear `localStorage` | keep client-side clear; note that a stolen token stays valid until expiry |
| Rotation | the reference issues a new token **only if `api_token` is null** — logging in twice returns the same token forever | n/a | issue a fresh token on every verify |

The last three rows are **deliberate improvements over the reference**, approved
by the user in the same message that approved D6. Recorded so the matrix does not
later flag them as parity gaps.

## T2 — Uploaded files stay public

**Ruling:** `/uploads` is not touched. No allow-list, no signed URLs, and the
"private folder" stage is dropped.

**Recorded verbatim at the user's request:**
> «فایل‌های آپلودی شامل مدارک عمداً عمومی هستند — تصمیم مالک پروژه»
> (Uploaded files, including identity documents, are deliberately public — the
> project owner's decision.)

### The light check the user asked for — result: ✅ already correct

| Check | Result | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Filenames unguessable? | **Yes.** `md5(Date.now() + originalname + randomUUID())` + the original extension | `src/modules/admin-uploads/admin-uploads.service.ts:53` |
| Sequential or original name on disk? | **No.** `originalName` is kept only as a DB column, never as the filename | `admin-uploads.service.ts:62` |
| Directory listing? | **No.** `PublicUploadsController` only resolves a single `:filename`, and `resolveStoredUpload()` rejects `.`/`..` and anything resolving outside the upload dir | `public-uploads.controller.ts:17`, `upload-path.ts:34-49` |

Nothing to change. No existing files were moved.

## T3 — Two-stage hotfix

Approved, with the condition that `GET /customers` be checked first.

**Check result:** the apps **are** dependent on it. Its only consumer is
`LoginView.vue:131` in both apps, and `CustomerSummary` is used nowhere else
(verified by grep). The fields actually read are `mobile`, `isActive`,
`isArchived`, then `session.login(id, mobile)` — four fields.

So per the ruling: stage 1 strips the sensitive fields and keeps the route; stage
2 removes the route when login moves to OTP.

---

# Urgent investigation results

## `percent` — full trace (D9)

### In the reference, `percent` is a real column on the customer

| Fact | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Column exists on `customers` | `database/migrations/2020_10_19_153228_customer_add.php:32` — `$table->double('percent')->default(0);` |
| Mass-assignable | `app/Models/Customer.php:31` |
| Defaulted to **3** for app-registered customers | `app/Http/Controllers/Adm/AdminController.php:338` — `$input['percent'] = 3;` |
| **Required** when an admin creates a wholesale customer | `AdminController.php:354` — `'percent'=>'required'` |
| Selected into the wholesale customer list | `Adm/MajorCustomerController.php:36` |
| Shown in a report column «درصد» | `Adm/ReportController.php:137` |

### What it actually does — it shifts the customer's making-charge filter

`app/Http/Controllers/Api/ApiMobileController.php:391-396`:

```php
if (sizeof($limit_percent) > 0 and auth('api-customer')->check()) {
    $limit_percent[0] = $limit_percent[0] - auth('api-customer')->user()->percent;
    $limit_percent[1] = $limit_percent[1] - auth('api-customer')->user()->percent;
    $product->whereHas('variants', fn($q) => $q->whereBetween('percentage_pay', $limit_percent));
}
```

And it shifts the **filter bounds the app is told to display**, at login
(`ApiMobileController.php:76-77`):

```php
$customer['filterPercentPay'][] = strval(ProductVariant::min('percentage_pay') + $customer['percent']);
$customer['filterPercentPay'][] = strval(ProductVariant::max('percentage_pay') + $customer['percent']);
```

So `customer.percent` is a **per-customer making-charge offset**: the UI shows
`percentage_pay + percent`, and the filter subtracts it again before querying.

### What it does NOT do

**It is not part of the price formula.** The formula's extra percent comes from a
**global** config row, not from the customer:

- `app/Models/ProductVariant.php:50` — `ConfigStatic::where('key','product_price_extra_percent')->first()['val'] ?? 7`
- `app/Models/ProductVariant.php:183` — `($this->percentage_pay + static::$product_price_extra_percent)`

There is a **separate, unrelated** `ConfigStatic` key also called `percent`, used
for the cashback/wallet rule (`AdminController.php:903,994`; `Controller.php:203`) —
`value = total_weight * (percent/100)`. **Do not confuse the two.**

A **third** unrelated `percent` is a per-order-item field in wholesale orders
(`Adm/MajorOrderController.php:220`): `w = rash_weight + rash_weight * (percent/100)`.
That one comes from the request, not from the customer.

### The target is wrong

`apps/api/src/modules/admin-customers/admin-customers.service.ts:245`:

```ts
// legacy `percent` came from the referring agent's commission rate
percent: c.referredByAgent?.wagePercent ?? null,
```

That comment is **incorrect** — the reference reads `customer.percent`, its own
column. Consequences:

1. **Read is wrong** — it shows the agent's commission, not the customer's offset.
2. **Write is missing** — `update()` never handles `data.percent`
   (`admin-customers.service.ts:600-658`), so editing the field in the admin form
   does nothing.
3. **The create default is missing** — the reference sets `percent = 3` for
   app-registered customers and **requires** it for admin-created wholesale
   customers.
4. **The app-side effect is missing** — no `filterPercentPay` offset anywhere in
   `user-app` / `user-app-v2`.

### Proposed reconstruction (needs user approval — it is a schema change)

1. Add `makingChargeOffsetPercent Decimal @default(0)` to `Customer` (additive
   migration). Name it clearly so it is never confused with the two other
   `percent`s; map it to the legacy key `percent` in `toRow()`.
2. `toRow()` returns that column, not `referredByAgent.wagePercent`. Remove the
   incorrect comment.
3. `create()`: default **3** on the app-registration path; **require** it on the
   admin wholesale path (reference `AdminController.php:354`).
4. `update()`: handle `data.percent`.
5. Catalogue filter: subtract the customer's offset from the `percentage_pay`
   bounds before querying, and return shifted `filterPercentPay` bounds at login
   — matching `ApiMobileController.php:391-396,76-77`.
6. The referring agent's `wagePercent` stays where it belongs (the agent), and is
   **not** exposed through the customer form.

---

## `@Public()` audit (D7) — every unauthenticated route in the target

15 routes across 7 controllers. Verified by reading each controller.

### 🔴 Group A — ledger writes (the ones the user flagged)

`apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts` — `@Public()` on the
**whole controller** (`:7`), prefix `accounting` (`:8`):

| # | Route | Line | Effect | Reference equivalent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | `GET accounting/customers/:customerId/balance` | `:12` | reads any customer's balance | `Adm/WalletController` — reference had auth **commented out** too (`routes/admin.php:12`) |
| A2 | `POST accounting/customers/:customerId/reconcile` | `:17` | **writes** — reconciles a balance | same: unauthenticated in reference |
| A3 | `POST accounting/repayments/gold` | `:22` | **writes** — records a gold repayment | same |
| A4 | `POST accounting/repayments/rial` | `:27` | **writes** — records a rial repayment | same |
| A5 | `POST accounting/entries/:entryId/confirm` | `:32` | **writes** — confirms a ledger entry | same |

**In the reference these were admin routes in `routes/admin.php`, and that whole
file's `auth:api` wrapper is commented out — so they were unauthenticated there
too.** The target faithfully reproduced that. Under **D1** the target is supposed
to be stricter, so these five are the clearest violation of D1 still standing.

**Recommendation:** A1–A5 are admin operations. Put them behind the admin JWT
guard with the matching rid (the wallet/document rids from `acl.constants.ts`).
**Awaiting your approval — this is the list you asked for.**

### 🟠 Group B — order writes

`apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts` — `@Public()` at `:7`, prefix `orders`:

| # | Route | Line | Note | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | `POST orders` | `:12` | customer places an order | `ApiMobileController::setOrder` — **was authenticated** via `auth('api-customer')`; it reads `auth()->id()` at `:533` |
| B2 | `GET orders/:id` | `:17` | reads any order by id | same guard in reference |
| B3 | `PATCH orders/:id/status` | `:22` | **changes order status**; DTO accepts a client-supplied `actorAdminUserId` | admin operation in reference |

**B1/B2 differ from the reference in kind:** the reference's customer endpoints
sat behind the `api-customer` guard and derived the customer from the token.
The target has **no customer session at all**, so it takes `customerId` from the
request body. That is why they are public. Fixing this properly means building
customer auth — which is exactly what **D6** starts.

**B3 is the worst of the three:** it lets an anonymous caller move an order's
status *and* attribute the action to any admin.

### 🟢 Group C — genuinely public reads (match the reference's public storefront)

| # | Route | File:line | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | `GET customers` | `customers/customers.controller.ts:10` | **see the leak below** |
| C2 | `GET customers/:id` | `:15` | — |
| C3 | `GET customers/:id/orders` | `:20` | — |
| C4 | `GET customers/:id/ledger-entries` | `:25` | — |
| C5 | `GET catalog/products` | `catalog/catalog.controller.ts:10` | reference storefront was public (`routes/site.php`) ✅ |
| C6 | `GET pricing/latest` | `pricing/pricing.controller.ts:10` | reference `/price` was public ✅ |
| C7 | `GET home/slider` | `admin-misc/public-slider.controller.ts:21` | reference `mobile_main_slider` config, public ✅ |
| C8 | `GET uploads/:filename` | `admin-uploads/public-uploads.controller.ts:17` | reference served uploads statically ✅ |

C5–C8 are legitimately public. **C1–C4 are not** — they expose customer records.

