Additive and nullable. Owner ruling 2026-10-07: keep the typed text
verbatim, and set cityId as well only on an exact match.
Legacy customers.new_city is free text: all 172 live values are names,
none are ids. The legacy city table has only 15 rows and 43 of the names
match no city, so dropping the text would lose where those customers are.
Legacy sign-up also forced city_id = 5 (Tehran) on everyone
(Major/CustomerController.php:21). 91 of the 92 customers with both
values carry that forced Tehran, so the typed name is the truth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
compareLocalHash() returns false for any passwordHash that does not
start with `$2`: '' (accounts created without a password) and the new
OTP_ONLY_PASSWORD_HASH sentinel the data import writes for ~1,590
OTP-only legacy customers. It is used on both local-compare paths of
verifyPassword(), IAM off and IAM fallback.
bcryptjs 3 already returns false for these. The guard keeps the result
from depending on that: a future version or a native binding that
throws would turn a wrong password into a 500 (owner ruling 2026-10-07).
Behaviour-neutral for existing data. Real hashes start with $2a$, $2b$
or PHP's $2y$, and every row that fails the prefix already failed in
bcrypt. Verified live: wrong password 401, correct password 200.
Tests: refusal for both values with IAM off and on, bcrypt never
called for them, and legacy $2y$ hashes still verify. 21/21.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
verifyStepOne() sent REJECTED to `default`, which returns 2
("accepted"). The admin list unlocks the order/account switches when
step one is 2, so a rejected customer would have had them unlocked.
REJECTED now maps to 3, matching legacy, where a step-one reject also
set active = -1.
Both switches are now exhaustive with no `default`, so a future enum
value fails the build instead of falling through silently.
Both user apps' ProfileView label it «رد شده». Before this they showed
the raw English value.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Purely additive; nothing dropped, renamed or retyped. Owner rulings of
2026-10-06/07, recorded in docs/DATA-MIGRATION-MAP.md.
- Customer.nationalCode is now optional. All 1,595 live legacy customers
have none, and fabricating one is a data violation. Still @unique:
NULLs do not collide in Postgres, so the import must write NULL, not ''.
- Customer.birthDate added, empty. Must not be backfilled until the
Jalali-vs-Gregorian check (precheck-3) is in.
- VerificationStep.REJECTED plus verificationRejectionReason/RejectedAt.
Legacy has a third "rejected" state that the enum could not represent.
- CustomerFavorite for legacy `fav` (251 rows), which had no home.
accounting-sync customerPayload() now takes `nationalCode: string | null`.
validNationalCode() already handled null, so Tahesab/Zarrin receive
exactly what they did before. Caught by tsc after the column change.
Not touched: accounting* columns, ProductVariant.imageId, the
Accounting* tables, SMS (PROTECTED.md §B, §G).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by running the delivery flow against the actual built container rather
than a local dev process.
DEPLOY-02 (Critical) — ADMIN LOGIN RETURNED 500 FOR EVERY USER IN DOCKER.
docker-compose.yml passes each optional variable as ${X:-}, so an unconfigured
one arrives as "" rather than undefined. The code read them with
`process.env.X ?? 'default'`, which only falls back on undefined, so the empty
string reached jsonwebtoken and it threw
"expiresIn" should be a number of seconds or string representing a timespan
on every sign. Invisible to every existing suite, all of which run against a
local process where the variable is genuinely absent.
Added src/common/env.ts (envOr / envOrNull), which treat blank as unset, and
applied it to every auth, port, upload and SMS read. Three were not cosmetic:
a blank UPLOAD_DIR would have served static files from the FILESYSTEM ROOT, a
blank PORT would have bound a random ephemeral port (Number('') === 0), and a
blank JWT_SECRET would have become the verifying key. Recorded as D25, with a
standing rule to use these readers instead of `??`.
Pinned by src/common/env.spec.ts (9 tests), which reproduces the original throw
against the real jsonwebtoken and asserts the reader can no longer produce it.
DEPLOY-03 (process, documented) — the API image is `COPY release/ ./`, so it
ships a bundle pre-built on the developer machine. `docker compose build` will
happily produce an image from a STALE release/app.js and report success; at the
start of this run that bundle was four days old and the rebuilt container was
missing every route added since. DELIVERY.md's deploy section now leads with
`pnpm build:release`.
