parity(api,apps): close SEC-02 - orders take the customer from the token

The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders
with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's
account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger.

POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the
customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token;
the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays
optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating
while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is
unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes
that id explicitly, behind the admin guard.

GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both
return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the
new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id
route because Nest matches in declaration order.

Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered
customerId, which is no longer a credential.

OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere;
one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is
wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by
NODE_ENV !== 'production'.

Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code
included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text
searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the
hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line.

Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken
from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes
rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement;
logged rather than changed, per D4.

Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body
customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types.

[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/api/src/modules/orders/orders.controller.ts

@@ -2,40 +2,59 @@ import { Body, Controller, Get, Param, Patch, Post } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { OrdersService } from './orders.service';
 import { CreateOrderDto } from './dto/create-order.dto';
 import { UpdateOrderStatusDto } from './dto/update-order-status.dto';
-import { Public, RequirePermission } from '../auth/guards';
+import { RequirePermission } from '../auth/guards';
+import { CurrentCustomer, CustomerAuth } from '../customer-auth/customer.guards';
+import type { AuthenticatedCustomer } from '../customer-auth/customer-jwt.strategy';
 
 /**
- * Customer-facing order routes.
+ * Order routes.
  *
- * POST / and GET /:id stay `@Public()` for now: the target has no customer
- * session yet, so the customer id travels in the request body. The reference
- * derived it from the `api-customer` guard instead
- * (henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533 reads `auth()->id()`), which is what
- * stage 2 of the security hotfix restores. Tracked as SEC-02 / B1-B2 in
- * docs/parity/ISSUES.md.
- *
- * PATCH /:id/status was public too, which was worse in kind: it let an
- * anonymous caller move any order's status AND attribute the change to any
- * admin via the DTO's actorAdminUserId. It is an admin operation in the
- * reference, it had no caller in this repo (the admin panel posts to
- * admin/orders/status instead), so it is now behind the order-status rid.
+ * All three were `@Public()` until the security hotfix. The reference's
+ * customer-facing order endpoints sat behind its `api-customer` guard and read
+ * the customer from the token (`auth()->id()`,
+ * henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533); the target had no customer session
+ * at the time, so the id travelled in the body and the server trusted it.
+ * That meant an anonymous caller could place an order on anyone's account —
+ * and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger. Now that the
+ * customer token exists, the reference's arrangement is restored.
  */
 @Controller('orders')
 export class OrdersController {
   constructor(private readonly orders: OrdersService) {}
 
-  @Public()
+  /** The customer comes from the token; the body's `customerId` is ignored. */
+  @CustomerAuth()
   @Post()
-  create(@Body() dto: CreateOrderDto) {
-    return this.orders.createOrder(dto);
+  create(@Body() dto: CreateOrderDto, @CurrentCustomer() me: AuthenticatedCustomer) {
+    return this.orders.createOrder(dto, me.id);
   }
 
-  @Public()
-  @Get(':id')
-  get(@Param('id') id: string) {
+  /**
+   * Unscoped read for operators.
+   *
+   * Declared BEFORE the `:id` route below: Nest matches in declaration order,
+   * so a literal segment that could also be read as a parameter has to come
+   * first or it is never reached.
+   */
+  @Get('admin/:id')
+  @RequirePermission('order.list')
+  getAsAdmin(@Param('id') id: string) {
     return this.orders.getById(id);
   }
 
+  /**
+   * A customer reading one of their own orders. Scoped by token; someone
+   * else's order is a 404 rather than a 403, so ids stay unenumerable.
+   *
+   * Mounted under /orders/:id (not /customer/me/orders/:id) so the existing
+   * client paths keep working; it is the scoping that matters, not the shape.
+   */
+  @CustomerAuth()
+  @Get(':id')
+  get(@Param('id') id: string, @CurrentCustomer() me: AuthenticatedCustomer) {
+    return this.orders.getOwnedById(id, me.id);
+  }
+
   @Patch(':id/status')
   @RequirePermission('order.list.sts.submit')
   updateStatus(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() dto: UpdateOrderStatusDto) {