---

## Login leak (D8) — it is in the **target**, and it is worse than "a list"

**Where:** target only. `apps/user-app` and `apps/user-app-v2` both call
`GET /api/customers` at login and match the phone number **in the browser**.

**What leaks:** `GET /customers` is `@Public()`
(`customers/customers.controller.ts:10`) and returns **every active,
non-archived customer** with these fields
(`customers/customers.service.ts:6-23`, `:44-50`):

| Field | Sensitive? |
|---|---|
| `id`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt` | low |
| `fullName` | 🔴 **PII** |
| `mobile` | 🔴 **PII** |
| `nationalCode` | 🔴 **national ID number** |
| `cityId`, `referredByAgentId` | medium |
| `goldCreditLimitGrams`, `goldDebtGrams`, `fiatDebtRial` | 🔴 **financial position of every customer** |
| `verificationStep`, `isActive`, `isArchived` | medium |
| `nationalIdImageUrl`, `businessLicenseUrl`, `shopImageUrl` | 🔴 **URLs of ID-document scans** |

**`passwordHash` is correctly excluded** — the select list is explicit and the
source comment says so (`customers.service.ts:5`). So no password material leaks.

**Everything else does.** Any anonymous visitor can fetch the full customer book —
names, mobiles, national ID numbers, debts, and links to identity-document images
(and `GET uploads/:filename` is public too, so those links resolve).

**In the reference this was not possible.** Login was
`POST userAuth` → SMS code → `POST userVerfiy`
(`ApiMobileController.php:39-78`): the server looked the customer up by mobile
and returned **only that one customer** after the code matched. There was no
"download everyone and match on the client" step.

**Root cause:** the target has no customer authentication, so the client does the
lookup. **D6 (real OTP) is the fix for both problems at once** — once
`POST auth/otp/verify` returns the authenticated customer, `GET /customers` can
be taken off the public surface entirely.

---

# Stage 2 implementation record (2026-09-22)

## Deliberate improvements over the reference — user-approved

Recorded here so the Phase 1/2 matrices do not later flag them as parity gaps.

| # | Behaviour | Reference | Target | Approved in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | OTP storage | plain text in `customer.send_password` | bcrypt hash in `CustomerOtp.codeHash` | D6 |
| 2 | OTP expiry | none — valid forever | 2 minutes | D6 |
| 3 | Attempt limit | none | 5 per challenge, then lockout | D6 |
| 4 | Replay | code stayed usable | single use (`consumedAt`) | D6 |
| 5 | Send throttle | none | 60s cooldown/number, 5 per number and 20 per IP per 10 min | user message of 2026-09-22 |
| 6 | Unknown number | `firstOrFail()` → 404, enumerable | identical `{sent:true}` | implied by 5; recorded here |
| 7 | Token rotation | `api_token` issued once, reused forever | fresh token on every verify | T1 |
| 8 | Token expiry | none | `JWT_CUSTOMER_EXPIRES_IN`, default 30d | T1 |
| 9 | Token secret | single opaque string | `JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET`, separate from admin, plus a `typ` claim | T1 |

## New environment variables

| Name | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET` | falls back to `JWT_SECRET`, then a dev string | signs customer tokens |
| `JWT_CUSTOMER_EXPIRES_IN` | `30d` | customer token lifetime |

Both fall back so local development keeps working, and both inherit the SEC-04
problem (an insecure default when unset) — tracked there, not re-logged.

## Known gap left open on purpose

`POST /orders` and `GET /orders/:id` are still `@Public()`. The customer token
now exists, so they can be closed, but `CreateOrderDto` carries `customerId` in
the body and changing that is an API-contract change touching both apps' cart
flow. Left for the Phase 2 apps work rather than widened into this hotfix.
Tracked as SEC-02 (B1/B2) in `ISSUES.md`.

---

# D13 — Retail storefront: preserved, but out of scope (2026-09-22)

**Owner's ruling.** The reference also contained a **retail storefront**
(single-customer / B2C shop). The **wallet**, **cashback** and
`ConfigStatic['percent']` belong to that storefront, not to the B2B gold
business this project is porting.

## The rule

1. **Nothing is deleted or disabled.** No code, table, column, endpoint, setting
   or data belonging to the storefront may be removed or switched off — neither
   in the target nor in the reference. Whatever exists in the target today stays
   exactly as it is.
2. **No work is done on it.** No parity, no fixes, no refactoring.
3. **In the matrices** these items are listed with status
   **⏸️ حفظ‌شده — خارج از کار فعلی** (preserved — out of current scope) so they
   remain visible, but **no gap row and no work row is created for them**.
4. **Shared surfaces need a heads-up.** If fixing something shared — product,
   variant, price, order, customer — would affect the storefront, **ask the
   owner before changing it**, so nothing in the storefront breaks.
5. **No guessing.** If it is unclear whether something is storefront-only or
   shared, **list it and ask**.

## Status legend addition

| Symbol | Meaning |
|---|---|
| ⏸️ | Preserved — out of current scope (D13). Listed for visibility only; no gap row, no work row. |

## Endpoint classification — where the reference endpoints go

**The previously reported total of 369 was wrong; the real figure is 412.**
Recounting the live routes per file (excluding the 6 commented-out ones,
expanding `Route::resource` ×7 and `Route::match(['get','post'])` ×2) shows
`admin.php` has **151** explicit routes, not the 117 recorded in
`_inv-ref-server.md` §3.6 — so admin is **249**, not 215. Corrected in
`00-INVENTORY.md` §2.1.

| Surface | Route file(s) | Endpoints | In scope? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admin panel — B2B | `admin.php` minus the storefront block below | **218** | ✅ in scope (Phase 1) |
| Admin panel — storefront management | `admin.php`: wallet 6, `single*` 8, comment 2, `get-analytics-tak` 1 explicit + `single` resource 7 + `comment` resource 7 | **31** | ⏸️ preserved, out of scope |
| B2B mobile app | `api.php` | **70** | ✅ in scope (Phase 2) |
| Retail storefront — customer API | `customer.php` | **48** | ⏸️ preserved, out of scope |
| Retail storefront — public site API | `site.php` | **30** | ⏸️ preserved, out of scope |
| Dev/ops closures, price cron, redirects | `web.php` | **15** | ⏸️ out of scope (dead/dev — see DEAD-\* in `ISSUES.md`) |
| **Total** | | **412** | |

**Result: 109 of the 412 endpoints belong to the retail storefront**
(48 `customer.php` + 30 `site.php` + 30 storefront management inside
`admin.php`), **15 more are dev/ops closures in `web.php`**, and
**288 remain in scope** (218 admin + 70 B2B app).

Evidence for the storefront classification:

| Block | Where | Why it is storefront |
|---|---|---|
| `routes/customer.php` (prefix `cu`) | whole file | guarded by `auth:api-singleCustomer`; cart, fav, address, comment, payment gateway, `customer/wallet` |
| `routes/site.php` (prefix `site`) | whole file | public shop front: `Site\SiteController`, `Site\CollectionController`, `Api\SiteController` |
| `admin/wallet/*` | `admin.php:186-191` | `Adm\WalletController` — cashback percent, charge, config |
| `admin/single*` | `admin.php:35,59,60,194-199` | `Adm\SingleCustomerController` — the retail customer's orders, transactions, wallet, report |
| `admin/comment*` | `admin.php:150-152` | `Adm\CommentController` — product reviews, a storefront feature |

The three unrelated `percent` meanings were already separated in
`MIGRATION-STATE.md`. D13 confirms that **`ConfigStatic['percent']` (wallet
cashback) is storefront and out of scope**, while **`customers.percent`
(→ `makingChargeOffsetPercent`) is B2B and stays in scope**.

---

# Report — SMS provider (parity investigation, 2026-09-22)

Requested before implementing. **Nothing was implemented yet; awaiting approval.**

## 1. Which provider does the reference use?

**Trez SMS panel** (`smspanel.trez.ir`), called directly with Laravel's `Http`
facade. There is **no package, no config file and no env var** — the endpoint and
the credentials are hardcoded in one model.

| Item | Value | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Class | `App\Models\Sms` | `henza_server/app/Models/Sms.php` |
| Live endpoint | `https://smspanel.trez.ir/SendMessageWithCode.ashx` | `Sms.php:69` (`Send`), `Sms.php:97` (`SendSms`) |
| Method | `POST`, form-urlencoded, 20s timeout | `Sms.php:71-78` |
| Form fields | `PhoneNumber` (sender line), `Username`, `Password`, `Mobile`, `Message` | `Sms.php:73-77` |
| Persistence | `Sms::set()` writes every message to the `messages` table | `Sms.php:80,120-129` |
| Queue | `SendSmsJob` / `SendSmsAfterCreate` exist, but `QUEUE_CONNECTION` defaults to `sync` (`config/queue.php:16`), so sends are inline | `app/Jobs/SendSmsJob.php:40` |

**A superseded provider is commented out above each call**: `0098sms.com`
(`sendsmslink.aspx`, GET, sender line `3000164545`). Not ported — dead code.