New: scripts/test-compose-e2e.cjs — the whole delivery flow against the built
container, over HTTP only, as a black box: a sales expert and an ordinary
customer both sign in with the master code, both place an order, both orders
appear in the admin grid and open there, and the three token boundaries still
hold in the deployed image. 32/32.
Verified: compose e2e 32/32 · jest 54/54 · build 5/5 ·
against the CONTAINER: complete-profile 38/38, report 40/40, expert login 36/36 ·
locally: apps smoke 43/43, admin smoke 43/43, B2B scan 34 ok/0 broken.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ports "گزارش" end to end (D24), the last missing app page.
In the reference this feature computes nothing: Customer\TahesabController
proxies an external accounting system (hesab.henzagold.com and a bare IP at
31.7.68.147:3030) with TLS verification disabled, a bearer token hardcoded in
the source and a URL-embedded secret, keyed on Customer.mcode. The target has
no such system and no mcode, so per the owner's option الف this is built on our
own ledger with no external connection.
API — customer/me/report{,/detail,/balances,/:id}
- one row per CONFIRMED ledger entry with the running gold and rial balance
after it, newest first as the reference displayed it
- only confirmed entries count, the same rule the cached
Customer.goldDebtGrams/fiatDebtRial follow, so the statement's closing
balance agrees with the figure shown everywhere else in the app
- fields the target has no source for (foreign currency, نام کارساخته,
جنس فلز, the external system's internal ids) are null/zero and the UI OMITS
the row rather than rendering a fabricated value (REP-01)
SEC-16, NOT ported: the reference's detail($id) took the factor code from the
URL and performed no ownership check at all — it never consults auth() — so any
signed-in customer could read any other customer's document by guessing a code.
Here the id is only a filter on top of a customerId scope from the token.
Tested in both directions.
Apps (both, template+script byte-identical, per-app styling only)
- ReportView with the reference's two tabs, its card rows and its «جزئیات»
modal; ReportDocument for one document
- routes /report and /report/detail, the latter opening the second tab
- dashboard entry (v1 tile, v2 row), shown to every signed-in customer since
the reference's hasMCode() gate has no target equivalent
Verified: build 5/5 · jest 45/45 · report 40/40 (new) ·
complete-profile 38/38 · apps smoke 43/43 · typecheck clean on all four apps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ports "تکمیل پروفایل" end to end (D22).
API
- POST customer/me/complete-profile — three required document ids, the
customer taken from the token, verification step set to the reference's
LIVE value (approved outright; its `= 1` line is commented out at :83 in
favour of `= 2` at :85). Both SMS messages byte-identical and non-blocking
per D20.
- POST customer/me/documents — the reference let the app upload through the
same file/create the admin used, inside its auth:api-customer group
(routes/api.php:95); the target's copy is admin-guarded, so the page could
not have uploaded at all. Reuses AdminUploadsService unchanged, so both
paths share one size limit, MIME whitelist and naming scheme (UPL-01).
- PROFILE_ADMIN_MOBILES replaces the reference's four hardcoded personal
numbers; blank means nobody is notified and the upload still succeeds.
Three reference behaviours deliberately NOT ported, all in ISSUES.md:
- SEC-14: `$customer->update($request->all())` mass-assigned the whole request
body, letting the app write its own credit limit, making charge, gold debt,
active flag or mobile. Replaced with a three-field whitelist.
- SEC-15: four real personal mobiles hardcoded in the source.
- APP-03: refresh()'s unterminated setInterval page reload.
Apps (both, template+script byte-identical, per-app styling only)
- CompleteProfileView + SingleImageUploader
- route /complete_profile, redirecting home once the documents are in, as the
reference's guard did (router/index.ts:266)
- the entry point on the profile screen, shown only while they are missing
(profile.vue:96-102)
Also (D23): JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET now warns loudly at boot when unset. It falls
back to JWT_SECRET, which signs app and admin tokens with the same key and
leaves the `typ` check as the only barrier — and an expert's app token carries
their AdminUser id in `sub`. Warn rather than refuse to boot (D19, lowest
risk); DELIVERY.md lists it as the first pre-release step (REL-03).
