69f4ba2b29db7ad73720c0955064b0aeee0294f1
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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69f4ba2b29 |
feat(api): sales-expert login to the customer apps (D21)
A sales expert can now sign into the apps with their AdminUser account, without reversing D17 — the expert remains an AdminUser and is never turned back into a Customer. The app token carries a `typ` of 'customer' or 'sales-expert'; the strategy resolves both to one principal whose `id` is always a Customer id, so every route already written for a customer works unchanged for an expert. That is what the reference gave them, where an agent was a customer with extra screens. Each expert gets ONE linked trading Customer row (additive migration, dry-run clean and rolled back before applying) created at first sign-in, seeded from the two numbers the reference read off the agent's own row: SalesExpertProfile .gramLevel -> goldCreditLimitGrams and AdminUser.wagePercent -> makingChargeOffsetPercent. Orders the expert places land there, exactly as the reference's single row did. New expert-only routes scope on the AdminUser id from the token: POST expert/child-orders (legacy /order/child, ApiMobileController:759, keeping its sts=5 filter as DELIVERED_TO_AGENT), POST expert/my-customers (legacy /my-child, :184) and GET expert/whoami so the apps can hide the entries. Security: jwt.strategy now rejects any token carrying an app `typ`. An expert's app token holds their AdminUser id in `sub`, and JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET falls back to JWT_SECRET when unset — in that configuration the token would otherwise have validated as an admin with full panel permissions. NOT ported: myChild minted an api_token per listed customer (:197-201), letting an agent act AS that customer. Recorded in D21 rather than silently dropped. Tests: new test-sales-expert-app-login.cjs 36/36 — expert sign-in, trading account seeding, own-customers-only (with both negatives), child orders, the expert ordering for themselves, an ordinary customer refused both screens with their own app unaffected, and all four token boundaries including immediate lockout on deactivation. jest 45/45, admin smoke 43/43, apps smoke 43/43, B2B scan 34/34, B2B writes 25/25, auth-smoke 32/32. [ref: henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ApiMobileController.php:184-195,534-535,759-781] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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460cf276b6 |
parity(api,apps): delivery-mode gaps — master OTP, non-blocking SMS, faToEn, v2 cart cap
D20: OTP_MASTER_CODE login bypass read only from the environment, disabled when unset, audited on every use, with a boot banner while armed. SMS no longer aborts the boot in production — it warns and declines silently, so no message can stop an operation. D19: port Utility::faTOen onto admin-entered mobiles (before the uniqueness lookup, which could previously be bypassed with Persian digits), and the create-only welcome SMS, byte-identical to the reference and fire-and-forget. user-app-v2 was missing the cart stock ceiling entirely: capQty/maxQty, the un-orderable guard and the qty clamp are ported, leaving v2's own design intact. The two cart stores are now byte-identical. isVariantOrderable and the orderable-first default selection ported too. jest 45/45; typecheck clean on api, admin-panel, user-app, user-app-v2. [ref: henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Adm/AdminController.php:333,348,364,378-387] [ref: henza_server/app/Models/Utility.php:26] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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8133a2bdf4 |
parity(api,admin): split customer name, add making-charge offset, wire SMS
Applies the two approved additive migrations and fixes every consumer.
D0 — Customer.firstName / lastName
The reference has had two columns since 2020
(2020_10_01_120430_customers_table.php:18-19); the port collapsed them, so
the edit form showed the whole name in the "first name" box and saved an
empty last name. Adds both columns, backfills first-token/rest, and keeps
fullName in sync with a customer_sync_full_name trigger. Nothing dropped.
The trigger is SQL, so Prisma cannot see it: writing the parts rebuilds
fullName, writing fullName re-derives the parts, and writing both in one
statement lets THE PARTS WIN. Documented in the migration header, the
Customer model doc comment and DECISIONS.md §D14, because a write can now
store something other than what was passed.
