parity(api,apps): close SEC-02 - orders take the customer from the token
The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger. POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token; the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes that id explicitly, behind the admin guard. GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id route because Nest matches in declaration order. Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered customerId, which is no longer a credential. OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere; one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by NODE_ENV !== 'production'. Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line. Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement; logged rather than changed, per D4. Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api, user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types. [ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Severity: `Critical` (money loss / security / data loss) · `High` · `Medium`
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| ID | Severity | Where | Description | Evidence | Suggested fix |
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| SEC-01 | Critical | REF `henza_server/routes/admin.php:12,272` | The whole admin route file is **unauthenticated** — the `Route::middleware('auth:api')->group(...)` wrapper is commented out at both ends, leaving all ~215 admin routes public (incl. `wallet/charge`, `users`, `roles`). | Verified by reading both lines. | n/a in reference (read-only). Drives TGT decision below. |
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| SEC-02 | Critical | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7`, `orders/orders.controller.ts:7`, `customers/customers.controller.ts:5`, `catalog/catalog.controller.ts:5`, `pricing/pricing.controller.ts:5` | 15 routes carry `@Public()`, including **ledger writes** (`POST accounting/repayments/*`, `entries/:id/confirm`) and `POST /api/orders` + `PATCH /api/orders/:id/status`. The public status DTO accepts a client-supplied `actorAdminUserId`, so a caller can attribute an action to any admin. | `grep -rn "@Public()"`; source comments say "pre-existing unauthenticated endpoint". | Introduce customer-session auth for the app-facing routes; move ledger/status writes behind the admin guard. **[replicated]** from SEC-01. |
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| SEC-02 | ~~Critical~~ **FIXED — hotfix stage 3** | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7`, `orders/orders.controller.ts:7`, `customers/customers.controller.ts:5`, `catalog/catalog.controller.ts:5`, `pricing/pricing.controller.ts:5` | 15 routes carry `@Public()`, including **ledger writes** (`POST accounting/repayments/*`, `entries/:id/confirm`) and `POST /api/orders` + `PATCH /api/orders/:id/status`. The public status DTO accepts a client-supplied `actorAdminUserId`, so a caller can attribute an action to any admin. | `grep -rn "@Public()"`; source comments say "pre-existing unauthenticated endpoint". | ✅ All closed across stages 1-3. Ledger + order-status behind admin rids; customer routes behind the customer JWT; `POST /orders` takes the customer from the token and ignores the body. Only `catalog/products`, `pricing/latest`, `home/slider` and `uploads/:filename` remain public, all by design. |
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| SEC-03 | ~~Critical~~ **FIXED — hotfix stage 2** | TGT `apps/user-app/src/views/user/LoginView.vue`, `apps/user-app-v2/` same | OTP is **not verified** — any 4-digit code logs the user in. This is a **parity gap**: the reference does verify it (`ApiMobileController.php:51-57`, mismatch → HTTP 422). | `DECISIONS.md` D6 | ✅ Real server-side OTP: bcrypt-hashed code, 2-min expiry, 5 attempts, single use, send throttle, no enumeration. Verified end-to-end by `auth-smoke.sh`. |
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| SEC-08 | ~~Critical~~ **FIXED — hotfix stage 2** | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/customers/customers.service.ts:6-23,44-50` + `customers.controller.ts:10` (`@Public()`) | **Full customer book exposed to anonymous callers.** Login downloads `GET /customers` and matches the phone client-side, so the endpoint returns **every** active customer with `fullName`, `mobile`, **`nationalCode`**, `goldDebtGrams`, `fiatDebtRial`, `goldCreditLimitGrams`, and the URLs of **national-ID / business-licence / shop scans** (and `GET uploads/:filename` is public too, so those URLs resolve). `passwordHash` is correctly excluded. Not possible in the reference, where `userVerfiy` returned **one** customer after the code matched. | Read `customers.service.ts:5-23`; `DECISIONS.md` D8 | ✅ Closed. The whole controller is deleted — no route accepts a customer id any more. Reads moved to token-derived `/customer/me*`. Stage 1 had only narrowed the fields, which left the ids and the `:id` routes exposed. |
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| SEC-09 | ~~Critical~~ **FIXED — hotfix stage 1** | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/accounting/accounting.controller.ts:7` | `@Public()` on the whole accounting controller exposes **5 routes, 4 of them writes**: reconcile a balance, record a gold repayment, record a rial repayment, confirm a ledger entry. Faithful to the reference (whose admin routes were all unauthenticated) but contradicts the confirmed decision D1. | `DECISIONS.md` §"@Public audit" group A | ✅ Done: rids `wallet.list`, `wallet.charge`, `document.create` ×2, `document.list.confirm`. Verified 401/403/pass-through by `apps/api/scripts/auth-smoke.sh`. |
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@@ -90,3 +90,10 @@ Severity: `Critical` (money loss / security / data loss) · `High` · `Medium`
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| STUB-02 | TGT `apps/api` | No OTP, no SMS provider, no payment gateway/callbacks, no cron, no websockets. SMS and notifications are DB-persistence only. |
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| STUB-03 | TGT both user apps | All list filtering and "pagination" is **client-side** over one flat `GET /catalog/products`; no server `page`/`limit` params. "Pagination" is a 20-item IntersectionObserver window. |
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| STUB-04 | TGT both user apps | Live price is **pull-on-mount only** (`GET /pricing/latest?karatPerMille=750`) — no socket, no SSE, no polling interval. `quotedAt` renders as a Jalali **date only**, so a stale rate looks current. |
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## Found during the stage-3 OTP audit
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| ID | Severity | Where | Description | Evidence | Status |
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| SEC-11 | High | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/customer-auth/customer-auth.service.ts` (deliver) | The OTP message text, **code included**, was persisted to `SmsMessage.body`, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text searches (`admin-misc.service.ts:135-136`). Any operator holding the `sms` rid could read live codes — defeating the bcrypt hashing of `codeHash`. | Read both files; grid `allowed` includes `body`. | ✅ Fixed in stage 3: the persisted row is a redacted audit line. |
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| MON-08 | Medium | TGT `apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.service.ts:40-52` | `wagePercent`, `discountPercent` and `flatRialCharge` are taken from the **client** on order creation, so a caller can set their own making charge. `rashWeightGrams` is correctly read from the variant. **The reference is worse** — `ApiMobileController.php:538-539,619` takes `rash_weight` from the client too — so this is a partial improvement already. Reported per the user's instruction to flag client-supplied pricing. | REF `:536-545,615-632` vs TGT `:40-52` | Log only (D4). Fix in Phase 2 alongside the price-formula work. |
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