Verified: build 5/5 · jest 45/45 · complete-profile 38/38 (new) ·
expert login 36/36 · apps smoke 43/43 · admin smoke 43/43 ·
B2B scan 34 ok/0 broken · typecheck clean on all four apps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A sales expert can now sign into the apps with their AdminUser account, without
reversing D17 — the expert remains an AdminUser and is never turned back into a
Customer.
The app token carries a `typ` of 'customer' or 'sales-expert'; the strategy
resolves both to one principal whose `id` is always a Customer id, so every
route already written for a customer works unchanged for an expert. That is what
the reference gave them, where an agent was a customer with extra screens.
Each expert gets ONE linked trading Customer row (additive migration, dry-run
clean and rolled back before applying) created at first sign-in, seeded from the
two numbers the reference read off the agent's own row: SalesExpertProfile
.gramLevel -> goldCreditLimitGrams and AdminUser.wagePercent ->
makingChargeOffsetPercent. Orders the expert places land there, exactly as the
reference's single row did.
New expert-only routes scope on the AdminUser id from the token:
POST expert/child-orders (legacy /order/child, ApiMobileController:759, keeping
its sts=5 filter as DELIVERED_TO_AGENT), POST expert/my-customers (legacy
/my-child, :184) and GET expert/whoami so the apps can hide the entries.
Security: jwt.strategy now rejects any token carrying an app `typ`. An expert's
app token holds their AdminUser id in `sub`, and JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET falls back
to JWT_SECRET when unset — in that configuration the token would otherwise have
validated as an admin with full panel permissions.
NOT ported: myChild minted an api_token per listed customer (:197-201), letting
an agent act AS that customer. Recorded in D21 rather than silently dropped.
Tests: new test-sales-expert-app-login.cjs 36/36 — expert sign-in, trading
account seeding, own-customers-only (with both negatives), child orders, the
expert ordering for themselves, an ordinary customer refused both screens with
their own app unaffected, and all four token boundaries including immediate
lockout on deactivation. jest 45/45, admin smoke 43/43, apps smoke 43/43,
B2B scan 34/34, B2B writes 25/25, auth-smoke 32/32.
[ref: henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ApiMobileController.php:184-195,534-535,759-781]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DEPLOY-01: docker-compose.yml passed only DATABASE_URL and PORT to the api
service, so JWT_SECRET, JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, OTP_MASTER_CODE and every SMS_TREZ_*
variable were silently dropped in Docker. A deployed build would have used the
development JWT fallback and would not have had the delivery master code at all,
so the demo login would have failed with no obvious cause. All are now forwarded,
defaulting to empty (which the code treats as unset); verified with
`docker compose config`.
TEST-01: test-sales-expert-roundtrip.cjs had localhost:3077 hardcoded and could
only connect by accident. Now defaults to the repo's API_PORT. 33/33.
DELIVERY.md documents env vars (names only), run/deploy commands, how migrations
run inside the container, the verification results and the known issues.
release/delivery contains both parity branches with no conflicts (fast-forward).
build 5/5, jest 45/45, admin smoke 43/43, apps smoke 43/43, B2B scan 34/34,
B2B writes 25/25, auth-smoke 32/32, typecheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
scan-admin-b2b.cjs (34 ok, 0 broken) hits every read endpoint the wholesale desk
uses daily. smoke-admin-b2b-writes.cjs (25/25) covers the money-touching writes:
admin order placement and a cash payment document, asserting the ledger and the
customer balance rather than the HTTP status.
Verified: the making charge computes exactly, a document is created unconfirmed,
confirming moves the gold debt, and confirming again toggles back and restores
the balance to the byte.
Retail/storefront surfaces were deliberately not scanned (D13).
No B2B breakage found. Three first-draft failures were test bugs, corrected
against the real callers: cities/list -> admin/cities/list, by-ids takes
products_id, and document type 4 is cash (2 is a transfer).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
smoke-apps.cjs walks login (master OTP), catalogue, cart cap, order placement
and order history, with the empty-order and unauthenticated negatives: 43/43.
