# CHANGELOG — parity changes Every change made to `gold-banking-monorepo` during the parity project, with the reason and the reference path that justifies it. Format: ``` ## — — - **What:** - **Why:** - **Reference:** - **Target:** - **Matrix row:** - **Commit:** ``` --- ## 2026-09-21 — Phase 0 — Setup - **What:** Created branch `parity/phase-0` and `docs/parity/` scaffolding (`PROGRESS.md`, `ISSUES.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`). - **Why:** Persistent state required by `CLAUDE.md` §6. - **Reference:** n/a - **Target:** `docs/parity/` - **Matrix row:** n/a _No source code changed in Phase 0 (read-only phase)._ --- ## 2026-09-22 — Security hotfix, stage 1 — close the unauthenticated write paths Branch `parity/security-hotfix`. Authorised by the user's rulings D7, T1–T3. ### 1. Ledger routes are admin-only (SEC-09) - **What:** removed the controller-level `@Public()` from `AccountingController` and gave each route a rid: `wallet.list` (balance), `wallet.charge` (reconcile), `document.create` (both repayments), `document.list.confirm` (confirm entry). - **Why:** four of the five routes WRITE to the ledger and were reachable with no token at all. Faithful to the reference, whose entire admin route file is unauthenticated, but contrary to confirmed decision D1. - **Reference:** `henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272` (the `auth:api` wrapper is commented out at both ends) - **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts` - **Breakage check:** `api.getBalance()` is the only app-side consumer and it has **zero call sites** in either user app (dead code, already logged as DEAD-01/02). ### 2. Order status change is admin-only (SEC-10) - **What:** moved `@Public()` from the class to the two customer-facing handlers, leaving `PATCH orders/:id/status` behind `order.list.sts.submit`. - **Why:** it let an anonymous caller move any order's status **and** attribute the change to any admin through the DTO's `actorAdminUserId`. - **Reference:** an admin operation; the admin panel posts to `admin/orders/status` (`apps/admin-panel/src/api/endpoints.ts:42,48`), so this route had no caller. - **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts` - **Still public:** `POST /orders` and `GET /orders/:id`, because the target has no customer session yet — closed in stage 2. ### 3. `GET /customers` no longer leaks the customer book (SEC-08) - **What:** added `LOGIN_LOOKUP_SELECT` (`id`, `mobile`, `isActive`, `isArchived`) and pointed `list()` at it. Removed `fullName`, `nationalCode`, `goldDebtGrams`, `fiatDebtRial`, `goldCreditLimitGrams`, `verificationStep`, `cityId`, `referredByAgentId`, `nationalIdImageUrl`, `businessLicenseUrl`, `shopImageUrl`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt` from that response. - **Why:** the route is unauthenticated because both apps match the phone number in the browser, so it shipped every customer's national ID number, debts, credit limit and identity-document URLs to any visitor. - **Reference:** login was `POST userAuth` → SMS → `POST userVerfiy`, returning exactly one customer after the code matched (`henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ApiMobileController.php:39-78`). - **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/customers/customers.service.ts`, plus `CustomerSummary` narrowed in **both** apps' `src/api/client.ts` (parity rule: the same logic change in both). - **Route survives** until stage 2 replaces the client-side phone match with OTP. ### 4. Test script - **What:** added `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh` — asserts 401 without a token, 403 with a low-privilege token, and pass-through for a super admin, on every closed route; plus that the public routes still answer 200 and that `GET /customers` exposes only the four login fields. - **Result:** **23 passed, 0 failed** against a live server and the dev seed. ### Not changed `/uploads` — per ruling T2, uploaded files including identity documents stay public. The filename check requested alongside it passed with no changes needed (md5 of time + name + UUID; no directory listing). --- ## 2026-09-22 — Security hotfix, stage 2 — real customer sessions Branch `parity/security-hotfix`. Authorised by D6, D7, T1 and T3. Stage 1 narrowed `GET /customers` but, as the user pointed out, did not close the leak: the response still carried every customer **id**, and `/customers/:id`, `/:id/orders` and `/:id/ledger-entries` were still public — so two requests still reconstructed the whole book. Stage 2 removes the id-bearing surface entirely. ### 1. Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1) - **New:** `src/modules/customer-auth/` — `CustomerJwtStrategy` (passport strategy `'customer-jwt'`), `CustomerJwtGuard`, `@CustomerAuth()`, `@CurrentCustomer()`. - Signed with **`JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET`**, separate from `JWT_SECRET`, and every token carries **`typ: 'customer'`** which the strategy verifies. Either check alone would be enough; both are present deliberately. - Customer state is re-read from the DB on every request, so deactivating or archiving a customer takes effect at once rather than at token expiry. - **Reference:** the same split existed there — `auth:api` for admins, `auth('api-customer')` for the app. ### 2. Real OTP (D6) - **New table `CustomerOtp`** (migration `20260922000000_customer_otp`, additive: one new table, nothing existing touched). - `POST /api/customer/auth/request-otp` ← `ApiMobileController::userAuth` (:39-49) - `POST /api/customer/auth/verify-otp` ← `ApiMobileController::userVerfiy` (:51-64) - **Parity behaviour:** the 4-digit `rand(1000,9999)` range, the active-customer filter, `Utility::faTOen()` digit normalisation on both the number and the code, and rejection on mismatch. - **Deliberate improvements over the reference** (user-approved, recorded in DECISIONS.md so the matrix does not flag them later): - the code is stored as a **bcrypt hash**, never plain text; - it **expires** after 2 minutes (the reference's never did); - **5 attempts** per challenge, then lockout (the reference had no limit); - **single use** — a consumed code cannot be replayed; - **send throttle**: 60s cooldown per number, 5 per number and 20 per IP per 10 minutes, counted off the table so it survives restarts; - **no enumeration** — an unregistered number returns the same `{sent:true}`. The reference's `firstOrFail()` leaked a 404 for unknown numbers. - No SMS gateway exists in this project (STUB-02), so the code is logged in non-production only and the message is persisted as an `SmsMessage` row. The reference's message text is kept verbatim for when a gateway lands. ### 3. The id-bearing customer routes are gone - **Deleted** `customers.controller.ts` — with it `GET /customers`, `/customers/:id`, `/:id/orders`, `/:id/ledger-entries`. - **Replaced by** `/api/customer/me`, `/me/orders`, `/me/ledger-entries`, which take the id **from the token**. There is no longer any route that accepts a customer id, so the IDOR is closed structurally rather than by a check. - `CustomersService` stays and is reached only through those routes. - The admin panel was unaffected — it uses `admin/customers-omde/*`. ### 4. Both apps migrated together (parity rule) - `stores/session.ts`: `token` is now the credential and `isLoggedIn` is token-based. `customerId` is kept for display only and is no longer an identity claim. - `api/client.ts`: sends `Authorization: Bearer`, throws `UnauthorizedError` on 401 and calls the handler registered in `main.ts`, which clears the session and routes to login so stale personal data cannot stay on screen. - `LoginView.vue`: real two-step OTP. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only the logic changed, and it is identical in both. - The four account screens now call `getMe()` / `getMyOrders()` / `getMyLedgerEntries()`; router guards test `isLoggedIn`. ### Tests - `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh` extended with the stage-2 assertions: **46 passed, 0 failed** against a live server — old routes 404, customer routes 401 without a token, wrong/reused code 401, correct code 200, throttle 429, no enumeration, customer token rejected on admin routes and admin token rejected on customer routes, no id-bearing surface, and `/customer/me` returning the token's own customer. - **jest installed** (dev-only, user-approved) with `jest.config.cjs`, so `pnpm test` works for the first time: **7 passed** covering `faToEn`. `faToEn` moved to its own `digits.ts` so it can be tested without booting Nest. - Typecheck clean on api, user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.