parity(api,apps): security hotfix stage 1 - close unauthenticated write paths

Authorised by rulings D7 and T1-T3 in docs/parity/DECISIONS.md. This is the
CLAUDE.md section 3 carve-out: matching the reference here would keep a money
write path open to anonymous callers.

Closed, each behind the rid the legacy vocabulary already had:
  GET   accounting/customers/:id/balance    -> wallet.list
  POST  accounting/customers/:id/reconcile  -> wallet.charge
  POST  accounting/repayments/gold          -> document.create
  POST  accounting/repayments/rial          -> document.create
  POST  accounting/entries/:id/confirm      -> document.list.confirm
  PATCH orders/:id/status                   -> order.list.sts.submit

Four of the accounting routes WRITE to the ledger. The order-status route was
worse in kind: its DTO takes a client-supplied actorAdminUserId, so an
anonymous caller could move any order and pin it on any admin. It had no
caller - the admin panel posts to admin/orders/status.

GET /customers kept its public status (both apps' login still matches the
phone number in the browser) but now selects only id/mobile/isActive/
isArchived. It previously returned every active customer's full name, national
code, both debts, credit limit and the URLs of their identity-document scans.
CustomerSummary narrowed in BOTH user apps in the same commit, per the
v1/v2 parity rule.

Not changed: /uploads stays public per ruling T2. The filename check requested
alongside it passed unchanged - md5(time + name + uuid), no directory listing.

Tests: apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh asserts 401 without a token, 403 with a
low-privilege token (ut 88, 5 unrelated rids) and pass-through for a super
admin on every closed route, plus that the public routes still answer 200 and
that GET /customers exposes only the four login fields. 23 passed, 0 failed
against a live server. Typecheck clean on api, user-app and user-app-v2.