The cart rules are executed from BOTH apps' own source so the result cannot be
carried by v1 alone.
No behavioural divergence found: all 9 stores are byte-identical, and the router,
API client and composables match except v1's protected variant-image picker.
APP-01: both apps' OTP box is exactly 4 inputs and only submits at 4, so a longer
OTP_MASTER_CODE cannot be typed into them. The login UI was left alone; main.ts
now warns at boot when the code is not 4 digits and .env.example states the rule.
APP-02 logged, not fixed: user-app-v2 has no getHomeSlider, so admin-configured
home slides show in v1 only. Changing v2's hero during a delivery is not worth
the risk.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
views/order/List.vue handed the timeline activity entry straight to
single/order-sts/edit. That entry is {status, title, proceed, uaj, note} and has
no order id, so UpdateOrderStatusDto rejected every call with 400 — neither
"ثبت وضعیت" nor "حذف وضعیت" worked on the retail order screen. Both handlers now
take the id from tempRow, matching OmdeList.vue and TaminList.vue, which were
already correct.
Found by the new scripts/smoke-admin.cjs (43/43), which walks login, customer
create, sales-expert create/edit, product+variant create/edit and order
list/detail/status, asserting the database changed rather than trusting a 200.
[ref: henza_server/routes/admin.php:59]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two live scripts against a running API, covering both halves of the master-OTP
contract:
* with OTP_MASTER_CODE set (8/8): signs in, the JWT works on customer/me,
Persian digits accepted, and the RULE E1 negatives — near-miss code,
unknown mobile, inactive customer — all still rejected.
* without it (6/6): the same code returns 401, no boot banner, a real code
still logs in, and replaying it fails.
Also confirmed from the boot log that with no SMS credentials the server starts
normally and declines to send instead of erroring (D20).
.env.example gained the auth, SMS and upload variables, names only, no values,
with OTP_MASTER_CODE marked delivery-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
D20: OTP_MASTER_CODE login bypass read only from the environment, disabled when
unset, audited on every use, with a boot banner while armed. SMS no longer
aborts the boot in production — it warns and declines silently, so no message
can stop an operation.
D19: port Utility::faTOen onto admin-entered mobiles (before the uniqueness
lookup, which could previously be bypassed with Persian digits), and the
create-only welcome SMS, byte-identical to the reference and fire-and-forget.
user-app-v2 was missing the cart stock ceiling entirely: capQty/maxQty, the
un-orderable guard and the qty clamp are ported, leaving v2's own design intact.
The two cart stores are now byte-identical. isVariantOrderable and the
orderable-first default selection ported too.
jest 45/45; typecheck clean on api, admin-panel, user-app, user-app-v2.
[ref: henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Adm/AdminController.php:333,348,364,378-387]
[ref: henza_server/app/Models/Utility.php:26]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Restores the sales-expert fields that were lost when a sales expert became
an AdminUser instead of a type=1 Customer row.
New SalesExpertProfile holds cityId, gramLevel, phone and nationalCode. A
separate table rather than columns on AdminUser, because these mean
something only for role = SALES_EXPERT. gramLevel is DECIMAL(14,4), matched
to Customer.goldCreditLimitGrams so the same credit limit has identical
precision on both tables. phone and nationalCode copy the reference exactly:
nullable, NOT unique, no format rule — createCustomer validates only mobile
and percent, and both fields are required:false on the reference form.
Inventing a uniqueness constraint would reject data the reference accepts.
reagent_id is deliberately NOT ported (D17). Every use of it in the
reference reads a CUSTOMER's reagent_id, which the target already models as
Customer.referredByAgentId. On a sales expert's own form it was a side
effect of the shared customers form: filling it removed that expert from
the selectable-agent list, because queryReagent filters on
whereNull('reagent_id'). The target's equivalent filters on role and active
only, so no agent can be dropped — strictly better than the reference.