WARNING — **the reference has live production credentials committed to git**
(`Sms.php:74-76`: a panel username, a plaintext password, and a sender line).
They are **not** copied into the target and are **not** repeated here. Logged as
**SEC-12**. The owner should assume they are compromised and rotate them.

## 2. Message templates

`Sms::Send($to, $msg)` takes a fully-built string; there are no provider-side
template ids. Lines are separated by a newline.

### OTP — the one this project needs

`ApiMobileController.php:47`:

```
<#> code is {CODE}
رمز عبور یکبار مصرف شما جهت ورود به اپلیکشن هنزا گلد {CODE} می باشد
aMo6iFyUQaY
```

The first line and the trailing `aMo6iFyUQaY` are the **Android SMS Retriever**
hash — they must stay byte-identical or autofill breaks. This exact string is
already in the target at `customer-auth.service.ts:219-222`, built and held
ready, currently discarded via `void smsText`.

A second OTP variant exists for the web app (`WebApp/AuthController.php:21`),
ending with the site domain and a hash. Not used by the B2B app.

### The other B2B messages (all in scope)

| # | Trigger | Text | Where |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Customer created by admin | `هنزا گلد` / `همکار گرامی {fname} {lname}` / `نام کاربری : {mobile}` | `AdminController.php:380-383` |
| 2 | Customer activated (`active == -1`) | `{name} عزیز ` / `حساب كاربري شما در اپليكيشن هنزا فعال شد.` / `هم اكنون مي توانيد محصولات جديد را بررسي و ثبت سفارش كنيد.` / `با مراجعه به لینک زیر می توانید وارد پروفایل کاربری خود شوید.` / `https://henzagold.com/customer/login` / `هنزا، راهكارهاي نوين تامين محصولات` | `AdminController.php:441-447` |
| 3 | Financial document approved | `هنزا گلد` / `سند مالی شما توسط مدیر سیستم تایید شد.` | `AdminController.php:465`, `CashController.php:141` |
| 4 | Financial document rejected | `هنزا گلد` / `سند مالی شما توسط مدیر سیستم رد شد.` | `CashController.php:144` |
| 5 | Order approved | `هنزا گلد` / `سفارش شما با شماره سند {oId}تایید شد.` (no space before «تایید» in the reference) | `AdminController.php:522` |
| 6 | Order placed — normal | `سفارش شما به شماره {id} به ثبت رسید. هنزا گلد` | `ApiMobileController.php:742` |
| 7 | Order placed — over `gram_level` | `سفارش شما به شماره {id} به ثبت رسید اما به دلیل عبور از سقف مجاز گرمی در حالت معلق قرار گرفت. هنزا گلد` | `ApiMobileController.php:739` |
| 8 | Order placed by the sales expert for a customer | `هنزا گلد` / `همکار گرامی {fname} {lname}` / `سفارشی به وزن {allGram} گرم توسط آقای {reagentName} برای شما در سیستم ثبت شده است.` / `در صورت مورد تایید بودن سفارش بر روی لینک زیر کلیک نمایید.` / `{confirmLink}` | `ApiMobileController.php:733` |
| 9 | To the customer's sales expert, on every order | `هنزا گلد` / `سفارشی توسط {fname} {lname} به شماره {id}و به وزن {allGram} به ثبت رسید.` | `ApiMobileController.php:749` |
| 10 | To four hardcoded admin numbers, on every order | `هنزا گلد` / `سفارشی توسط  {fname} {lname}` / ` به وزن {round(allGram)}` / `در سیستم ثبت شد.` | `ApiMobileController.php:601-605` |
| 11 | To three hardcoded admin numbers, on findoc submit | `هنزا گلد` / `سندی توسط آقای / خانم {fname} {lname} در سیستم ثبت شد.لطفا نسبت به بررسی و تایید آن اقدام نمایید. ` | `ApiMobileController.php:154-158` |
| 12 | Admin free-text / batch | operator-supplied | `SmsController.php:56,151` |

Messages 10 and 11 go to **phone numbers hardcoded in the source**
(six different mobile numbers across `ApiMobileController.php:154-158,601-605`).
Porting those literals would be wrong — they belong in configuration. Proposal:
one env var holding a comma-separated list, defaulting to empty. Logged as
**STUB-05**.

**Storefront messages are excluded** per D13: the cashback/wallet texts
(`AdminController.php:921,951`), `Customer/OrderController.php:94,141-145`,
`SingleCustomerController.php:66`, `Site/SiteController.php:182`,
`birthdayCommand.php`, `SmsWalletCommand.php`.

## 3. Proposed env vars — names only, no values in code or git

| Name | Required | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `SMS_PROVIDER` | no, default `trez` | selects the driver; `none` keeps today's dev behaviour |
| `SMS_TREZ_URL` | no, defaults to the reference endpoint | provider endpoint |
| `SMS_TREZ_USERNAME` | **yes in production** | panel username |
| `SMS_TREZ_PASSWORD` | **yes in production** | panel password |
| `SMS_TREZ_SENDER_LINE` | **yes in production** | the `PhoneNumber` form field |
| `SMS_ADMIN_RECIPIENTS` | no, default empty | replaces the hardcoded admin numbers (STUB-05) |

Proposed behaviour, per the owner's instruction:

- **Key absent, `NODE_ENV !== 'production'`** — today's behaviour is unchanged:
  the code is logged once by `Logger`, a redacted audit row is written.
- **Key absent, `NODE_ENV === 'production'`** — the server **fails to boot** with
  an explicit error naming the missing variable. No silent no-op, because a
  silent no-op means no customer can log in and nothing says why.
- Secrets are read from `process.env` only; nothing is written to the repo, and
  `.env.example` carries the **names with empty values**.

**Awaiting approval before implementing.**

---

# Report — MON-08: where the pricing values come from (2026-09-22)

Requested: in `henza_pwa`, does the user type `wagePercent` / `discountPercent` /
`flatRialCharge`, or does the app compute them?

## Answer: the app computes all of them. The user types none of them.

The whole order payload is built in one place,
`henza_pwa/src/views/cart.vue:160-184` (`submitOrder`):

| Payload field | Target equivalent | Source | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| `percent_pay` | `wagePercent` | `getWage(variant)` = `myStore.state.percent + variant.percentage_pay` | `cart.vue:173` -> `src/Mixins/product/index.ts:69-75` |
| `discount` | `discountPercent` | `getPromotion(product)?.discount_percent ?? 0` | `cart.vue:170` |
| `rial_pay` | `flatRialCharge` | **hardcoded `0`** — no UI writes it | `cart.vue:179` |
| `rash_weight` | (target reads from DB) | `cart.variant(cartItem).grams` — the variant's own weight | `cart.vue:178` |
| `qty` | `quantity` | the cart stepper — **the only genuine user input** | `cart.vue:177` |

Both computed inputs come from server-issued data:

- `variant.percentage_pay` — the variant's making charge, from the catalogue.
- `myStore.state.percent` — **`customers.percent`**, delivered by `POST /me-data`
  and stored at `myDataStore.ts:29,59,122-127`. This is the same
  `makingChargeOffsetPercent` field of D9, and it **confirms that trace from the
  client side**: the offset is per-customer and it is added to the making charge.
- `promotion.discount_percent` — from the promotion the server returned.

Two fields are sent as **literal constants with a `// how to get?!` comment**
(`cart.vue:181-182`): `wage_weight: 5.7856000000000005` and
`weight: 6.303744000000001`. The server ignores both — `setOrder` recomputes the
weight from `rash_weight`, and the `wage_weight` use is commented out
(`ApiMobileController.php:549-551`). Dead payload fields; logged as **DEAD-06**.

## What the server does with them

`ApiMobileController.php:536-541` computes the customer's **gold debt** directly
from the numbers in the request:

```php
$percent = ($item['percent_pay'] ?? 0) - ($item['discount'] ?? 0);
$gram    = ($item['rash_weight'] ?? 0) + (($item['rash_weight'] ?? 0) * ($percent / 100));
return $gram * ($item['qty'] ?? 0);
```

Nothing is re-read from the database and nothing is validated. A crafted request
sets its own making charge, its own discount and its own weight — so the
reference lets a customer decide how much gold they owe.

## Consequence — per the owner's ruling

The app computes these values, so the ruling applies:

> «اگر اپ حساب می‌کند: اولین کار Phase 2 این باشد که سرور همان مقادیر را با همان
> منطق از DB بخواند و مقادیر کلاینت را نادیده بگیرد، با تست مقایسه‌ای که نشان
> دهد نتیجه برای کاربر عادی یکسان است.»

