118 lines
5.3 KiB
Bash
118 lines
5.3 KiB
Bash
# Database configuration
|
|
POSTGRES_USER=postgres
|
|
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres
|
|
POSTGRES_DB=goldbank
|
|
|
|
# Host port exposed for PostgreSQL (used by docker-compose db service)
|
|
EXTERNAL_DB_PORT=5432
|
|
|
|
# Prisma connection string (inside Docker network use hostname "db")
|
|
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://${POSTGRES_USER}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@db:5432/${POSTGRES_DB}?schema=public
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Dev server ports — SINGLE SOURCE OF TRUTH for this monorepo.
|
|
# Every app's dev script/config reads its port from here. Do not hardcode a
|
|
# port anywhere else. strictPort is enabled everywhere: if a port below is
|
|
# already taken, the dev server fails with a clear error instead of silently
|
|
# picking another port.
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
API_PORT=3000
|
|
ADMIN_PANEL_PORT=5180
|
|
USER_APP_PORT=5181
|
|
USER_APP_V2_PORT=5182
|
|
|
|
# API Configuration (kept for any tooling that still reads bare PORT)
|
|
PORT=3000
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Authentication
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Admin JWT signing secret. REQUIRED in any real deployment — without it the
|
|
# API falls back to a well-known development string.
|
|
JWT_SECRET=
|
|
# Admin token lifetime (default 12h).
|
|
JWT_EXPIRES_IN=
|
|
# Customer JWT signing secret. Deliberately SEPARATE from JWT_SECRET so an
|
|
# admin token can never validate as a customer token (T1).
|
|
JWT_CUSTOMER_SECRET=
|
|
# Customer token lifetime (default 30d).
|
|
JWT_CUSTOMER_EXPIRES_IN=
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Central IAM — delegated admin login (docs/iam-sso.md)
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# OFF by default. When off, nothing changes: admin login stays a local bcrypt
|
|
# check and no request ever leaves this server.
|
|
#
|
|
# When on, the admin's phone + password are verified against the central
|
|
# identity service instead. There is NO UI change: no SSO button, no redirect.
|
|
# If the identity service is unreachable or does not know the account, the
|
|
# local password check still runs (see IAM_LOGIN_DELEGATION).
|
|
IAM_ENABLED=false
|
|
IAM_ISSUER=
|
|
# The client must be registered there as confidential AND trusted.
|
|
IAM_CLIENT_ID=
|
|
IAM_CLIENT_SECRET=
|
|
# One of the two; tenant_id wins when both are set.
|
|
IAM_TENANT_ID=
|
|
IAM_TENANT_SLUG=
|
|
# off | fallback (default, safest) | exclusive (local password no longer accepted)
|
|
IAM_LOGIN_DELEGATION=fallback
|
|
IAM_HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS=8000
|
|
|
|
# Revocable admin sessions (AdminSession table).
|
|
#
|
|
# An admin token is self-contained and lives for JWT_EXPIRES_IN (12h), so until
|
|
# this existed nothing could end a session early — not disabling the account, not
|
|
# a central sign-out. Every issued token now carries a `jti` recorded in the
|
|
# database, and a revoked row is refused on the next request.
|
|
#
|
|
# Unset = follows IAM_ENABLED (on with the IAM, so central revocation reaches
|
|
# here). `true` turns it on without the IAM; `false` opts out of the per-request
|
|
# lookup and central revocation then cannot end a session here.
|
|
AUTH_SESSION_TRACKING=
|
|
|
|
# To let the IAM end sessions here, register this path on the client there as its
|
|
# backchannel_logout_uri:
|
|
# https://<api-host>/api/iam/backchannel-logout
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# ⚠ DELIVERY ONLY — REMOVE BEFORE THE REAL RELEASE (D20 / ISSUES REL-01)
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# A fixed OTP that signs in ANY active customer, alongside the real code.
|
|
# MUST BE EXACTLY 4 DIGITS: the apps' login box has four single-character
|
|
# inputs and only submits at four (LoginView.vue:43). A longer code still works
|
|
# over the API but cannot be typed into either app.
|
|
# Leave it EMPTY or unset to disable it completely — that is the correct state
|
|
# for production. While it is set, the API prints a warning banner at boot.
|
|
OTP_MASTER_CODE=
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# SMS gateway (Trez). Leave blank to disable sending: the server still boots,
|
|
# messages are logged instead of sent, and customers cannot receive a login
|
|
# code (D20). Never commit real values.
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# "trez" (default) or "none" to disable explicitly.
|
|
SMS_PROVIDER=
|
|
# Override only for staging; defaults to the provider's live endpoint.
|
|
SMS_TREZ_URL=
|
|
SMS_TREZ_USERNAME=
|
|
SMS_TREZ_PASSWORD=
|
|
SMS_TREZ_SENDER_LINE=
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Uploads
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Absolute path for uploaded files; defaults to <api>/storage/uploads.
|
|
UPLOAD_DIR=
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Profile completion ("تکمیل پروفایل")
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Comma-separated admin mobiles told when a customer uploads their documents.
|
|
# The reference hardcoded four numbers in its source
|
|
# (henza_server Major/CustomerController::sendSmsToAdmin); they live here
|
|
# instead so no personal number is committed. Blank means nobody is notified —
|
|
# the upload and the customer's own SMS still go through (D20).
|
|
PROFILE_ADMIN_MOBILES=
|