AdminUser gains firstName/lastName with the same additive migration,
backfill and sync trigger as Customer, for all admins rather than only
sales experts. This closes D0 requirement 7, and every remaining
`fname: fullName, lname: ''` was fixed — six further sites across
admin-users, admin-comments, admin-documents, admin-orders and
admin-preorders.
listReagents now returns real city_id, city, gram_level, phone and ncode,
and left-joins so an expert without a profile still lists with empty cells
rather than vanishing. The two grid filters map through the relation. The
service upserts a profile on create and on a role change to SALES_EXPERT,
and the migration backfilled one for every existing expert.
ReagentCustomer.vue gains the four fields plus the city -> commission
autofill, ported verbatim including the reference's falsy test so a city
percent of 0 also falls through to the aux lookup (replicated, not fixed).
Tests: new sales-expert round trip 33/33, covering create with every field,
an edit form with each field populated separately, a byte-identical no-op
save, single-field edits, both grid filters with negative cases, the
left-join case and the referrer dropdown. «محمد علی» + «احمدی» survives
intact. Plus jest 32/32, auth-smoke 53/53, customer trigger 9/9, typecheck
clean on api and admin-panel. Migration dry-run twice in a rolled-back
transaction before applying; drift is zero.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Prisma migrate diff proposed DROP TABLE "_goldbank_migrations" because the
table exists in the database but was not declared in the schema. Declaring
it with @@ignore removes the proposal without exposing it to Prisma Client,
and the table and all its rows are kept.
Correcting the earlier DEAD-07 note: this is not a leftover from the
pre-Prisma port. It is the tracking table of the application's own
migration runner (src/prisma/migrate.ts:5), which exists because the Docker
deploy image is copy-only and ships no Prisma CLI, so migrate deploy cannot
run in the container (migrate.ts:7-13). The project therefore keeps two
ledgers deliberately: _prisma_migrations for the CLI in development, and
_goldbank_migrations for the runtime runner in the container. That runner
already filtered out any DROP of its own table (migrate.ts:190-196); the
schema declaration removes the cause rather than relying on that guard.
The practical consequence, recorded in DECISIONS.md D15: a new migration
must be safe under both paths, so its SQL stays idempotent.
The ledger grew 12 -> 14 rows while testing, with nothing deleted: starting
the API ran prepareDatabase(), which appended the two migrations applied
earlier today. Its $$-aware statement splitter handled the PL/pgSQL trigger
body correctly — trigger and function are both present and the 9 trigger
assertions pass against the live database.
Also records the UTF-8 testing rule: Persian test input must come from a
file, never a shell argument, because the Windows shell replaces Persian
characters with '?' and a test can then pass while storing '????'.
Verified: migrate diff -> "This is an empty migration" (zero drift);
migrate status -> up to date; tsc clean; 32 jest; 9 trigger assertions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Applies the two approved additive migrations and fixes every consumer.
D0 — Customer.firstName / lastName
The reference has had two columns since 2020
(2020_10_01_120430_customers_table.php:18-19); the port collapsed them, so
the edit form showed the whole name in the "first name" box and saved an
empty last name. Adds both columns, backfills first-token/rest, and keeps
fullName in sync with a customer_sync_full_name trigger. Nothing dropped.
The trigger is SQL, so Prisma cannot see it: writing the parts rebuilds
fullName, writing fullName re-derives the parts, and writing both in one
statement lets THE PARTS WIN. Documented in the migration header, the
Customer model doc comment and DECISIONS.md §D14, because a write can now
store something other than what was passed.
D9 — Customer.makingChargeOffsetPercent
Legacy customers.percent, the per-customer making-charge offset that the
app adds to the variant's making charge (henza_pwa
Mixins/product/index.ts:69-75). toRow() was returning the referring
AGENT's commission rate instead (CUST-02). DB default 0 reproduces
today's behaviour exactly, so no existing customer's price moves; the
reference's application-layer default of 3 for NEW customers
(AdminController.php:338) lives in the create form, and the field is
required on create with the reference's own message (:354).
update() and updateCredit() both accepted percent and silently discarded
it; both now persist it. Sort/filter aliases fname/lname pointed at
fullName and now point at the real columns.
SMS — Trez provider (Sms.php:57-82)
New global SmsModule/SmsService: form-urlencoded POST, 20s timeout, body
trimmed, every message persisted. send() never throws, matching the
reference, which discarded Sms::Send's result so a gateway outage never
aborted the order or approval that triggered it. The OTP text is
byte-identical, including the Android SMS Retriever markers. Credentials
come from env only; production refuses to boot without them rather than
silently locking every customer out. .env.example carries names, no values.