[ref: henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272; ApiMobileController.php:39-78]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
s.esmaeili
2026-09-22 00:43:11 +03:30
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 004a3945c2
commit fdf833565f
11 changed files with 356 additions and 23 deletions
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@@ -27,3 +27,68 @@ Format:
- **Matrix row:** n/a
_No source code changed in Phase 0 (read-only phase)._
---
## 2026-09-22 — Security hotfix, stage 1 — close the unauthenticated write paths
Branch `parity/security-hotfix`. Authorised by the user's rulings D7, T1–T3.
### 1. Ledger routes are admin-only (SEC-09)
- **What:** removed the controller-level `@Public()` from `AccountingController`
and gave each route a rid: `wallet.list` (balance), `wallet.charge`
(reconcile), `document.create` (both repayments), `document.list.confirm`
(confirm entry).
- **Why:** four of the five routes WRITE to the ledger and were reachable with no
token at all. Faithful to the reference, whose entire admin route file is
unauthenticated, but contrary to confirmed decision D1.
- **Reference:** `henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272` (the `auth:api` wrapper is
commented out at both ends)
- **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts`
- **Breakage check:** `api.getBalance()` is the only app-side consumer and it has
**zero call sites** in either user app (dead code, already logged as DEAD-01/02).
### 2. Order status change is admin-only (SEC-10)
- **What:** moved `@Public()` from the class to the two customer-facing handlers,
leaving `PATCH orders/:id/status` behind `order.list.sts.submit`.
- **Why:** it let an anonymous caller move any order's status **and** attribute
the change to any admin through the DTO's `actorAdminUserId`.
- **Reference:** an admin operation; the admin panel posts to `admin/orders/status`
(`apps/admin-panel/src/api/endpoints.ts:42,48`), so this route had no caller.
- **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts`
- **Still public:** `POST /orders` and `GET /orders/:id`, because the target has
no customer session yet — closed in stage 2.
### 3. `GET /customers` no longer leaks the customer book (SEC-08)
- **What:** added `LOGIN_LOOKUP_SELECT` (`id`, `mobile`, `isActive`,
`isArchived`) and pointed `list()` at it. Removed `fullName`, `nationalCode`,
`goldDebtGrams`, `fiatDebtRial`, `goldCreditLimitGrams`, `verificationStep`,
`cityId`, `referredByAgentId`, `nationalIdImageUrl`, `businessLicenseUrl`,
`shopImageUrl`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt` from that response.
- **Why:** the route is unauthenticated because both apps match the phone number
in the browser, so it shipped every customer's national ID number, debts,
credit limit and identity-document URLs to any visitor.
- **Reference:** login was `POST userAuth` → SMS → `POST userVerfiy`, returning
exactly one customer after the code matched
(`henza_server/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ApiMobileController.php:39-78`).
- **Target:** `apps/api/src/modules/customers/customers.service.ts`,
plus `CustomerSummary` narrowed in **both** apps' `src/api/client.ts`
(parity rule: the same logic change in both).
- **Route survives** until stage 2 replaces the client-side phone match with OTP.
### 4. Test script
- **What:** added `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh` — asserts 401 without a token,
403 with a low-privilege token, and pass-through for a super admin, on every
closed route; plus that the public routes still answer 200 and that
`GET /customers` exposes only the four login fields.
- **Result:** **23 passed, 0 failed** against a live server and the dev seed.
### Not changed
`/uploads` — per ruling T2, uploaded files including identity documents stay
public. The filename check requested alongside it passed with no changes needed
(md5 of time + name + UUID; no directory listing).
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@@ -166,6 +166,67 @@ Run it for the sales expert too.
---
## T1 — Customer authentication: a separate JWT strategy (option **الف**)
Approved. Conditions:
1. **Separate secrets** — customer tokens are signed with `JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET`,
admin tokens with `JWT_SECRET`.
2. **A `typ` claim is checked in both guards** — `typ: 'admin'` vs `typ: 'customer'`.
3. **Mandatory cross-token tests:** a customer token on any admin route → 401;
an admin token on a customer route → rejected, unless deliberately allowed.
4. **Token lifetime and logout must be compared against the reference and
recorded here** (see below).
5. **No IDOR** — customer routes that return personal data derive the customer
from the **token**, never from an id in the request.
### Reference comparison — token lifetime and logout
| Aspect | Reference | Target (current) | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|
| Customer token | `api_token = Str::random(60)`, a random opaque string stored on the customer row (`ApiMobileController.php:60-62`) | none | new customer JWT |
| Expiry | **none** — the reference token never expires; it is reused on every login if already set | admin JWT `JWT_EXPIRES_IN`, default `12h` | customer JWT gets an explicit expiry (deliberate improvement over the reference) |
| Logout | the reference has **no logout endpoint**; the app drops the token client-side | apps clear `localStorage` | keep client-side clear; note that a stolen token stays valid until expiry |
