Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5 f71fd5bfe1 feat(apps): sales-expert screens in both apps + v2 admin home slider (D21, APP-02)
Both expert screens are built in user-app and user-app-v2, with byte-identical
template and script and a per-app style block only — verified by diffing
everything above <style>:

  ChildOrdersView  "سفارش مشتریان"  — legacy ChildOrders.vue. Keeps the
    reference's title, search, infinite paging, and per-card item count, total
    weight, customer name and the fixed «تحویل مسئول فروش» chip (the endpoint
    only returns that status, ApiMobileController:766).
  CustomerChoiceView "لیست مشتریان" — legacy customerChoice.vue. Keeps its
    title, per-search re-query and the reference's choice to LIST inactive
    customers (its active() scope is commented out at :187).

Reachable from inside the app, not just by URL: routes carry the reference's own
paths and names, the dashboard grows the two entries only for an expert (v1 as
tiles, v2 as its own rows), and a router guard sends an ordinary customer back
to their dashboard. None of that is relied on for safety — the server scopes
both endpoints on the AdminUser id in the token and answers 403 otherwise.

Not ported, both recorded in D21: the act-as api_token minting (:197-201) and
the child-order edit drawer, which recomputed an order's money from client-sent
values. The card opens a read-only summary instead.

APP-02 fixed: user-app-v2 gained getHomeSlider and now prefers admin-configured
slides, keeping its category-derived hero as the fallback and its own design.

Session stores stay byte-identical across the apps.
build 5/5, jest 45/45, expert login 36/36, apps smoke 43/43, typecheck clean.

[ref: henza_pwa/src/views/user/src/components/ChildOrders.vue, customerChoice.vue]
[ref: henza_pwa/src/router/index.ts:171-188]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 01:12:53 +03:30
s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5 024e3dd045 parity(api,apps): close SEC-02 - orders take the customer from the token
The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders
with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's
account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger.

POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the
customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token;
the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays
optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating
while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is
unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes
that id explicitly, behind the admin guard.

GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both
return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the
new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id
route because Nest matches in declaration order.

Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered
customerId, which is no longer a credential.

OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere;
one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is
wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by
NODE_ENV !== 'production'.

Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code
included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text
searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the
hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line.

Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken
from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes
rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement;
logged rather than changed, per D4.

Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body
customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types.

[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 07:09:33 +03:30
s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5 4efe543d62 parity(api,apps): security hotfix stage 2 - real customer sessions, close IDOR
Stage 1 narrowed GET /customers but did not close the leak: the response still
carried every customer id, and /customers/:id, /:id/orders and
/:id/ledger-entries were still public, so the full customer book was still two
requests away. The user caught this. Stage 2 deletes the id-bearing surface.

Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1):
  - new src/modules/customer-auth/ with its own passport strategy,
    CustomerJwtGuard, @CustomerAuth() and @CurrentCustomer()
  - signed with JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, and every token carries typ:'customer'
    which the strategy verifies; both checks are present deliberately
  - customer state re-read per request, so deactivating takes effect at once
  - mirrors the reference's own split: auth:api vs auth('api-customer')

Real OTP (D6), porting ApiMobileController::userAuth/userVerfiy (:39-64):
  - new CustomerOtp table, additive migration, nothing existing touched
  - parity behaviour: rand(1000,9999), active-customer filter, faTOen digit
    normalisation on both number and code, rejection on mismatch
  - approved improvements over the reference: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-minute
    expiry, 5 attempts then lockout, single use, send throttle (60s per
    number, 5/number and 20/IP per 10 min), and no number enumeration

Routes removed, replaced by token-derived equivalents:
  GET customers, customers/:id, /:id/orders, /:id/ledger-entries
    -> GET customer/me, customer/me/orders, customer/me/ledger-entries
No route accepts a customer id any more, so the IDOR is closed structurally
rather than by a check. The admin panel was unaffected (admin/customers-omde/*).

Both apps migrated in the same commit per the v1/v2 parity rule: token-based
session store, Bearer header, 401 -> clear session and route to login, real
two-step OTP login. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only logic moved.

Tests: auth-smoke.sh extended with the stage-2 assertions, 46 passed 0 failed
against a live server. jest installed dev-only (user-approved) so pnpm test
works for the first time: 7 passed covering faToEn, which moved to its own
digits.ts to be testable without booting Nest. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.

[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:39-78]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 01:20:00 +03:30
s.esmaeili a743f6f93c update admin 2026-09-21 17:37:26 +03:30
s.esmaeili ef1d4638cc admin user and ui panel 2026-09-21 08:32:31 +03:30
s.esmaeili 53a304b5d5 SearchView: Removed the dynamic collection-tile grid (e.g. "پرفروش‌های این هفته") and the "نتایج / N محصول" section header from the UI. Underlying data/filtering logic untouched.
DashboardView ("میز کار"): Rebuilt from scratch with a new structure, distinct from the old card+grid layout but visually aligned with HomeView (same blurred bar, @ink/@wine palette, staged reveal animation on mount):

Single hero card (ink→wine gradient) showing balance, gold/fiat debt, and identity — no quick-action icons inside it anymore.

Live gold rate folded into a slim inline row at the bottom instead of a titled section.
Iterated shadow/spacing on the hero card per feedback (softer, less clipped).
DialogVant / DialogVantOneButton (shared modal components, used in 7+ call sites: Dashboard, Cart, SingleProduct, Register, App): Replaced Vant's default dialog chrome with the app's own rounded-card language — circular icon badge for the illustration, pill-shaped primary/secondary buttons. No call-site markup changed.

LoginView: Rebuilt from scratch — full-bleed dark hero (brand + step copy) overlapped by a floating white form sheet, animated crossfade transition between the mobile-number and OTP steps, same staged entrance animation as Home/Dashboard. All auth logic (API check, OTP stub, session login) unchanged.
2026-09-18 12:54:45 +03:30