Admin panel: the split(' ') fallback is removed from singleCustomer.vue,
and bulkCustomer.vue defaults percent to 3, requires it, coerces the
Decimal on load so diff-send works, and only re-sends `name` when a name
part changed. ReagentCustomer.vue is untouched — its «درصد کمیسیون» is
AdminUser.wagePercent, a different field.
Tests: 32 jest (incl. 14 new SMS config/template), 9 trigger assertions,
53 auth smoke, and the full D12 round-trip on the customer entity —
«محمد علی» + «احمدی» survives create, edit, a byte-identical no-op save,
and single-field edits. Typecheck clean on api and admin-panel.
Note: migrate dev is interactive-only and could not run here, so the
migrations were applied with migrate deploy after a read-only drift check.
The only drift is the pre-existing _goldbank_migrations table, which
Prisma would DROP; it was NOT dropped (DEAD-07).
[ref: henza_server/app/Models/Sms.php, app/Http/Controllers/Adm/AdminController.php]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds computeVariantPrice(), a verbatim port of the live formula at
henza_server/app/Models/ProductVariant.php:183-190, with the per-customer
making-charge offset as an explicit input defaulting to 0. The three
superseded formulas commented out above it apply VAT to the whole price
and are deliberately not ported (D4).
11 unit tests assert against hand calculations derived from the PHP source
rather than from the implementation, covering: with and without the
offset, VAT on the non-metal portion only, floor-to-nearest-1000, the
extraPercent default of 7, and the equivalence between the app folding the
offset into percent_pay and the server deriving it. 18 tests pass overall.
Also adds the D0 name-split review report script (read-only) and two
investigations the owner asked for:
- SMS: the reference uses the Trez panel (smspanel.trez.ir, Sms.php:69,97)
with production credentials committed to git (SEC-12 — rotate them). All
12 message templates catalogued; env var names proposed; nothing
implemented pending approval.
- MON-08: henza_pwa computes percent_pay, discount and rial_pay rather
than asking the user (cart.vue:170-179, Mixins/product/index.ts:69-75),
so Phase 2 item #1 is to derive them server-side and ignore the client's
values. rash_weight stays read from the DB as a recorded deviation.
Records the owner's two new standing rules: migrations only through the
standard Prisma workflow, and every data deletion logged in CHANGELOG.
[ref: henza_server/app/Models/{ProductVariant,Sms}.php, henza_pwa/src/views/cart.vue]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders
with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's
account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger.
POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the
customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token;
the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays
optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating
while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is
unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes
that id explicitly, behind the admin guard.
GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both
return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the
new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id
route because Nest matches in declaration order.
Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered
customerId, which is no longer a credential.
OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere;
one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is
wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by
NODE_ENV !== 'production'.
Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code
included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text
searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the
hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line.
Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken
from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes
rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement;
logged rather than changed, per D4.
Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body
customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types.
[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stage 1 narrowed GET /customers but did not close the leak: the response still
carried every customer id, and /customers/:id, /:id/orders and
/:id/ledger-entries were still public, so the full customer book was still two
requests away. The user caught this. Stage 2 deletes the id-bearing surface.
Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1):
- new src/modules/customer-auth/ with its own passport strategy,
CustomerJwtGuard, @CustomerAuth() and @CurrentCustomer()
- signed with JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, and every token carries typ:'customer'
which the strategy verifies; both checks are present deliberately
- customer state re-read per request, so deactivating takes effect at once
- mirrors the reference's own split: auth:api vs auth('api-customer')
Real OTP (D6), porting ApiMobileController::userAuth/userVerfiy (:39-64):
- new CustomerOtp table, additive migration, nothing existing touched
- parity behaviour: rand(1000,9999), active-customer filter, faTOen digit
normalisation on both number and code, rejection on mismatch
- approved improvements over the reference: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-minute
expiry, 5 attempts then lockout, single use, send throttle (60s per
number, 5/number and 20/IP per 10 min), and no number enumeration
Routes removed, replaced by token-derived equivalents:
GET customers, customers/:id, /:id/orders, /:id/ledger-entries
-> GET customer/me, customer/me/orders, customer/me/ledger-entries
No route accepts a customer id any more, so the IDOR is closed structurally
rather than by a check. The admin panel was unaffected (admin/customers-omde/*).
