parity(api,apps): close SEC-02 - orders take the customer from the token

The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders
with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's
account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger.

POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the
customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token;
the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays
optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating
while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is
unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes
that id explicitly, behind the admin guard.

GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both
return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the
new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id
route because Nest matches in declaration order.

Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered
customerId, which is no longer a credential.

OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere;
one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is
wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by
NODE_ENV !== 'production'.

Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code
included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text
searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the
hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line.

Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken
from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes
rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement;
logged rather than changed, per D4.

Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body
customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types.

[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.service.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Injectable, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Injectable, Logger, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { OrderChannel, OrderStatus, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
 import { PrismaService } from '../../prisma/prisma.service';
 import { CatalogService } from '../catalog/catalog.service';
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ interface ComputedItem {
 
 @Injectable()
 export class OrdersService {
+  private readonly logger = new Logger(OrdersService.name);
+
   constructor(
     private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
     private readonly catalog: CatalogService,
@@ -29,9 +31,24 @@ export class OrdersService {
    * mirrors legacy ApiMobileController::setOrder. Debt is NOT posted here —
    * only once the order reaches DELIVERED_TO_AGENT (see updateStatus).
    */
-  async createOrder(dto: CreateOrderDto) {
-    const customer = await this.prisma.customer.findUnique({ where: { id: dto.customerId } });
-    if (!customer) throw new NotFoundException(`Customer ${dto.customerId} not found`);
+  /**
+   * @param customerId taken from the caller's token by the controller, NEVER
+   *   from the request body. The body's `customerId` is ignored; see the note
+   *   on CreateOrderDto.
+   */
+  async createOrder(dto: CreateOrderDto, customerId: string) {
+    const customer = await this.prisma.customer.findUnique({ where: { id: customerId } });
+    if (!customer) throw new NotFoundException(`Customer ${customerId} not found`);
+
+    // The apps still send customerId in the body (removed from them in Phase 2).
+    // It is not used for anything; a mismatch means either a stale client or an
+    // attempt to order on someone else's account, and both are worth seeing.
+    if (dto.customerId && dto.customerId !== customerId) {
+      this.logger.warn(
+        `Order body carried customerId=${dto.customerId} but the token is ${customerId}; ` +
+          `the token wins.`,
+      );
+    }
 
     const computedItems: ComputedItem[] = await Promise.all(
       dto.items.map(async (item) => {
@@ -78,7 +95,7 @@ export class OrdersService {
       const order = await tx.order.create({
         data: {
           orderNumber: this.generateOrderNumber(),
-          customerId: dto.customerId,
+          customerId,
           branchId: dto.branchId,
           channel: dto.channel ?? OrderChannel.RETAIL,
           status: initialStatus,
@@ -138,6 +155,7 @@ export class OrdersService {
     });
   }
 
+  /** Unscoped read. Only reachable from the admin-guarded route. */
   getById(orderId: string) {
     return this.prisma.order.findUnique({
       where: { id: orderId },
@@ -145,6 +163,22 @@ export class OrdersService {
     });
   }
 
+  /**
+   * A customer reading one of their own orders.
+   *
+   * Someone else's order is reported as 404, not 403: a 403 would confirm the
+   * id exists, which is the same enumeration leak the id-addressed customer
+   * routes had.
+   */
+  async getOwnedById(orderId: string, customerId: string) {
+    const order = await this.prisma.order.findFirst({
+      where: { id: orderId, customerId },
+      include: { items: true, statusEvents: true, ledgerEntries: true },
+    });
+    if (!order) throw new NotFoundException('سفارش یافت نشد');
+    return order;
+  }
+
   private generateOrderNumber(): string {
     const random = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8).toUpperCase();
     return `ORD-${Date.now()}-${random}`;