parity(api,apps): close SEC-02 - orders take the customer from the token

The user declined to defer this to Phase 2, correctly: a public POST /orders
with customerId in the body let anyone place an order on any customer's
account, and an order lands on that customer's gold debt and ledger.

POST /orders is now behind CustomerAuth. OrdersService.createOrder takes the
customer id as a separate argument that the controller fills from the token;
the body's customerId is ignored and a mismatch is logged. The field stays
optional in the DTO and in shared-types only so both apps keep validating
while they still send it -- they drop it in Phase 2. The admin builder is
unaffected: it legitimately places orders for a chosen customer and passes
that id explicitly, behind the admin guard.

GET /orders/:id is scoped to the owner. A foreign or nonexistent id both
return 404, never 403, so ids stay unenumerable. Operators read through the
new GET /orders/admin/:id behind rid order.list, declared before the :id
route because Nest matches in declaration order.

Both apps' CartView now gates on session.isLoggedIn rather than a remembered
customerId, which is no longer a credential.

OTP audit (requested): no master code, no bypass, no hardcoded code anywhere;
one code path issues a token and only after bcrypt.compare. No SMS provider is
wired up -- in development the code is logged once, guarded by
NODE_ENV !== 'production'.

Fixed while auditing (SEC-11): deliver() persisted the real message text, code
included, into SmsMessage.body, which the admin SMS grid lists and full-text
searches. Any operator with the sms rid could read live codes, defeating the
hashing of codeHash. The stored row is now a redacted audit line.

Also logged MON-08: wagePercent/discountPercent/flatRialCharge are still taken
from the client on order creation. The reference is worse -- it takes
rash_weight from the client too -- so this is already a partial improvement;
logged rather than changed, per D4.

Tests: auth-smoke.sh now 53 passed, 0 failed, including a spoofed body
customerId being ignored in favour of the token. Typecheck clean on api,
user-app, user-app-v2 and shared-types.

[ref: henza_server ApiMobileController.php:533,536-545,615-632]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/api/src/modules/orders/dto/create-order.dto.ts

@@ -25,8 +25,20 @@ export class CreateOrderItemInputDto {
 }
 
 export class CreateOrderDto {
+  /**
+   * IGNORED BY THE SERVER. The customer is taken from the caller's token.
+   *
+   * It was required, and the route was public, so anyone could place an order
+   * on any customer's account — which lands on their gold debt and their
+   * ledger. Logged as SEC-02 in docs/parity/ISSUES.md.
+   *
+   * Kept as an optional field only so the two apps, which still send it, do not
+   * fail validation mid-flight. OrdersService logs a mismatch and always uses
+   * the token. Removed from the DTO and from both apps in Phase 2.
+   */
+  @IsOptional()
   @IsString()
-  customerId!: string;
+  customerId?: string;
 
   @IsOptional()
   @IsString()