| Rotation | the reference issues a new token **only if `api_token` is null** — logging in twice returns the same token forever | n/a | issue a fresh token on every verify |
The last three rows are **deliberate improvements over the reference**, approved
by the user in the same message that approved D6. Recorded so the matrix does not
later flag them as parity gaps.
## T2 — Uploaded files stay public
**Ruling:** `/uploads` is not touched. No allow-list, no signed URLs, and the
"private folder" stage is dropped.
**Recorded verbatim at the user's request:**
> «فایل‌های آپلودی شامل مدارک عمداً عمومی هستند — تصمیم مالک پروژه»
> (Uploaded files, including identity documents, are deliberately public — the
> project owner's decision.)
### The light check the user asked for — result: ✅ already correct
| Check | Result | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Filenames unguessable? | **Yes.** `md5(Date.now() + originalname + randomUUID())` + the original extension | `src/modules/admin-uploads/admin-uploads.service.ts:53` |
| Sequential or original name on disk? | **No.** `originalName` is kept only as a DB column, never as the filename | `admin-uploads.service.ts:62` |
| Directory listing? | **No.** `PublicUploadsController` only resolves a single `:filename`, and `resolveStoredUpload()` rejects `.`/`..` and anything resolving outside the upload dir | `public-uploads.controller.ts:17`, `upload-path.ts:34-49` |
Nothing to change. No existing files were moved.
## T3 — Two-stage hotfix
Approved, with the condition that `GET /customers` be checked first.
**Check result:** the apps **are** dependent on it. Its only consumer is
`LoginView.vue:131` in both apps, and `CustomerSummary` is used nowhere else
(verified by grep). The fields actually read are `mobile`, `isActive`,
`isArchived`, then `session.login(id, mobile)` — four fields.
So per the ruling: stage 1 strips the sensitive fields and keeps the route; stage
2 removes the route when login moves to OTP.
---
# Urgent investigation results
## `percent` — full trace (D9)
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@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ Severity: `Critical` (money loss / security / data loss) · `High` · `Medium`
| SEC-01 | Critical | REF `henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272` | The whole admin route file is **unauthenticated** — the `Route::middleware('auth:api')->group(...)` wrapper is commented out at both ends, leaving all ~215 admin routes public (incl. `wallet/charge`, `users`, `roles`). | Verified by reading both lines. | n/a in reference (read-only). Drives TGT decision below. |
| SEC-02 | Critical | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7`, `orders/orders.controller.ts:7`, `customers/customers.controller.ts:5`, `catalog/catalog.controller.ts:5`, `pricing/pricing.controller.ts:5` | 15 routes carry `@Public()`, including **ledger writes** (`POST accounting/repayments/*`, `entries/:id/confirm`) and `POST /api/orders` + `PATCH /api/orders/:id/status`. The public status DTO accepts a client-supplied `actorAdminUserId`, so a caller can attribute an action to any admin. | `grep -rn "@Public()"`; source comments say "pre-existing unauthenticated endpoint". | Introduce customer-session auth for the app-facing routes; move ledger/status writes behind the admin guard. **[replicated]** from SEC-01. |
| SEC-03 | Critical | TGT `apps/user-app/src/views/user/LoginView.vue`, `apps/user-app-v2/` same | OTP is **not verified** — any 4-digit code logs the user in. This is a **parity gap**: the reference does verify it (`ApiMobileController.php:51-57`, mismatch → HTTP 422). | `DECISIONS.md` D6 | **FIXING — D6** (plus expiry + attempt limits, which exceed the reference) |
| SEC-08 | Critical | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/customers/customers.service.ts:6-23,44-50` + `customers.controller.ts:10` (`@Public()`) | **Full customer book exposed to anonymous callers.** Login downloads `GET /customers` and matches the phone client-side, so the endpoint returns **every** active customer with `fullName`, `mobile`, **`nationalCode`**, `goldDebtGrams`, `fiatDebtRial`, `goldCreditLimitGrams`, and the URLs of **national-ID / business-licence / shop scans** (and `GET uploads/:filename` is public too, so those URLs resolve). `passwordHash` is correctly excluded. Not possible in the reference, where `userVerfiy` returned **one** customer after the code matched. | Read `customers.service.ts:5-23`; `DECISIONS.md` D8 | Fixed as a side-effect of D6: once OTP verify returns the authenticated customer, take `GET /customers` off the public surface. |
| SEC-09 | Critical | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7` | `@Public()` on the whole accounting controller exposes **5 routes, 4 of them writes**: reconcile a balance, record a gold repayment, record a rial repayment, confirm a ledger entry. Faithful to the reference (whose admin routes were all unauthenticated) but contradicts the confirmed decision D1. | `DECISIONS.md` §"@Public audit" group A | Put behind the admin guard with the matching wallet/document rid — **awaiting user approval** |
| SEC-10 | High | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts:22` | `PATCH orders/:id/status` is public **and** its DTO accepts a client-supplied `actorAdminUserId`, so an anonymous caller can move an order's status and attribute it to any admin. In the reference this was an admin operation. | `DECISIONS.md` §"@Public audit" B3 | Protect with the order-status rid |