**Phase 2, item #1** (recorded in `PROGRESS.md`):

1. The server derives, per line:
   `wagePercent = customer.makingChargeOffsetPercent + variant.percentagePay`,
   `discountPercent` from the applicable promotion, `flatRialCharge = 0`.
2. Client-sent values are **ignored**, and a warning is logged when they differ —
   the same pattern already used for `customerId` in `orders.service.ts`.
3. **A comparison test** proves that for an ordinary customer the server-derived
   values equal what the app sends today, so the total is unchanged.
4. The formula, its ordering and its rounding are untouched (D4).

This depends on `makingChargeOffsetPercent` existing, so the percent migration
must land first.

## `rash_weight` — accepted deviation

The reference trusts the client's `rash_weight` (`ApiMobileController.php:538`);
the target already reads the weight from the variant in the database. **Per the
owner's ruling the target's behaviour stays.** Recorded here as a deliberate
security deviation from the reference. The visible result is identical whenever
the client sends the true variant weight, which the reference app always does
(`cart.vue:178`); it differs only for a forged request, which is the point.

---

# D14 — Migration workflow, and the `customer_sync_full_name` trigger (2026-09-22)

## Workflow

| Environment | Command | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Development | `npx prisma migrate dev` | the only way schema changes are applied |
| Production | `npx prisma migrate deploy` | **only** this — never `migrate dev`, never `migrate reset` |
| Anywhere | `prisma db execute` | **no longer used for schema changes** |

If `migrate dev` reports drift and offers a reset: **stop, do not accept, report
it.** `_prisma_migrations` is never edited by hand.

### What actually happened on 2026-09-22

`migrate dev` **refused to run**: it is interactive by design and this shell is
not a TTY. That is a safety property, not a problem — a reset prompt could never
be auto-accepted here.

Before falling back, drift was checked read-only with `prisma migrate diff`. It
reported one pre-existing difference that has nothing to do with this work:

```
-- DropTable
DROP TABLE "_goldbank_migrations";
```

`_goldbank_migrations` is a **bespoke ledger from the earlier port**, holding 12
historical rows (`0001_init.sql`, `seed:initial`, …). It is not in
`schema.prisma`, so Prisma considers it foreign and would drop it. **It was not
dropped.** Dropping it is a destructive operation, it is unapproved, and the
rows are the only record of how the pre-Prisma port was applied. Logged as
**DEAD-07**; leave it until the owner decides.

The two new migrations were therefore applied with **`migrate deploy`**, which
applies exactly the pending files and touches nothing else — so the drift was
neither "fixed" nor acted upon. Result: `11 migrations found. Database schema is
up to date!`

## The `customer_sync_full_name` trigger

Created by `20260922120000_customer_name_parts`. **Prisma does not know it
exists**, so a write through Prisma Client can produce a row different from what
was written. Documented in three places so the next developer cannot miss it:
the migration header, the `Customer` model doc comment in `schema.prisma`, and
here.

| Write | Result |
|---|---|
| the parts only | `fullName` is rebuilt as `first + ' ' + last` |
| `fullName` only | the parts are re-derived (first token / the rest) |
| **both in one statement** | **THE PARTS WIN**; the submitted `fullName` is discarded |

**Why the parts win.** After D0 the parts are what the three forms edit, so they
carry the operator's intent; `fullName` is the derived, legacy-facing value.
The opposite precedence would silently undo an edit made in the two boxes the
operator actually typed into.

Verified live by `apps/api/scripts/test-name-trigger.cjs` — 9 assertions across
all three directions plus insert, a multi-token name, and a no-op update. It
creates one temporary row and deletes it, reporting the deletion.

---

# D15 — `_goldbank_migrations` is kept, and the UTF-8 testing rule (2026-09-22)

## The table stays, declared and ignored

**Owner's ruling:** keep `_goldbank_migrations`, delete no row from it, declare
it in `schema.prisma` with `@@ignore` so `migrate diff` stops proposing a drop,
and explain why it is there.

Done — `model goldbank_migrations` at the end of `schema.prisma`, mapped to the
real table name, with `@@ignore` so it never enters Prisma Client.

**Verification:**

```
npx prisma migrate diff --from-schema-datasource --to-schema-datamodel --script
→ -- This is an empty migration.        (drift: ZERO)
npx prisma migrate status
→ 11 migrations found. Database schema is up to date!
Prisma Client exposes it?  no (@@ignore)
```

## ⚠️ Correction to the earlier DEAD-07 assessment

The previous entry called this table a leftover from the pre-Prisma port. **That
was wrong**, and investigating the ruling is what surfaced it.

`_goldbank_migrations` is the tracking table of **the application's own
migration runner**, `apps/api/src/prisma/migrate.ts:5`. That runner exists for a
real reason, stated at `migrate.ts:7-13`: the Docker deploy image is copy-only
and ships **no Prisma CLI**, so `migrate deploy` cannot run in the container.
The runner executes the same `.sql` files through Prisma Client instead and
records them here.

So the project keeps **two ledgers, deliberately**:

| Ledger | Written by | Used |
|---|---|---|
| `_prisma_migrations` | the Prisma CLI | development (`migrate dev` / `migrate deploy`) |
| `_goldbank_migrations` | `src/prisma/migrate.ts` | the deployed container, at boot |

That runner also **already defended this table**: `migrate.ts:190-196` filters
out any `DROP TABLE "_goldbank_migrations"` statement, with a comment noting
that `migrate diff` had once emitted exactly that. The `@@ignore` model now
removes the cause rather than relying on that guard.

**Consequence for D14:** `migrate deploy` remains the rule for production *when
run by hand*, but the container applies migrations itself at boot through
`prepareDatabase()`. Any new migration must therefore be safe under **both**
paths — which is why idempotent SQL (`IF NOT EXISTS`, `CREATE OR REPLACE`)
matters here beyond ordinary caution.

### Row count went 12 → 14, and nothing was deleted

Starting the API for the round-trip test ran `prepareDatabase()`, which appended
the two new migrations to this ledger:

```
2026-09-22T04:29:14.085Z  20260922120000_customer_name_parts
2026-09-22T04:29:14.101Z  20260922120100_customer_making_charge_offset
```

All 12 original rows are present and unmodified. The runner's `$$`-aware
statement splitter handled the PL/pgSQL trigger body correctly — the trigger and
its function are both present in the database, and the 9 trigger assertions pass
against it.

## Testing rule — Persian input always comes from a file

**Owner's ruling:** the Windows shell mangles Persian text, so any test with
Persian input (names, addresses, messages, validation) must read its data from a
**file** — the test file itself or a UTF-8 JSON fixture — never from a
command-line argument. Any earlier result that was wrong because of this must be
re-run.

### Why, concretely

A `curl -d '{"fname":"محمد علی"}'` issued through the shell arrived at the API
with every Persian character replaced by `?` (codepoint `0x3f`). The first
round-trip attempt therefore "passed" its internal consistency checks while
storing `????` — the API and DB agreed with each other, and both were wrong.

### What was re-run

The customer round-trip test, with the payload written by Node as UTF-8 and sent
with `curl --data-binary @file`. It then passed on real Persian text:
create «محمد علی» + «احمدی» → edit form shows each part correctly → no-op save
leaves the row byte-identical → single-field edits touch only that field. The
three rows from both attempts were deleted and logged.

### The rule going forward

- Fixtures live in the test file or in a `.json` written with `utf8` encoding.
- HTTP bodies are sent with `--data-binary @file`, not `-d '<inline>'`.
- Assertions compare against literals **in the test file**, never against a
  string that has passed through the shell.
- Console output of Persian is not evidence: the Windows console renders it as
  `?` even when the data is correct. Verify by comparing values or codepoints in
  Node, as `scripts/test-name-trigger.cjs` does.

---

# D16 — Price display is storefront; new work order (2026-09-22)

## 1. PRICE-01 is stopped — price belongs to the retail storefront

**Owner's ruling.** Computing and displaying `price` / `price_with_discount` is a
**retail storefront (تک‌فروشی)** concern. The B2B app works in **making charge
(اجرت)** only. So PRICE-01 falls under D13 and is marked **⏸️ preserved — out of
current scope**.

| Item | Ruling |
|---|---|
| `apps/api/src/modules/pricing/variant-price.ts` | **Kept, not deleted.** Simply not used. |
| `variant-price.spec.ts` (11 hand-checked tests) | **Kept** and still runs in CI. |
| Any code wiring price into the admin panel | **Revert.** — *None existed: `computeVariantPrice` was never called from anywhere outside its own file and spec, so there was nothing to revert. Verified by grep over `apps/api/src` and `apps/admin-panel/src`.* |
| Making-charge fields — `percentage_pay`, `makingChargeOffsetPercent`, wage display | **Still fully in scope.** |

PRICE-01 in `ISSUES.md` is re-marked ⏸️ rather than deleted, so the analysis and
its evidence stay available if the storefront is ever taken up.

**Why this matters beyond one row:** the reference's `ProductVariant::$appends`
carries `price`, `color_str` and `price_with_discount` together
(`ProductVariant.php:115-119`). Only the price pair is storefront; anything else
appended there is still judged on its own merits.