D9 — Customer.makingChargeOffsetPercent
Legacy customers.percent, the per-customer making-charge offset that the
app adds to the variant's making charge (henza_pwa
Mixins/product/index.ts:69-75). toRow() was returning the referring
AGENT's commission rate instead (CUST-02). DB default 0 reproduces
today's behaviour exactly, so no existing customer's price moves; the
reference's application-layer default of 3 for NEW customers
(AdminController.php:338) lives in the create form, and the field is
required on create with the reference's own message (:354).
update() and updateCredit() both accepted percent and silently discarded
it; both now persist it. Sort/filter aliases fname/lname pointed at
fullName and now point at the real columns.
SMS — Trez provider (Sms.php:57-82)
New global SmsModule/SmsService: form-urlencoded POST, 20s timeout, body
trimmed, every message persisted. send() never throws, matching the
reference, which discarded Sms::Send's result so a gateway outage never
aborted the order or approval that triggered it. The OTP text is
byte-identical, including the Android SMS Retriever markers. Credentials
come from env only; production refuses to boot without them rather than
silently locking every customer out. .env.example carries names, no values.
Admin panel: the split(' ') fallback is removed from singleCustomer.vue,
and bulkCustomer.vue defaults percent to 3, requires it, coerces the
Decimal on load so diff-send works, and only re-sends `name` when a name
part changed. ReagentCustomer.vue is untouched — its «درصد کمیسیون» is
AdminUser.wagePercent, a different field.
Tests: 32 jest (incl. 14 new SMS config/template), 9 trigger assertions,
53 auth smoke, and the full D12 round-trip on the customer entity —
«محمد علی» + «احمدی» survives create, edit, a byte-identical no-op save,
and single-field edits. Typecheck clean on api and admin-panel.
Note: migrate dev is interactive-only and could not run here, so the
migrations were applied with migrate deploy after a read-only drift check.
The only drift is the pre-existing _goldbank_migrations table, which
Prisma would DROP; it was NOT dropped (DEAD-07).
[ref: henza_server/app/Models/Sms.php, app/Http/Controllers/Adm/AdminController.php]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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024e3dd045 |
parity(api,apps): close SEC-02 - orders take the customer from the token
The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger. POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token; the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes that id explicitly, behind the admin guard. GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id route because Nest matches in declaration order. Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered customerId, which is no longer a credential. OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere; one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by NODE_ENV !== 'production'. Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line. Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement; logged rather than changed, per D4. Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api, user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types. [ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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s.esmaeiliandClaude Opus 5
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4efe543d62 |
parity(api,apps): security hotfix stage 2 - real customer sessions, close IDOR
Stage 1 narrowed GET /customers but did not close the leak: the response still
carried every customer id, and /customers/:id, /:id/orders and
/:id/ledger-entries were still public, so the full customer book was still two
requests away. The user caught this. Stage 2 deletes the id-bearing surface.
Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1):
- new src/modules/customer-auth/ with its own passport strategy,
CustomerJwtGuard, @CustomerAuth() and @CurrentCustomer()
- signed with JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, and every token carries typ:'customer'
which the strategy verifies; both checks are present deliberately
- customer state re-read per request, so deactivating takes effect at once
- mirrors the reference's own split: auth:api vs auth('api-customer')
Real OTP (D6), porting ApiMobileController::userAuth/userVerfiy (:39-64):
- new CustomerOtp table, additive migration, nothing existing touched
- parity behaviour: rand(1000,9999), active-customer filter, faTOen digit
normalisation on both number and code, rejection on mismatch
- approved improvements over the reference: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-minute
expiry, 5 attempts then lockout, single use, send throttle (60s per
number, 5/number and 20/IP per 10 min), and no number enumeration
Routes removed, replaced by token-derived equivalents:
GET customers, customers/:id, /:id/orders, /:id/ledger-entries
-> GET customer/me, customer/me/orders, customer/me/ledger-entries
No route accepts a customer id any more, so the IDOR is closed structurally
rather than by a check. The admin panel was unaffected (admin/customers-omde/*).
Both apps migrated in the same commit per the v1/v2 parity rule: token-based
session store, Bearer header, 401 -> clear session and route to login, real
two-step OTP login. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only logic moved.
Tests: auth-smoke.sh extended with the stage-2 assertions, 46 passed 0 failed
against a live server. jest installed dev-only (user-approved) so pnpm test
works for the first time: 7 passed covering faToEn, which moved to its own
digits.ts to be testable without booting Nest. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.
[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:39-78]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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