Both apps migrated in the same commit per the v1/v2 parity rule: token-based
session store, Bearer header, 401 -> clear session and route to login, real
two-step OTP login. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only logic moved.
Tests: auth-smoke.sh extended with the stage-2 assertions, 46 passed 0 failed
against a live server. jest installed dev-only (user-approved) so pnpm test
works for the first time: 7 passed covering faToEn, which moved to its own
digits.ts to be testable without booting Nest. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.
[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:39-78]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Authorised by rulings D7 and T1-T3 in docs/parity/DECISIONS.md. This is the
CLAUDE.md section 3 carve-out: matching the reference here would keep a money
write path open to anonymous callers.
Closed, each behind the rid the legacy vocabulary already had:
GET accounting/customers/:id/balance -> wallet.list
POST accounting/customers/:id/reconcile -> wallet.charge
POST accounting/repayments/gold -> document.create
POST accounting/repayments/rial -> document.create
POST accounting/entries/:id/confirm -> document.list.confirm
PATCH orders/:id/status -> order.list.sts.submit
Four of the accounting routes WRITE to the ledger. The order-status route was
worse in kind: its DTO takes a client-supplied actorAdminUserId, so an
anonymous caller could move any order and pin it on any admin. It had no
caller - the admin panel posts to admin/orders/status.
GET /customers kept its public status (both apps' login still matches the
phone number in the browser) but now selects only id/mobile/isActive/
isArchived. It previously returned every active customer's full name, national
code, both debts, credit limit and the URLs of their identity-document scans.
CustomerSummary narrowed in BOTH user apps in the same commit, per the
v1/v2 parity rule.
Not changed: /uploads stays public per ruling T2. The filename check requested
alongside it passed unchanged - md5(time + name + uuid), no directory listing.
Tests: apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh asserts 401 without a token, 403 with a
low-privilege token (ut 88, 5 unrelated rids) and pass-through for a super
admin on every closed route, plus that the public routes still answer 200 and
that GET /customers exposes only the four login fields. 23 passed, 0 failed
against a live server. Typecheck clean on api, user-app and user-app-v2.
[ref: henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272; ApiMobileController.php:39-78]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- SingleProduct.vue: rebuild gallery/header/action bar as a self-scrolling
layout with a sticky photo, solid-on-scroll header matching PageBar, and
a full-screen image preview (blurred overlay, centered thumbnail strip)
- Add GallerySlider.vue: pointer-based swipe carousel isolated in an
LTR subtree, fixing RTL/transform sign mismatch that caused slide jumps
- Fix Icon.vue: icon was read into a plain ref once at setup and never
updated on prop change; switch to computed so icon swaps (e.g. cart
qty stepper trash/minus toggle) actually re-render
- Fix quantity stepper DOM order in SingleProduct.vue/CartItem.vue so
plus/minus render correctly under RTL flex
- prisma/assign-downloaded-images.js: seed real product photos (FEATURED/
FEATURED_MOBILE/GALLERY/GALLERY_MOBILE) onto the 5 placeholder products
DashboardView ("میز کار"): Rebuilt from scratch with a new structure, distinct from the old card+grid layout but visually aligned with HomeView (same blurred bar, @ink/@wine palette, staged reveal animation on mount):
Single hero card (ink→wine gradient) showing balance, gold/fiat debt, and identity — no quick-action icons inside it anymore.
Live gold rate folded into a slim inline row at the bottom instead of a titled section.
Iterated shadow/spacing on the hero card per feedback (softer, less clipped).
DialogVant / DialogVantOneButton (shared modal components, used in 7+ call sites: Dashboard, Cart, SingleProduct, Register, App): Replaced Vant's default dialog chrome with the app's own rounded-card language — circular icon badge for the illustration, pill-shaped primary/secondary buttons. No call-site markup changed.