## 2. The gate stands: admin first, then the apps

### Phase 1 — admin, in this order

**(a) Persons (اشخاص)**
1. The **5 missing sales-expert fields** (`ncode`, `phone`, `city_id`,
   `gram_level`, `reagent_id`): **report first** — where the reference uses each
   one for `type=1` — then add according to what that shows. Standing proposal:
   a `SalesExpertProfile` related to `AdminUser` (D10). Fields with no use are
   **listed for the owner to decide**, not added speculatively.
2. `singleCustomer` migrates to **diff-send** (D11).
3. Field-by-field audit of every form and grid in Persons — retail customer,
   wholesale customer, sales expert — per D12, each with its round-trip test.

**(b) Products, categories, variants, and order detail in the admin** — deep
field-by-field: every form field, column, filter and button (D12).
- The **variant image picker stays untouched** (PROTECTED, `PROTECTED.md` §B);
  only genuine omissions are added.
- The **making charge of every variant and every order line must display and
  persist exactly as the reference does.**

**(c) The rest of the admin, in order:** financial documents → users and
permissions → admin SMS templates → promotions / notifications / cities /
branches / workshops → reports.

**(d)** Full admin test pass, the Phase 1 report, then the gate question
**«ادمین کامل و تست شد. بریم سراغ اپ‌ها؟»** — and **stop and wait**.

### Phase 2 — apps (only after the owner approves)

**(a)** The 5 v2-behind-v1 logic gaps, most important the **cart stock ceiling
(`capQty`/`maxQty`)**, matching v1 and the reference exactly — v2's design fully
preserved, with a test proving v1 and v2 behave identically.

**(b)** The missing screens (`report`, `report/detail`, `ChildOrder`,
`customerChoice`, `complete_profile`) in **both** apps, each in its own design,
plus whatever backend they need.

**(c)** Field-by-field audit of products, categories, variants, cart and order in
the apps.

**(d)** The remaining Phase 2 items: MON-08, removing `customerId` from the order
DTO, route analytics, the `isLoaded` / `sts_verify_step_two` guards, guest
behaviour, app SMS templates, and the remaining screens.

## 3. Working method per section

**Implement the gaps first, then field-by-field test that same section.** Before
fixing any section, **show the owner a short summary of the gaps found** and wait.

This supersedes the "audit everything, then fix everything" reading of D12: the
field-by-field requirement is unchanged, but it is applied **per section**, with
a checkpoint before each one.

---

# D17 — Sales expert: `SalesExpertProfile`, and `reagent_id` deliberately not ported (2026-09-22)

## `reagent_id` — deliberately NOT replicated

**Owner's ruling, verbatim:**

> «`reagent_id` در فرم کارشناس مرجع، اثر جانبی فرم مشترک `customers` بوده و پر
> کردنش کارشناس را از لیست قابل‌انتخاب حذف می‌کرد (`queryReagent:420`). عمداً
> پورت نشد. منطق معرف روی `Customer.referredByAgentId` کامل پیاده شده است.»

### The evidence behind it

`reagent_id` carries real logic in the reference — but **every single use reads a
CUSTOMER's `reagent_id`** (which agent introduced them), never a sales expert's
own:

| Use | Reference | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| Scope "my customers" | `AdminController.php:271` | `->where('reagent_id', $auth->id)` |
| Set on customer create | `AdminController.php:326` | records the introducing agent |
| Commission / gram-sold rollup | `MajorOrderController.php:267-269,316-318` | `updateGramSell($customer->reagent_id)` |
| SMS to the customer's agent | `ApiMobileController.php:727,750` | notify the agent |
| Analytics rollup | `AdminController.php:550-552` | `whereNull('reagent_id')` roots + their children |

A `grep` for any code reading `reagent_id` on a `type=1` row returns **nothing**.

**The decisive line is `queryReagent` (`AdminController.php:415-424`):**

```php
Customer::select(['id', 'name as title'])->whereNull('reagent_id')
```

Only rows **without** a `reagent_id` may be chosen as an agent. So filling the
`reagent_id` field on a sales expert's own form (`ReagentCustomer.vue:139`)
**removes that expert from the selectable-agent list** — an unwanted side effect
of the shared `customers` form, not a feature. The same `whereNull` filter shapes
the analytics rollup.

**Therefore:** the field is not added to `SalesExpertProfile`. Adding it would
either do nothing or reproduce that defect. No new hierarchy logic is invented.

Matrix annotation: **«عمداً تکرار نشد — D17»**.

### Confirmed: no agent can be dropped from the referrer dropdown

The owner asked for explicit confirmation. The target's agent list is
`queryReagents()` (`apps/api/src/modules/admin-customers/admin-customers.service.ts:779-786`):

```ts
this.prisma.adminUser.findMany({
  where: { role: 'SALES_EXPERT', isActive: true },
  orderBy: { fullName: 'asc' },
  select: { id: true, fullName: true },
})
```

It filters on **role and active only** — there is no `whereNull` equivalent, so
**every active sales expert appears and none can be accidentally excluded.**
This is strictly better than the reference, whose `whereNull('reagent_id')`
silently hid any agent whose own `reagent_id` had been filled in.

Wiring: `admin-customers.controller.ts:82` → `GET admin/customers-omde/query/reagent`,
mapped at `apps/admin-panel/src/api/endpoints.ts:77`, consumed by
`bulkCustomer.vue:436`.

## `SalesExpertProfile` — approved shape

A separate table rather than columns on `AdminUser`, because these fields are
meaningful only for `role = SALES_EXPERT` and would be permanently null for every
other admin.

| Column | Type | Reference origin | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| `adminUserId` | unique FK → `AdminUser` | — | one profile per expert |
| `cityId` | FK → `City`, nullable | `ReagentCustomer.vue:111` | a filterable grid column (`ReagentListModel.js:14`) **and** it drives the commission autofill |
| `gramLevel` | `Decimal(14,4)`, default 0 | `ReagentCustomer.vue:158` | the «سطح اعتبار» column, filterable (`ReagentListModel.js:17`) |
| `phone` | text, nullable | `ReagentCustomer.vue:95` | stored in the reference; no reader — added on the owner's instruction |
| `nationalCode` | text, nullable | `ReagentCustomer.vue:31` | same |

`phone` and `nationalCode` keep the reference's validation exactly:
`required: false`, message `لطفا مقدار را وارد کنید`.

## City-driven commission autofill

Ported verbatim from `henza_admin/src/views/apps/customer/ReagentCustomer.vue:215-228`:

1. On city selection, look for `percent` on the already-loaded city row.
2. If it is absent or falsy, `GET cities/get-percent-aux/{id}` and use the response.
3. Write the result into the form's `percent` field.

Backend: `AdminController.php` behind `admin.php:225-226`
(`cities/get-percent/{id}` and `cities/get-percent-aux/{id}`), reading
`cities.percent` / `cities.percent_aux` — both already present on the target's
`City` model as `percent` / `percentAux` (`schema.prisma` `model City`).

## `firstName` / `lastName` on `AdminUser`

Closes D0 requirement 7. Same pattern as `Customer`, applied to **all**
`AdminUser` rows, not only sales experts: additive columns, backfill
(first token → `firstName`, the rest → `lastName`), a sync trigger where **the
parts win** when both change in one statement, and a multi-token review report.

Every `fname: fullName, lname: ''` site is corrected — starting with
`listReagents` (`admin-customers.service.ts:375-376`).

---

# D18 — Standing approval (owner decision, 2026-09-22)

To reduce round-trips, the owner granted a **standing approval**. From now on the
following are done **without stopping and without asking**, with only a short
report at the end of each section before moving straight to the next:

- Implementing gaps whose reference behavior is unambiguous — a field, column,
  filter, validation, message, button or page.
- Fixing target/reference mismatches where the reference behavior is clear.
- **Purely additive** migrations (a new column or table) on the development DB,
  provided a dry-run inside a transaction with rollback is clean first.
- Writing and running tests.
- Applying the same fix to other sites of the same pattern (as with the six
  extra `fname: fullName, lname: ''` sites found during D17).

**STOP and ask** only for:

1. Deleting any data, column, table, file or capability.
2. Any change to a PROTECTED zone or to the storefront surfaces of D13.
3. Any place the reference behavior is ambiguous or open to two readings.
4. Any place a reference bug is NOT being ported and that affects business
   logic (the D17 situation).
5. A migration that alters existing data (backfill or update), unless it only
   touches test data.
6. The Phase 1 end gate.

Everything else in DECISIONS, PROTECTED, D13 and D15 stays in force. In
particular this approval does **not** loosen: the ban on `migrate reset` or
touching `_prisma_migrations`, the CHANGELOG entry required for every data
deletion, or the UTF-8-from-file rule for tests with Persian input.

---

# D19 — Delivery Mode (owner decision, 2026-09-22)

The owner has a **delivery tonight**. Until further notice:

1. **No more deep field-by-field auditing and no more questions.** Implement the
   main gaps and make sure the project works.
2. **The "admin first, then apps" gate is lifted for tonight.** Work on admin and
   both apps in the priority order below.
3. **Nothing is deleted or changed** in PROTECTED zones, storefront (D13) areas,
   data, features or designs. All earlier security rules remain in force.
4. **When a decision is needed, pick the lowest-risk option that breaks nothing**,
   continue, and record it here rather than stopping to ask.