| SEC-08 | ~~Critical~~ **MITIGATED — hotfix stage 1** | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/customers/customers.service.ts:6-23,44-50` + `customers.controller.ts:10` (`@Public()`) | **Full customer book exposed to anonymous callers.** Login downloads `GET /customers` and matches the phone client-side, so the endpoint returns **every** active customer with `fullName`, `mobile`, **`nationalCode`**, `goldDebtGrams`, `fiatDebtRial`, `goldCreditLimitGrams`, and the URLs of **national-ID / business-licence / shop scans** (and `GET uploads/:filename` is public too, so those URLs resolve). `passwordHash` is correctly excluded. Not possible in the reference, where `userVerfiy` returned **one** customer after the code matched. | Read `customers.service.ts:5-23`; `DECISIONS.md` D8 | ✅ Stage 1: narrowed to `id`/`mobile`/`isActive`/`isArchived`. National ID, debts, credit limit and document URLs no longer leave the API. Route closes in stage 2 with OTP. |
| SEC-09 | ~~Critical~~ **FIXED — hotfix stage 1** | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7` | `@Public()` on the whole accounting controller exposes **5 routes, 4 of them writes**: reconcile a balance, record a gold repayment, record a rial repayment, confirm a ledger entry. Faithful to the reference (whose admin routes were all unauthenticated) but contradicts the confirmed decision D1. | `DECISIONS.md` §"@Public audit" group A | ✅ Done: rids `wallet.list`, `wallet.charge`, `document.create` ×2, `document.list.confirm`. Verified 401/403/pass-through by `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh`. |
| SEC-10 | ~~High~~ **FIXED — hotfix stage 1** | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts:22` | `PATCH orders/:id/status` is public **and** its DTO accepts a client-supplied `actorAdminUserId`, so an anonymous caller can move an order's status and attribute it to any admin. In the reference this was an admin operation. | `DECISIONS.md` §"@Public audit" B3 | ✅ Done: `order.list.sts.submit`. Had no caller — the admin panel uses `admin/orders/status`. |
| SEC-04 | High | TGT `apps/api` (two files) | `JWT_SECRET` falls back to `'dev-only-insecure-secret'` and is absent from `.env.example`. `enableCors()` is wide open. | Reported by api inventory; see `_inv-tgt-api.md` §11. | Require the env var at boot; restrict CORS origins. |
| SEC-05 | High | TGT `apps/api/prisma/seed.ts` | Seed creates a SUPER_ADMIN (`09128081392`) whose **password equals the phone number**, holding all 144 rids. Marked DEV-ONLY in comments but lives in the normal seed. | `docs/CHANGELOG-PORT-HISTORY.md` §4 documents this as intentional for dev. | Gate behind an explicit env flag so it can never run outside dev. |
| SEC-06 | High | REF `henza_server` | Hardcoded secrets committed to the repo: SMS panel password, PayPing bearer token, Tahesab bearer + IP allowlist, wallet hash pepper (`"yhoenszeaf"`). | See `_inv-ref-server.md` §11.4. | Rotate all of them before any deployment that reuses these credentials. |
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@@ -7,12 +7,27 @@
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| **Phase** | Phase 0 ✅ passed → **Phase 1 starting** |
| **Branch** | `parity/phase-0` (next: `parity/phase-1-admin`) |
| **Status** | Gate passed. Decisions D0–D12 recorded in `DECISIONS.md`. Urgent traces (percent, @Public, login leak) done and delivered. |
| **Next step** | Show the user the `percent` trace + `@Public` list (done), get approval on (a) protecting the 5 ledger routes and (b) the `percent` schema change → then build `01-ADMIN-MATRIX.md` **field-by-field** (D12) |
| **Blocked on** | user approval for: the 5 `@Public` ledger routes (D7), the `percent` column (D9), the D0 migration file (approval required before running) |
| **Last updated** | 2026-09-21 |
| **Phase** | Security hotfix (out-of-band, authorised by D7/T1–T3) — **stage 1 ✅ done**, stage 2 next |
| **Branch** | `parity/security-hotfix` |
| **Status** | Stage 1 complete and tested live: 23/23 smoke assertions pass. Decisions D0–D12 + T1–T3 recorded. |
| **Next step** | Stage 2 — customer JWT (`typ` claim, separate secret) + real OTP + migrate both apps' login; then remove `GET /customers` from the public surface |
| **Blocked on** | nothing for stage 2. Still pending later: D0 migration + `percent` migration must be **shown and approved before running** |
| **Last updated** | 2026-09-22 |
### Security hotfix — stage 1 result
| Route | Was | Now | Rid |
|---|---|---|---|
| `GET accounting/customers/:id/balance` | public | admin | `wallet.list` |
| `POST accounting/customers/:id/reconcile` | public **write** | admin | `wallet.charge` |
| `POST accounting/repayments/gold` | public **write** | admin | `document.create` |
| `POST accounting/repayments/rial` | public **write** | admin | `document.create` |
| `POST accounting/entries/:id/confirm` | public **write** | admin | `document.list.confirm` |
| `PATCH orders/:id/status` | public **write** | admin | `order.list.sts.submit` |
| `GET customers` | 18 fields incl. national ID, debts, doc URLs | 4 fields | still public until stage 2 |
Test: `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh` — **23 passed, 0 failed**.
Typecheck: api ✅ · user-app ✅ · user-app-v2 ✅.
## ⚠️ Read `DECISIONS.md` before doing anything