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feat(admin): birth date on the customer forms; permission saves limited to known rids (PERS-03, SEC-07)

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- PERS-03: «تاریخ تولد» (Jalali DateInput) on the wholesale and retail
  forms, as legacy. The server accepts birth_date or birth_day, refuses
  impossible or future dates, clears on '', and returns both names.
- SEC-07: setRoles stores only rids in ALL_RIDS or their tree parents.
  Anything else is dropped with a warning log, so a tick on a legacy-only
  tree leaf never fails the save.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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s.esmaeili
2026-10-08 16:45:41 +03:30
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 7bb5c2e00f
commit d91dcf197b
6 changed files with 105 additions and 6 deletions
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docs/parity/ISSUES.md
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Severity: `Critical` (money loss / security / data loss) · `High` · `Medium`
| SEC-04 | ~~High~~ **FIXED 2026-10-08** — production (`NODE_ENV=production`) refuses to boot without `JWT_SECRET`; CORS reads `CORS_ORIGINS` (exact origins, comma-separated), blank = allow-all with a boot warning in production. Verified: boot refused with a blank key in production only; a listed origin gets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`, an unlisted one does not. | TGT `apps/api` (two files) | `JWT_SECRET` falls back to `'dev-only-insecure-secret'` and is absent from `.env.example`. `enableCors()` is wide open. | Reported by api inventory; see `_inv-tgt-api.md` §11. | Require the env var at boot; restrict CORS origins. |
| SEC-05 | ~~High~~ **FIXED 2026-10-08** — worse than logged: the app runs the seed once on a fresh database at boot (`bootstrap.ts`), and the WHOLE seed was demo data (sample customers, products, orders, posted debt, and admin accounts with known passwords). Now only roles + permissions run in production; the rest needs `SEED_DEMO_DATA=true`. ⚠ Any deployment that already booted on an empty database has these demo rows and must be checked. | TGT `apps/api/prisma/seed.ts` | Seed creates a SUPER_ADMIN (`09128081392`) whose **password equals the phone number**, holding all 144 rids. Marked DEV-ONLY in comments but lives in the normal seed. | `docs/CHANGELOG-PORT-HISTORY.md` §4 documents this as intentional for dev. | Gate behind an explicit env flag so it can never run outside dev. |
| SEC-06 | High | REF `henza_server` | Hardcoded secrets committed to the repo: SMS panel password, PayPing bearer token, Tahesab bearer + IP allowlist, wallet hash pepper (`"yhoenszeaf"`). | See `_inv-ref-server.md` §11.4. | Rotate all of them before any deployment that reuses these credentials. |
| SEC-07 | Medium | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/admin-customers/admin-customers.service.ts` | `setRoles` stores arbitrary strings as rids with no validation against `ALL_RIDS`. | api inventory §9. | Validate against the rid catalogue. |
| SEC-07 | Medium | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/admin-customers/admin-customers.service.ts` | `setRoles` stores arbitrary strings as rids with no validation against `ALL_RIDS`. | api inventory §9. | Validate against the rid catalogue. ✅ **FIXED 2026-10-08:** `setRoles` stores only rids in ALL_RIDS or their tree parents; anything else is dropped with a warning log, so a tick on a legacy-only tree leaf (e.g. notify.create.single.*, which no route checks) cannot fail the save. Test: admin-users.roles.spec.ts. |
## Customer / person module (found during the user-requested deep check)
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ Severity: `Critical` (money loss / security / data loss) · `High` · `Medium`
| **REL-02** | High | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/sms/sms.service.ts` | D20 removed the rule that a missing SMS credential aborts the boot in production. The server now starts with SMS disabled, so **customers cannot receive a login code** and the failure is only a log line. Deliberate, to keep the delivery unblocked. | D14 (superseded) vs D20 | After the delivery, decide whether to restore a boot check or add a health endpoint that reports SMS readiness. **Eased by D26 (2026-10-05):** the default `relay` driver needs no credentials, so SMS works on a fresh deployment; a gateway refusal is still only a log line. |
| **PERS-01** | Medium | REF `AdminController.php:348` vs TGT `admin-customers.service.ts` `update()` | The reference **discards the submitted mobile on edit** (`$input['mobile'] = $customer->mobile;`), making it immutable once set; the target lets an operator change it. D19 ruled the lock NOT ported, so the target keeps the editable behaviour. Changing a mobile changes the customer's login identity. | `AdminController.php:348`; D19 answer B | If the lock is wanted later, apply it in `update()` and hide/disable the field on the edit form. |
| **PERS-02** | Medium | REF `cities` table vs TGT `City` model | The reference's cities are a **two-level hierarchy** (`parent` + `level`, provinces at level 0) rendered as an `a-tree-select` with provinces **not selectable** (`citiesModel.js:38`). The target flattened this to a nullable `province` **string** and a flat `a-select` on all three Persons forms. Functionally the city is still captured; the province grouping and its tree UI are absent. | `2021_09_18_171700_city_table.php:18-19`; `henza_admin/src/mixins/citiesModel.js:20-48`; `schema.prisma` `model City` | ✅ **FIXED 2026-10-08** (owner: as legacy). `City.parentId` (self relation, Restrict) replaces `province`; migration `20261008170000_city_tree` turns each province label into a parent row («استان …») before dropping the column. Admin pickers are legacy's tree (`CityTreeSelect.vue`: top level with children not selectable); city form/grid have «والد». **Also restored:** legacy `_getP` — a city without its own percent takes its ancestor's (`getCityPercent`); the omde-customer form's city→percent autofill. Import copies legacy parents. Delete refuses a city with children; a parent loop is refused. |
| **PERS-03** | Low — **column added 2026-10-07 (`Customer.birthDate`, 541 legacy dates imported); form field still missing** | REF `bulkCustomer.vue:111`, `singleCustomer.vue:29` vs TGT | The reference collects a **Jalali birth date** on both the wholesale (`birth_date`) and retail (`birth_day`) customer forms via `DateInput`. The target's `Customer` model has no column for it and both forms omit the field. | `henza_admin/.../bulkCustomer.vue:111`; `schema.prisma` `model Customer` (no birth field) | Additive: add a nullable `birthDate` column and the picker, if the owner wants it. |
| **PERS-03** | Low — **column added 2026-10-07 (`Customer.birthDate`, 541 legacy dates imported); form field still missing** | REF `bulkCustomer.vue:111`, `singleCustomer.vue:29` vs TGT | The reference collects a **Jalali birth date** on both the wholesale (`birth_date`) and retail (`birth_day`) customer forms via `DateInput`. The target's `Customer` model has no column for it and both forms omit the field. | `henza_admin/.../bulkCustomer.vue:111`; `schema.prisma` `model Customer` (no birth field) | Additive: add a nullable `birthDate` column and the picker, if the owner wants it. ✅ **FIXED 2026-10-08:** Jalali «تاریخ تولد» (DateInput) on the wholesale (`birth_date`) and retail (`birth_day`) forms; create/update accept either name, refuse impossible/future dates, '' clears; customer rows return both names. |
| **PERF-01** | Low | TGT `admin-customers.service.ts` `listReagents()` | The per-agent gold-sold total runs **one `order.aggregate` per row** inside `Promise.all` — an N+1 on every page of the sales-expert grid. Harmless at the current agent count. | `listReagents()` `rows.map(async ...)` | Replace with a single `groupBy` over the referring agent. |
## Apps — found during the delivery smoke test (2026-09-23)