## Answers that closed the Persons audit

| Q | Ruling |
|---|---|
| A — `singleCustomer` diff-send | **Do not touch it** (D13 wins). **D11 is CANCELLED.** |
| B — lock `mobile` on edit | **Not ported.** The target keeps its current editable behaviour. Logged in ISSUES. |
| Gap 2 — `faToEn` on admin mobile | **Implement** (create and update). |
| Gap 1 — welcome SMS | **Implement**, byte-identical text, but non-blocking per D20. |
| Gap 4 — province/city tree | **ISSUES only.** |
| Gap 5 — Jalali birth date | **ISSUES only.** |

**D11 is superseded by this decision and must not be acted on.**

---

# D20 — SMS boot rule reversed, and a master OTP for delivery (2026-09-22)

## 1. SMS must never block anything

The rule from D14 — *"in production, if the SMS key is missing the server must
fail to boot with a clear error"* — is **REMOVED**.

New behaviour, in every environment:

* Missing credentials → log a **warning** and **boot normally**.
* `send()` with no credentials → **silently declines and logs**; it never throws.
* **No SMS, including the welcome SMS, may ever stop an operation.** Customer
  creation succeeds whether or not the message goes out.

The live send test to the owner's number is **cancelled**; the SMS panel is not
a priority for this delivery.

## 2. `OTP_MASTER_CODE` — a manual login code for the delivery

A temporary bypass so login works during the demo.

| Rule | Detail |
|---|---|
| Source | **`OTP_MASTER_CODE` env var only.** Never hardcoded in source. |
| Default | Unset or empty → **completely disabled**. |
| Effect | When set, it is accepted for **any active customer's** mobile, **alongside** the real code, which keeps working. |
| Unchanged | Active-customer check, throttling and attempt limits all still apply. |
| Boot | When enabled, print a clear warning: `OTP_MASTER_CODE فعال است — قبل از انتشار اصلی حذف شود`. |
| Audit | Every login through it is logged **with the customer's mobile**. |

Tests required: master code logs in; with the env var absent the same code is
rejected; the real code still works.

**Before the real release: remove `OTP_MASTER_CODE` from the environment and
configure the SMS credentials.** Recorded in `DELIVERY.md` and as a Critical
entry in `ISSUES.md`.

---

# D21 — Sales-expert login to the customer apps (owner decision, 2026-09-23)

The owner required that a sales expert be able to sign into the customer apps,
**without** reversing D17 (the expert stays an AdminUser, never a Customer).

## The problem

In the reference a sales agent WAS a Customer row (`customers.type = 1`), so:

* they logged in through the ordinary customer flow and got the whole app;
* `setOrder` did `Customer::findOrFail(auth()->id())` and read that row's
  `gram_level` (`ApiMobileController.php:534-535`) — the agent's own order, own
  credit limit, own ledger;
* `getChildOrder` filtered `where('reagent_id', auth()->id())`
  (`:767`) and `myChild` the same (`:188`) — the logged-in customer's id.

Here the expert is an AdminUser, which has **no ledger and no credit limit** and
cannot be an `Order`'s subject (`Order.customerId` is a required FK).

## The design

**One token family, two principals.** The app token's `typ` claim is either
`'customer'` or `'sales-expert'`; `customer-jwt.strategy.ts` resolves both to
one shape whose `id` is **always a Customer id**. Every route already written
for a customer therefore works unchanged for an expert — which is exactly what
the reference gave them.

**A trading account.** Each expert gets **one** linked Customer row
(`SalesExpertProfile.tradingCustomerId`, additive migration
`20260923120000_sales_expert_trading_customer`), created lazily at their first
`request-otp`. It carries only their own trading position.

### Answering the owner's question — whose name, and from where

| Question | Answer | Source |
|---|---|---|
| An order the expert places is **whose**? | Their **own trading account** — not a customer's | Reference: the agent's order was their own row |
| Its **making charge**? | `AdminUser.wagePercent` → `makingChargeOffsetPercent` | Reference: the agent's `customers.percent` |
| Its **credit limit**? | `SalesExpertProfile.gramLevel` → `goldCreditLimitGrams` | Reference: `$customer->gram_level` (`:535`) |

Both numbers are the same two the reference read off the agent's own Customer
row, so the behaviour matches; only the storage location differs. Seeded at
creation and not resynchronised afterwards — an operator editing the expert's
commission changes it for their referred customers, and changing an existing
trading account's terms silently is a money change nobody asked for.

## Scope rules

* `Customer.referredByAgentId` points at the **AdminUser**, so "my customers"
  and "my customers' orders" scope on `me.adminUserId`, taken from the token.
  An expert can never see another expert's customers (tested, both directions).
* The trading account has `referredByAgentId = null` — an expert is not their
  own referred customer.
* Child orders keep the reference's `sts = 5` filter as
  `status = DELIVERED_TO_AGENT` — the same «تحویل مسئول فروش» point.
* Both expert routes 403 for an ordinary customer, and `expert/whoami` lets the
  apps hide the menu entries. The server does not rely on the UI hiding them.

## Token boundaries (all tested)

| Token | On | Result |
|---|---|---|
| expert app token | admin route | **401** |
| customer token | admin route | **401** |
| admin token | expert route | **401** |
| expert token, after deactivation | expert route | **401**, immediately |

`jwt.strategy.ts` gained an explicit check that rejects any token carrying an
app `typ`. This matters because an expert's app token holds their **AdminUser
id** in `sub`: `JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET` falls back to `JWT_SECRET` when unset, and
in that configuration the token would otherwise have validated as an admin and
been handed full panel permissions.

## Deliberately NOT ported

`myChild` minted an `api_token` for every listed customer as a side effect
(`ApiMobileController.php:197-201`), which let an agent act **as** that
customer. That is a session-hijack primitive; every session here derives from
the caller's own token. Not ported, and recorded here rather than silently
dropped.

> ⚠️ **SUPERSEDED BY D29 (2026-10-12).** The owner asked for the capability
> back, so acting as one's own customer now exists — with the reference's full
> scope, but not its mechanism: no token is minted, the expert keeps their own,
> and ownership is re-checked on every request. The paragraph above still
> describes correctly what is **not** done (minting customer tokens). See D29.

## Ambiguity resolved the low-risk way

If one mobile ever belonged to both an expert and a customer, the owner ruled
the **expert wins**. Since `Customer.mobile` is unique, the code adopts the
existing customer row as the expert's trading account rather than failing the
login or creating a duplicate, and logs a warning.

---

## D22 — «تکمیل پروفایل» (complete_profile), 2026-09-23

Ports `POST /major/complete`
(henza_server `Major/CustomerController::complete`, reached from
`henza_pwa/src/views/user/src/completeProfile.vue`) as
`POST customer/me/complete-profile`.

**Reference behaviour kept**
- all three document ids required; a miss is rejected before anything is written
- the customer comes from the session, never from the body (D21)
- the verification step is set to the reference's **live** value 2 — approved
  outright, not "waiting for an expert". The reference's own
  `sts_verify_step_two = 1` line is commented out at `:83` in favour of `= 2`
  at `:85`. That is `VerificationStep.VERIFIED` here.
- both SMS messages byte-identical, and non-blocking per D20
- the entry point is the **profile screen**, shown only while the documents are
  missing (`profile.vue:96-102`), and the route redirects home once they are in
  (`router/index.ts:266`)

**Reference behaviour deliberately NOT ported** (all in ISSUES.md)
- **SEC-14** — `$customer->update($request->all())` mass-assigned the whole
  request body, letting the app write its own credit limit, making charge, gold
  debt, active flag or mobile. Replaced with a three-field whitelist.
- **SEC-15** — four real personal mobiles hardcoded in the source. They come
  from `PROFILE_ADMIN_MOBILES` instead; blank means nobody is notified.
- **APP-03** — `refresh()`'s unterminated `setInterval` page reload.

**One gap had to be closed first (UPL-01).** The reference let the app upload
through the same `file/create` the admin used, inside its `auth:api-customer`
group; the target's copy is admin-guarded. Added `POST customer/me/documents`,
reusing `AdminUploadsService` unchanged so both paths share one size limit,
MIME whitelist and naming scheme.

## D23 — `JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET` warns loudly, 2026-09-23

`customerJwtSecret()` falls back to `JWT_SECRET`. When it does, app and admin
tokens are signed with the **same key**, leaving the `typ` check in
`jwt.strategy.ts` as the only barrier — and an expert's app token carries their
AdminUser id in `sub`. The owner asked for a refusal to boot **or** a very
clear warning; the lower-risk option was chosen (D19), since failing the boot
could take down a running deployment that has not set the variable yet. A
banner as loud as the master-OTP one now fires at boot, and DELIVERY.md lists
it as the **first** pre-release step (REL-03).

