parity(api,apps): security hotfix stage 2 - real customer sessions, close IDOR

Stage 1 narrowed GET /customers but did not close the leak: the response still
carried every customer id, and /customers/:id, /:id/orders and
/:id/ledger-entries were still public, so the full customer book was still two
requests away. The user caught this. Stage 2 deletes the id-bearing surface.

Customer JWT, separate from the admin one (T1):
  - new src/modules/customer-auth/ with its own passport strategy,
    CustomerJwtGuard, @CustomerAuth() and @CurrentCustomer()
  - signed with JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET, and every token carries typ:'customer'
    which the strategy verifies; both checks are present deliberately
  - customer state re-read per request, so deactivating takes effect at once
  - mirrors the reference's own split: auth:api vs auth('api-customer')

Real OTP (D6), porting ApiMobileController::userAuth/userVerfiy (:39-64):
  - new CustomerOtp table, additive migration, nothing existing touched
  - parity behaviour: rand(1000,9999), active-customer filter, faTOen digit
    normalisation on both number and code, rejection on mismatch
  - approved improvements over the reference: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-minute
    expiry, 5 attempts then lockout, single use, send throttle (60s per
    number, 5/number and 20/IP per 10 min), and no number enumeration

Routes removed, replaced by token-derived equivalents:
  GET customers, customers/:id, /:id/orders, /:id/ledger-entries
    -> GET customer/me, customer/me/orders, customer/me/ledger-entries
No route accepts a customer id any more, so the IDOR is closed structurally
rather than by a check. The admin panel was unaffected (admin/customers-omde/*).

Both apps migrated in the same commit per the v1/v2 parity rule: token-based
session store, Bearer header, 401 -> clear session and route to login, real
two-step OTP login. Each app keeps its own markup and styling; only logic moved.

Tests: auth-smoke.sh extended with the stage-2 assertions, 46 passed 0 failed
against a live server. jest installed dev-only (user-approved) so pnpm test
works for the first time: 7 passed covering faToEn, which moved to its own
digits.ts to be testable without booting Nest. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app and user-app-v2; both apps build.

[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:39-78]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/user-app/src/api/client.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,56 @@
-import type { CreateOrderDto, CustomerBalanceDto } from '@gold-bank/shared-types';
+import type { CreateOrderDto } from '@gold-bank/shared-types';
 
 const BASE = '/api';
+const TOKEN_KEY = 'gold-bank:token';
+
+/**
+ * Called when the API rejects our token. Wired up in main.ts rather than
+ * imported from the store, so this module stays free of a Pinia dependency
+ * (the client is used before Pinia is active during app bootstrap).
+ */
+let onUnauthorized: (() => void) | null = null;
+export function setUnauthorizedHandler(fn: () => void) {
+  onUnauthorized = fn;
+}
+
+/** Thrown for a 401 so callers can tell "session gone" from any other failure. */
+export class UnauthorizedError extends Error {
+  constructor(path: string) {
+    super(`API ${path} rejected the session (401)`);
+    this.name = 'UnauthorizedError';
+  }
+}
+
+function readToken(): string | null {
+  try {
+    return localStorage.getItem(TOKEN_KEY);
+  } catch {
+    // Private mode / blocked storage — treat as logged out rather than throwing.
+    return null;
+  }
+}
 
 async function request<T>(path: string, options?: RequestInit): Promise<T> {
+  const token = readToken();
+
   const res = await fetch(`${BASE}${path}`, {
-    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
     ...options,
+    headers: {
+      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+      // Customer JWT from POST /customer/auth/verify-otp. The API derives the
+      // customer from this, never from an id in the URL.
+      ...(token ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {}),
+      ...options?.headers,
+    },
   });
+
+  if (res.status === 401) {
+    // Expired or revoked: drop the session and send the user to login, so no
+    // stale personal data stays on screen behind a dead token.
+    onUnauthorized?.();
+    throw new UnauthorizedError(path);
+  }
+
   if (!res.ok) {
     const body = await res.text();
     throw new Error(`API ${path} failed (${res.status}): ${body}`);
@@ -85,24 +129,6 @@ export interface LedgerEntrySummary {
   note: string | null;
 }
 
-/**
- * What `GET /customers` returns — the login lookup, and nothing more.
- *
- * It used to carry fullName, national ID, both debts and the credit limit. The
- * route is unauthenticated (the login screen matches the phone number in the
- * browser), so that shipped the whole customer book to any visitor; the API now
- * selects only these four fields. See SEC-08 in docs/parity/ISSUES.md.
- *
- * The route disappears altogether once OTP verify returns the one authenticated
- * customer, the way the reference did it.
- */
-export interface CustomerSummary {
-  id: string;
-  mobile: string;
-  isActive: boolean;
-  isArchived: boolean;
-}
-
 export interface OrderSummary {
   id: string;
   orderNumber: string;
@@ -165,12 +191,37 @@ export interface AdminSlide {
 
 export const api = {
   listProducts: () => request<ProductSummary[]>('/catalog/products'),
-  listCustomers: () => request<CustomerSummary[]>('/customers'),
-  getCustomer: (id: string) => request<CustomerDetail>(`/customers/${id}`),
-  getBalance: (customerId: string) => request<CustomerBalanceDto>(`/accounting/customers/${customerId}/balance`),
-  getLedgerEntries: (customerId: string) => request<LedgerEntrySummary[]>(`/customers/${customerId}/ledger-entries`),
+
+  /**
+   * Step 1 of login — ports henza_server ApiMobileController::userAuth.
+   * Always resolves `{ sent: true }`, even for an unregistered number, so the
+   * endpoint cannot be used to discover which numbers are customers.
+   */
+  requestOtp: (username: string) =>
+    request<{ sent: boolean }>('/customer/auth/request-otp', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      body: JSON.stringify({ username }),
+    }),
+
+  /**
+   * Step 2 — ports ApiMobileController::userVerfiy. The server compares the
+   * code and returns a token plus that one customer. A wrong, expired or
+   * already-used code is a 401.
+   */
+  verifyOtp: (username: string, password: string) =>
+    request<{ token: string; customer: { id: string; mobile: string } }>(
+      '/customer/auth/verify-otp',
+      { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({ username, password }) },
+    ),
+
+  // The three reads below identify the customer by TOKEN. They replaced
+  // /customers/:id, /:id/orders and /:id/ledger-entries, which took the id from
+  // the URL and let anyone read anyone (SEC-08).
+  getMe: () => request<CustomerDetail>('/customer/me'),
+  getMyOrders: () => request<OrderDetail[]>('/customer/me/orders'),
+  getMyLedgerEntries: () => request<LedgerEntrySummary[]>('/customer/me/ledger-entries'),
+
   createOrder: (dto: CreateOrderDto) => request<OrderSummary>('/orders', { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(dto) }),
-  getCustomerOrders: (customerId: string) => request<OrderDetail[]>(`/customers/${customerId}/orders`),
   getLatestGoldPrice: (karatPerMille = 750) => request<GoldPriceQuote>(`/pricing/latest?karatPerMille=${karatPerMille}`),
   /** GET /home/slider — public, no auth. Empty array when the admin hasn't
    *  configured any slides (the caller falls back to a derived hero). */