LoginView: Rebuilt from scratch — full-bleed dark hero (brand + step copy) overlapped by a floating white form sheet, animated crossfade transition between the mobile-number and OTP steps, same staged entrance animation as Home/Dashboard. All auth logic (API check, OTP stub, session login) unchanged.
# Please enter a commit message to explain why this merge is necessary,
# especially if it merges an updated upstream into a topic branch.
#
# Lines starting with '#' will be ignored, and an empty message aborts
# the commit.
- Fix silent redirect-to-home for unauthenticated users on protected routes;
now redirects to login with a return path
- Restyle OrderCard, SearchInput, Filters, DropDown, and product card image
sizing/centering to match the app's LESS-token design language
- Fix ant-design Slider handle placement/drag under RTL and seed a valid
default range so handles actually render
- Fix chip-row edge padding and top spacing across Orders/Cart/Search lists
- Add pull-to-refresh to the dashboard and fix its header/padding to match
the fixed PageBar pattern
- Remove the floating WhatsApp button from index.html
The folder-discovery fix in the previous commit surfaced a second problem.
Databases migrated BEFORE that fix recorded the baseline under the name of
the hand-added flat duplicate that used to sit beside it
(prisma/migrations/0001_init.sql). Once the runner started discovering the
real folder (20260910113720_first), it saw a name it had never recorded and
tried to apply the baseline again — against a database that already had it:
Raw query failed. Code: 42710.
ERROR: type "AdminRole" already exists
The two files are identical SQL (verified byte-for-byte after normalising
line endings; they differ only by one trailing blank line), so the recorded
legacy name genuinely means that migration is applied. A LEGACY_NAME_ALIASES
map now treats '0001_init.sql' as an already-applied marker for
'20260910113720_first', so upgrading an existing database is a no-op instead
of a crash.
Verified against the local dev database this actually broke on
(postgresql://localhost:5432/gold_banking, which had recorded only the old
flat name): 'npm run dev' in apps/api now logs 'No pending migrations' and
'Nest application successfully started' instead of dying. That database's
tracking table was also reconciled to record both real migration names, and
it was confirmed to already contain both migrations' schema (AdminRole,
City.percent, user_type, CustomerKind all present) — nothing was re-run
against it. The dockerised database is unaffected: it already records the
real names, so the alias is inert there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three real bugs found and fixed while wiring up product images end-to-end:
1. src/prisma/migrate.ts only discovered flat prisma/migrations/<name>.sql
files, never Prisma's own folder-per-migration layout
(<timestamp>_<name>/migration.sql). Every migration created the normal
way (via 'prisma migrate dev') was silently skipped; only a hand-added
flat duplicate (prisma/migrations/0001_init.sql, now removed) ever ran.
This meant schema.prisma had drifted well ahead of what any real deploy
database actually had (missing columns on City, Customer, Branch,
Product, several new tables). Fixed to discover both layouts; the
drift is closed with a new 20260914165255_sync_schema_drift migration.
2. Neither nginx.conf (production) nor vite.config.ts (dev) proxied
/uploads/ to the API — only /api/. UploadedFile/ProductImage URLs
(/uploads/<file>, served by main.ts's useStaticAssets OUTSIDE the /api
prefix) 404'd through both. Both now proxy /uploads/ the same way /api/
already was.
3. docker-compose.yml's api service had no volume for storage/uploads, so
every uploaded file — and by extension every ProductImage row pointing
at one — was lost on the next container recreate/redeploy. Added a
named volume.
Also: main.ts's static file serving now sets Content-Type: image/avif
explicitly (serve-static's bundled mime table predates .avif and served it
as application/octet-stream; browsers rendered it anyway by sniffing, but
a stricter client would not have).
Product photos: copied 15 real jewelry photos into the uploads volume,
registered them as UploadedFile rows, and assigned each of the 5 existing
Product rows a randomly picked one (duplicates allowed, per request),
replacing their /img/no-items.png placeholder ProductImage row. Verified
end-to-end in a real browser against the real containerized API+DB: logged
in, opened the admin product list, confirmed all 5 rows render their photo
(naturalWidth/Height populated, network 200s, no console errors).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