## D24 — «گزارش» (report + report/detail) on the internal ledger, 2026-09-23

**In the reference this feature computes nothing.** `Customer\TahesabController`
(henza_server `app/Http/Controllers/Customer/TahesabController.php`) forwards
every call to an external accounting system — `hesab.henzagold.com` and a bare
IP at `31.7.68.147:3030` — with `Http::withoutVerifying()` (TLS verification
off), a bearer token hardcoded in the source and a URL-embedded `sfx` secret,
keyed on `Customer.mcode`, the customer's id in that other system. The PWA
renders whatever comes back.

The target has no such system and no `mcode`. **The owner chose option الف:**
build the reference's UI and flow over our own ledger, with no external
connection. So `customer/me/report*` reproduces the statement's SHAPE — the
field names `henza_pwa/src/type/accounting.ts` declares, so the ported
components bind unchanged — from `LedgerEntry`.

**Honesty rule.** Every figure is computed from confirmed ledger entries.
Where the external system carried a column the target has no equivalent for
(foreign currency, وزن پلاستیک, نام کارساخته, جنس فلز and its internal
bookkeeping ids), the field is `null`/zero and the UI **omits the row** rather
than rendering a fabricated value. Recorded as REP-01.

**Two things the target does better, deliberately:**
- Only **confirmed** entries count, the same rule the cached
  `Customer.goldDebtGrams` / `fiatDebtRial` follow — so the statement's closing
  balance agrees with the figure shown everywhere else in the app. Asserted by
  the test.
- **SEC-16:** the reference's `detail($id)` took the factor code from the URL
  and performed **no ownership check whatsoever** — it never looks at `auth()`
  — so any signed-in customer could read any other customer's document by
  guessing a code. Here the id is only ever a filter on top of a `customerId`
  scope, so someone else's id returns nothing. Tested in both directions.

The reference gated the page on `myStore.hasMCode()`; with no mcode in the
target the gate is simply a session, and the server scopes every row to the
token.

## D25 — blank env vars are treated as unset, 2026-09-23

Found by the pre-delivery compose run (DEPLOY-02): **admin login returned 500
for every user in Docker.** `docker-compose.yml` passes each optional variable
as `${X:-}`, so an unconfigured one arrives as `""`, not `undefined`. The code
read them with `process.env.X ?? 'default'`, which only falls back on
`undefined` — so the empty string won and `jsonwebtoken` threw on every sign.

Invisible to every existing suite, all of which ran against a local dev process
where the variable is genuinely absent.

`src/common/env.ts` now provides `envOr` / `envOrNull`, which treat blank as
unset, and every auth, port, upload and SMS read uses them. Three of those were
not merely cosmetic: a blank `UPLOAD_DIR` would have served static files from
the **filesystem root**, a blank `PORT` would have bound a random ephemeral port
(`Number('') === 0`), and a blank `JWT_SECRET` would have become the verifying
key. Pinned by `src/common/env.spec.ts`, which reproduces the original throw
against the real `jsonwebtoken` and asserts the reader can no longer produce it.

**Standing rule from here on:** read an environment variable with `envOr` /
`envOrNull`, never with `??`, unless an empty string is a meaningful value for
that specific variable.

## D26 — SMS through the owner's relay gateway, drivers per provider, 2026-10-05

The owner supplied the PHP client of their own SMS gateway — a relay at
`http://185.231.112.101/api/createsms` that handles SMS for several panels and
apps. Owner rulings:

| Topic | Ruling |
|---|---|
| Default | The relay **replaces Trez as the default**. Trez is **kept**, selectable with `SMS_PROVIDER=trez`; more providers may follow. |
| Secret | The `secret_key` **lives in source** as the default. The gateway has a second verification factor held elsewhere, so the owner does not treat it as sensitive. `SMS_RELAY_SECRET` overrides it. (Contrast SEC-12, where the Trez credentials stay env-only.) |
| Platform | **Every** message goes through Kavenegar (`platform: "kave"`). |
| Host | The server's own IP is correct, as in the PHP client; `SMS_RELAY_HOST` overrides it. |
| Address | The IP over HTTP is correct. HTTPS on that IP presents an expired `*.montpar.ir` certificate (checked 2026-10-05), so HTTPS is not usable on the IP; `SMS_RELAY_URL` can switch later. |
| Replies | Undocumented; left to the implementation. A 2xx counts as sent unless the JSON body says `status: false`, `success: false`, `ok: false`, `status: "error"`/`"failed"` or carries `error`. |

Implementation: `apps/api/src/modules/sms/drivers/` — one `SmsDriver` per
provider (`relay.driver.ts`, `trez.driver.ts`) registered in `drivers/index.ts`.
A new provider is one file plus one registry line. `SmsService` keeps the
cross-provider rules: trim, persist every message (SEC-11 for OTP unchanged),
log failures and never throw (D20). Plan: `docs/SMS-RELAY-PLAN.md`.

Consequence: with no SMS variables set, **every environment now sends real
SMS**, local development included. Set `SMS_PROVIDER=none` on a machine that
must not send.

## D27 — accounting integration (Tahesab / Zarrin), switchable from the admin panel, 2026-10-05

The owner wants the app connected to the shop's accounting software, and the
software differs per installation: **Tahesab** or **Zarrin**, picked with one
switch in the admin panel (`none | tahesab | zarrin`). Plan and the full API
survey: `docs/ACCOUNTING-INTEGRATION-PLAN.md`. Owner rulings:

| Topic | Ruling |
|---|---|
| Scope | Customer sync, balance sync, order documents, and ready-made items (کارساخته) ↔ products. **Everything else stays in the app** — repayment documents (melted gold, cash, cheque) are not sent. |
| Balance | The accounting balance is **shown to the customer**; the **credit-limit check stays on the internal ledger**. |
| Report | «گزارش» reads from the accounting software when the integration is on, so it agrees with the balance shown. Supersedes D24 for that case only; D24 remains the fallback. |
| Customers | Created in the accounting software when an admin marks them **VERIFIED**; existing ones are linked by **mobile**. Accounts that exist only in the accounting software are **created in the app**, keyed by mobile (national code falls back to the mobile, as elsewhere). |
| Documents | Sent at the debt-recognition point (`DELIVERED_TO_AGENT`) as **temporary** (موقت) documents for the accountant to finalise. Ready-made items only for now; gold/coin trading later. |
| Products | One accounting کارساخته = one app **Product**. Title, code and stock belong to the accounting software; images, description, variants, category and **making charge belong to the app**. |
| Visibility | **A product with no image is never shown in the app** — all products, automatically. |
| Stock | Accounting stock is shown in the admin panel; at zero the product is unavailable in the app (pre-order variants excepted). |

Security carried over from the reference's mistakes (SEC-06/16/17): TLS
verification is never disabled (a custom CA can be supplied instead), the
token is write-only and encrypted at rest with `ACCOUNTING_SECRET_KEY`, the
generic `const` settings routes refuse `accounting.*` keys, and statement
details are scoped to the token's own customer.

Later rulings, same day (plan §11–§12, ACC-08/09): sync is real-time (change
feed polled every 5 s, sends right after commit, order-time live stock that
falls back to the last known figure); sync buttons on the wholesale-customer
and product lists and a live balance on the app profile, all working whenever
a provider is connected regardless of the feature switches; and the order
status that posts the temporary document (پیش‌فاکتور) is an admin-chosen rule
(`documents.triggerStatus`, default «تحویل مسئول فروش»).

---

## D28 — ورود اپ باید خطای واقعی را بگوید (۲۰۲۶/۱۰/۱۲)

**گزارش مالک:** «اگر کاربری در اپ نبود خطا نمیدادی کاربر یافت نشد میبردیش توی
صفحه ارسال کد و واقعا نمیشد فهمید خطا از پروژه هست یا نه پیامک نمیاد یا نه واقعا
نیست میخوام خطا بدی کاربر یافت نشد»

**تصمیم:** مرحله اول ورود باید علت را بگوید.

| حالت | قبل | بعد |
|---|---|---|
| شماره ثبت نشده | `{ sent: true }` — کاربر به صفحه کد می‌رفت | **۴۰۴** «این شماره در سیستم ثبت نشده است…» |
| پیامک فرستاده نشد (درگاه خراب) | `{ sent: true }` | **۵۰۳** «ارسال پیام کوتاه در حال حاضر ممکن نیست…» |
| کارشناس فروش با حساب معاملاتی غیرفعال | `{ sent: true }` | **۴۰۳** «حساب شما غیرفعال است…» |
| کارشناس فروش بدون پروفایل | `{ sent: true }` | **۴۰۳** «حساب شما کامل نیست…» |

**نسبت با مرجع:** این همان کاری است که مرجع می‌کرد (`firstOrFail()` در
`ApiMobileController::userAuth:43` ⇒ ۴۰۴). پاسخ مبهم، انحراف ما بود نه این.

**معاوضه امنیتی، صریح:** پاسخ مبهم برای این بود که کسی از بیرون نتواند بفهمد چه
شماره‌هایی در سیستم ثبت‌اند. این محافظت در مرحله اول کاهش یافت، **عمداً و به
دستور مالک**، چون هزینه‌اش را کاربران واقعی و پشتیبانی می‌دادند. چیزی که سر جایش
ماند: سقف تعداد ارسال برای هر شماره و هر IP (`assertSendAllowed`) که مرجع
نداشت — پس شمارش‌کردن شماره‌ها محدود است نه آزاد؛ و مرحله دوم (`verifyOtp`) که
برای همه علت‌های شکست یک پیام واحد می‌دهد.

**چرا D20 اینجا نقض نمی‌شود:** D20 می‌گوید پیامک ناموفق نباید یک *عملیات* را
خراب کند — سفارش باید ثبت شود حتی اگر پیامکش نرود. در ورود، پیامک **خودِ
عملیات** است، پس سکوت از چیزی محافظت نمی‌کند.

ثبت شده در `ISSUES.md` به‌عنوان AUTH-01/02/03 و DOC-01.

---

## D29 — «ورود به حساب مشتری» برای کارشناس فروش (۲۰۲۶/۱۰/۱۲)

**خواسته مالک:** «کارشناس فروش میتونه از طریق اپ خودش وارد صفحه مشتری هاش بشه و
از جانب اون ها ثبت سفارش کنه و وضعیت اون هارو ببینه و یکجورایی انگار با اکانت
اون ها لاگین کرده همه چیز رو از دید اون مشتریش میدید و این خیلی کاربردی بود ولی
الان نیست» و سپس: «همان قابلیت هارو میخوام حالا هرجور که فکر میکنی از لحاظ
امنیت و پرفورمنس بهتره».

این **D21 را اصلاح می‌کند**: آنجا `changeUser` «عمداً پورت نشد» و به‌عنوان
session-hijack رد شد. مالک قابلیت را خواست، پس بازگردانده شد — با همان دامنه
کامل مرجع، ولی با سازوکار دیگر.

### دامنه: کامل، مثل مرجع

مرجع توکن را در interceptor سراسری axios عوض می‌کرد
(`henza_pwa/plugins/axios.ts:18` ← `getUserToken()`)، پس **هر** درخواست از طرف
مشتری می‌رفت: دیدن، ثبت سفارش، علاقه‌مندی، و آپلود مدارک. همان دامنه حفظ شد —
هیچ مسیری در حالت act-as بسته نشد.

### سازوکار: هدر، نه توکن

| | مرجع | اینجا |
|---|---|---|
| چطور | توکن دائمی مشتری (`api_token`) به کارشناس داده می‌شد (`ApiMobileController.php:197-201`) | کارشناس توکن **خودش** را می‌فرستد + هدر `X-Act-As-Customer` |
| کجا اعمال می‌شود | interceptor کلاینت | `CustomerJwtStrategy.validateExpert` — تنها نقطه |
| بررسی مالکیت | یک‌بار، در لحظه گرفتن توکن | **هر درخواست**، با `referredByAgentId` در همان کوئری |
| ماندگاری | `localStorage`، بی‌انقضا | `sessionStorage`؛ بستن تب = پایان |
| ردّ حسابرسی | هیچ — درخواست عیناً مشتری بود | `adminUserId` حفظ می‌شود؛ سفارش لاگ می‌شود |
| بعد از قطع همکاری کارشناس | توکن مشتری همچنان کار می‌کرد | ۴۰۱ فوری (نقش و `isActive` هر بار خوانده می‌شود) |

**چرا این نقطه:** `validate()` همیشه یک principal می‌سازد که `id` آن یک Customer
id است و **هر ۱۷ مسیر مشتری** از آن می‌خوانند. پس تغییر در یک نقطه، همه مسیرها
را از دید مشتری می‌کند — بدون تغییر در هیچ route.

**پرفورمنس:** یک `findFirst` روی کلید اصلی، **فقط** وقتی هدر هست؛ و جایگزین
کوئریِ `tradingCustomer` می‌شود نه اضافه بر آن. مشتری عادی و کارشناس در حالت
معمولی صفر هزینه اضافه.

**۴۰۳ و نه ۴۰۱** برای مشتریِ غیرمجاز: نشست خود کارشناس سالم است، پس اپ وضعیت
act-as را پاک می‌کند و او را از سیستم بیرون نمی‌اندازد.

### چیزهایی که مرجع نداشت و اضافه شد

۱. **نوار همیشگی «در حال مشاهده به‌عنوان …» + دکمه خروج.** در مرجع، جابجایی
   نامرئی بود: راه فهمیدن اینکه در حساب کیستی، فقط دیدن داده‌های عجیب بود، و
   ثبت سفارش روی حساب اشتباه یک کلیک فاصله داشت. تنها راه خروج هم logout بود که
   نشست خود کارشناس را هم می‌بست (`Dashboard.vue:781-789`).
۲. **پاک‌سازی حالت در جابجایی** (هر دو جهت): سبد، `queryCache` کلیدهای `me:`،
   علاقه‌مندی‌ها، و **اجرت‌های کش‌شده**. این آخری مالی است: اجرت هر مشتری
   متفاوت است، و بدون پاک‌سازی عددِ روی صفحه با عددِ ثبت سفارش یکی نمی‌بود.
   (در مرجع این مسئله وجود نداشت چون کل نشست با توکن عوض می‌شد.)

ثبت شده در `ISSUES.md` به‌عنوان EXP-01.

## D30 — بخش‌های «فقط سوپر ادمین» در پنل مدیریت (۲۰۲۶/۱۰/۱۴)

**خواسته مالک:** این بخش‌ها فقط به سوپر ادمین (۰۹۱۲۸۰۸۱۳۹۲) نشان داده شوند و در
سطح دسترسی‌ها هم نباشند: لیست مشتریان تک، لیست بنکداران، لیست مغازه‌داران حضوری،
شعب و کارگاه، تب «مشتری تک» در افزودن شخص، فیلد «سینی ها» در فرم محصول، ثبت
سفارش تک و لیست سفارش‌های تک، «افزودن تخفیف تک»، و «مدیریت کیف پول».

**پاسخ‌های مالک:**
- سوپر ادمین = **فقط حساب با موبایل ۰۹۱۲۸۰۸۱۳۹۲**، نه هر ادمینی که نقش `SUPER_ADMIN` دارد.
- اعمال **کامل**: مخفی در پنل + بستن آدرس مستقیم صفحه + ۴۰۳ از API.
- «سینی ها» در **هر دو جا**: فیلد فرم محصول و تب «مدیریت ثابت ها».
- تخفیف تک: **افزودن + ویرایش + حذف**، و هر سه از سطح دسترسی‌ها حذف.

**سازوکار.** `@SuperAdminOnly()` در `apps/api/src/modules/auth/guards.ts`، که
`PermissionsGuard` سراسری آن را اعمال می‌کند؛ شماره و فهرست rid ها در
`auth/super-admin.ts`. به سوپر ادمین rid های این بخش‌ها همیشه داده می‌شود
(`withSuperAdminRids`) تا با ذخیره‌ی دوباره‌ی سطح دسترسی‌اش از دست نروند. در پنل:
`users.isSuperAdmin` (از `is_super_admin` در login و `users/show`)، `superAdminOnly`
روی منو و route، و حذف این rid ها از درخت صفحه دسترسی‌ها برای غیر سوپر ادمین.

**تصمیم‌های جانبی (برای نشکستن چیزهای دیگر):**
- **پنل شعبه** همان endpoint های مشتری تک و سفارش تک را صدا می‌زند؛ این endpoint ها
  برای ادمینِ دارای `branchId` هم باز ماند (`allowBranch`). بدون این، کارکنان شعبه
  قفل می‌شدند. پیامد: ادمینی که شعبه دارد از API به این چهار endpoint دسترسی دارد.
- **سوپر ادمین در درخت دسترسی‌ها همه را می‌بیند** تا بتواند این rid ها را به سطح
  دسترسی کارکنان شعبه بدهد. دیگران آن‌ها را نمی‌بینند، و rid هایی که سطح از قبل
  دارد هنگام ذخیره توسط آن‌ها **حفظ** می‌شود (حذف بی‌صدا نمی‌شود).
- `admin/orders/:id`، `status` و `status-options` بین سفارش تک، عمده و تامین مشترک‌اند
  و `order.list` می‌خواستند؛ حالا هر کدام از `order.list` / `order.omde` / `order.tamin`
  کافی است (`RequirePermission` چند rid می‌پذیرد).
- لیست کارگاه‌ها (`admin/workshops/list`) **باز ماند**: انتخاب کارگاه در «سفارش های
  ساختنی» از آن است. بقیه‌ی endpoint های کارگاه و همه‌ی شعب بسته شدند.
- **تخفیف تک فقط در پنل بسته شد، نه در API**: API تک و عمده را از هم تشخیص نمی‌دهد
  (PROMO-TAK-01).
- بنکداران/مغازه‌داران و سینی‌ها rid مشترک با بخش‌های دیگر دارند (`persons.list.client.omde`،
  `collection.*`)؛ پس از درخت حذف نشدند و با `@SuperAdminOnly` / `isSuperAdmin` بسته شدند.